US embassy cable - 04MADRID2416

Disclaimer: This site has been first put up 15 years ago. Since then I would probably do a couple things differently, but because I've noticed this site had been linked from news outlets, PhD theses and peer rewieved papers and because I really hate the concept of "digital dark age" I've decided to put it back up. There's no chance it can produce any harm now.

SPANISH RESPONSE: MAINTAINING THE EU ARMS EMBARGO ON CHINA

Identifier: 04MADRID2416
Wikileaks: View 04MADRID2416 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Madrid
Created: 2004-06-25 15:44:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL PGOV MARR CH TW SP EUN Central
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L MADRID 002416 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/24/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, MARR, CH, TW, SP, EUN, Central/East Asia 
SUBJECT: SPANISH RESPONSE: MAINTAINING THE EU ARMS EMBARGO 
ON CHINA 
 
REF: STATE 137493 
 
Classified By: Kathleen Fitzpatrick, Political Counselor, for Reasons 1 
.4 (b) and (d) 
 
1. (C) Summary:  Spain continues to say that they believe the 
human rights situation in China is improving and that the EU 
arms embargo no longer makes sense. (Note: In our various 
approaches to senior levels of the previous government, we 
received a similar response.) Spain believes that it is 
important for the EU to send a positive signal to China, 
given the importance of the growing commercial interests 
between the two, and doubts that any actual arms sales will 
take place due to EU Code of Conduct restrictions.  While the 
GOS says that no date has been set, our interlocutors 
acknowledge that some in the EU would like the lifting of the 
embargo to take place this December.  Regarding the threat 
posed by sales of advanced arms to China, the GOS places the 
blame for tensions in the region on Taiwan.  Embassy 
delivered the demarche solo, as after agreement to deliver 
the demarche jointly with our Japanese colleagues, the 
Japanese embassy in Madrid later received instructions from 
the Japanese MFA not to accom 
pany us. 
 
2. (C) We delivered reftel demarche on June 25 to Enrique 
Mora, Director of the MFA's Office of EU Foreign Policy and 
Common Security.  DCM is reinforcing our concerns with Deputy 
Foreign Minister Bernadino Leon.  We had initially reached an 
agreement with the Japanese Political Counselor in Madrid, 
Kyoko Koga, to deliver the demarche jointly.  However, when 
Ms. Koga contacted her MFA superiors in Tokyo, she was told 
that they had just received our talking points that morning 
in Japan, and that after studying the document, they were 
declining to accompany us on the demarche. 
 
3. (C) Mora stated that Spain continues to disagree with us 
on the trend in human rights in China, as they view the 
situation as improving.  He said that maintaining the arms 
embargo had become "ridiculous" and that China did not belong 
in the league of other countries that the EU denies arms 
sales (Haiti, Sudan, etc.).  He noted that the EU was now the 
largest trading partner with China, surpassing the US and 
Japan, and that the EU needed to send a positive signal to 
China in order to keep building their "strategic 
relationship".  Mora acknowledged that some EU countries were 
pushing to announce the lifting of the embargo at the 
December EU-China summit, but said that no date had been 
fixed.  He added that some EU states, such as Denmark, may 
want to make the lifting of the embargo subject to certain 
conditions, such as the release of political prisoners or 
decreasing the use of the death penalty. 
 
4. (C) When we pressed on the threat posed by sales of 
advanced weaponry to China, especially given past Chinese 
actions, threats and posturing, Mora blamed Taiwan, replying 
that the situation "only heats up when the Taiwanese heat it 
up".  He compared Chinese remarks and posturing to Spain's 
position over Gibraltar (though when we made the comparison 
that Spain does not practice invasions of Gibraltar or 
conduct missile tests in the area, he agreed that Chinese 
behavior was different).  We also noted Chinese territorial 
and maritime claims against Japan, Vietnam and the 
Philippines, to which Mora acknowledged that the situation 
was more than just about Taiwan. 
 
5. (C) Mora stressed Spain's continuing belief that the EU 
Code of Conduct would prohibit any actual arms sales to 
China, and noted Russia as an example.  He said that the 
lifting of the embargo would only be symbolic, but that the 
symbolism was important to improve relations with China and 
that bringing China into the world community would increase 
security. 
 
6. (C) Mora acknowledged our offer to provide intelligence 
briefings on trends in PRC military modernization, but did 
not express an interest in receiving the briefings, saying 
only that he would pass the offer along. 
ARGYROS 

Latest source of this page is cablebrowser-2, released 2011-10-04