US embassy cable - 04ROME2489

C O N F I D E N T I A L  ROME 002489 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/25/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PARM, PHUM, ETTC, EU, CH, IT, HUMAN RIGHTS 
SUBJECT: ITALY - EU ARMS EMBARGO ON CHINA 
 
REF: STATE 137493 
 
Classified By: DCM Emil Skodon for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d). 
 
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Summary 
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1. (C)  We raised reftel points with senior Italian officials 
at meetings on June 23, 24 and 25.  They acknowledged that 
there may be a gradually emerging EU consensus on lifting the 
EU China Arms Embargo, but said that there is no deadline and 
that the EU does not want to signal to Beijing that the EU is 
satisfied with the human rights situation.  Our interlocutors 
insisted, however, that there has been some improvement in 
the human rights situation in China and said a reinforced 
code of conduct could serve as a continued brake on arms 
deliveries.  The Italians argued that since the embargo is 
applied strictly on the basis of human rights concerns, USG 
arguments that emphasize strategic considerations are not 
directly relevant.  They also claimed that lifting the 
embargo would not result in a flood of EU arms sales to 
China.  We carried out the demarche after contacting the 
Japanese Embassy which, after checking with Tokyo, was 
directed by the GOJ not to join in the demarche.  End Summary. 
 
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Export Control Talks 
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2. (C)  At a June 23 day-long bilateral meeting on export 
controls hosted by the Italian Foreign Ministry and including 
senior Ministry of Defense officials, PM/DDTC Managing 
Director Turk Maggi and Embassy's Econ Minister-Counselor 
stressed US concerns about any EU move to lift its arms 
embargo on China.  Their points tracked closely with those in 
reftel.  (Septel reports on the export control meeting.) 
 
3. (C)  MFA Export Control Coordinator Minister Carlo Tripepi 
(who chaired the bilateral meeting) argued that it was 
important for the USG to understand that the EU arms embargo 
was applied strictly on the basis of human rights concerns. 
He claimed that USG arguments emphasizing strategic 
considerations were, therefore, not directly relevant to the 
EU embargo.  Maggi responded that the USG position on the 
embargo was also linked to human rights; China has not taken 
sufficient steps to merit its lifting.  Tripepi emphasized 
that lifting the embargo would be a "political decision" and 
would not mean that the spigot on EU arms sales to China 
would be turned on fully.  Tripepi suggested that China has 
demonstrated a willingness to lean forward in improving its 
own behavior on export controls, adding that China has 
expressed an interest in improving cooperation within the 
context of Wassenaar, is a member of the NSG, and has 
indicated that it wants to improve cooperation with the 
Australia Group. 
 
4. (C)  Counselor Diego Ungaro, who directs the MFA office 
responsible for defense industrial issues, said that, with 
regard to China, the intricacy of the relationship between 
export controls and industrial cooperation argues for 
controlling the transfer of sensitive technology on a 
case-by-case basis.  He described the EU-China defense 
industrial relationship as one that cuts across many sectors 
and said he favored a close scrutiny of specific programs to 
guard against the transfer of critical technologies.  Ungaro 
recognized that there was a direct relationship between 
growing defense industrial cooperation with China and the 
need to have robust controls on technology transfer.  An MoD 
official assured Maggi that his ministry has a voice in 
export control decision making, but noted that the EU arms 
embargo was limited in scope because it only covers certain 
items on Italy's national munitions list primarily related to 
internal security.  He argued that lifting the embargo will 
not open the floodgates on Italy's arms exports. 
 
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Follow-up Demarches 
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5. (C)  Embassy officer followed up on the 24th with MFA 
China Desk Officer Gianluca Grandi, who had attended the 
meeting on the 23rd, to reiterate reftel points.  Grandi 
confirmed that there was a growing consensus within the EU in 
favor of lifting the embargo.  He said, however, that no 
deadline for doing so had been established and noted that 
Italy's openness to lifting the embargo was shared by "a 
majority" of its EU partners.  Pressed on whether it was a 
question of six months, a year, or more, he was noncommittal. 
 (Note: The Japanese Embassy here said the GOJ had been 
assured by the EU that no action on this issue would be taken 
 
 
under the Dutch Presidency.)  Grandi asserted that any shift 
in the EU's arms trade relationship with China would be 
accompanied by a reinforcement of the EU Code of Conduct, and 
that the CoC might even be made legally binding.  He said 
that Italy is aware that the human rights situation in China 
is not satisfactory, but argued that some progress has been 
made, noting that the Chinese constitution now includes a 
provision on protecting human rights.  Lifting the embargo 
would provide an incentive to make further progress, he 
argued. 
 
6. (C)  Poloff also raised reftel points in a June 25 meeting 
with MFA Director for EU CFSP Luigi Mattiolo.  Mattiolo said 
that the latest Council conclusions contained no clear or 
fixed end point for debates on lifting the embargo, a signal 
that the EU is far from consensus on this issue and that the 
embargo will "not be lifted anytime soon."  He claimed that, 
rather than working around a fixed date, the EU is 
considering the embargo "within the overall framework of 
relations with China."  Mattiolo acknowledged that the EU 
will have to agree on more definitive language during the 
Dutch Presidency to ensure that the December 8 China-EU 
Summit is not hijacked by that single issue.  At this time, 
however, the EU does not want to give a signal to Beijing 
that the EU is satisfied with the human rights situation in 
China or that there is building consensus towards lifting the 
ban.  Mattiolo said that the EU is working concomitantly to 
review the CoC on weapons sales.  Unlike Grandi, he admitted 
that it was unlikely that the CoC would evolve from a 
politically binding to a more legally binding agreement. 
 
7. (C)  Mattiolo agreed to discuss our request for an 
evaluation of China's human rights situation with the MFA's 
Human Rights Directorate.  He also thanked us for the 
heads-up that the issue would be raised during the US-EU 
Summit, and mentioned specifically USEU DCM Foster's detailed 
briefing to EU DG Cooper as tremendously useful in helping 
the EU prepare discussion points for the Summit. 
 
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Japanese Embassy 
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8. (C)  Prior to demarching the MFA, we conveyed reftel 
points to the Japanese Embassy in Rome and explored the 
possibility of delivering a joint demarche.  Political 
Counselor Yoshi Hoshino contacted Tokyo for guidance and was 
advised that, although Japan shares US concerns and wishes to 
collaborate closely on China issues, he was not to deliver a 
joint demarche.  Hoshino stated that at the recent EU-Japan 
Summit, Deputy FM Tanaka demarched the EU on the arms embargo 
and that the EU understands Japanese concerns and has given 
the GOJ assurances that no decision to lift the embargo will 
be made under the Dutch Presidency.  (Note: No such 
assurances were provided to us by our Italian interlocutors.) 
 Although the Japanese feel this is not the appropriate time 
to deliver a joint demarche since "it could risk jeopardizing 
a harmonious Japan-EU-US approach towards China", Hoshino 
assured us that the GOJ intends to deliver demarches on the 
arms embargo in the near future. 
 
9. (U) Mr. Maggi did not have an opportunity to clear this 
message. 
 
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	2004ROME02489 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL