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| Identifier: | 04MADRID2416 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 04MADRID2416 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Madrid |
| Created: | 2004-06-25 15:44:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | PREL PGOV MARR CH TW SP EUN Central |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L MADRID 002416 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/24/2014 TAGS: PREL, PGOV, MARR, CH, TW, SP, EUN, Central/East Asia SUBJECT: SPANISH RESPONSE: MAINTAINING THE EU ARMS EMBARGO ON CHINA REF: STATE 137493 Classified By: Kathleen Fitzpatrick, Political Counselor, for Reasons 1 .4 (b) and (d) 1. (C) Summary: Spain continues to say that they believe the human rights situation in China is improving and that the EU arms embargo no longer makes sense. (Note: In our various approaches to senior levels of the previous government, we received a similar response.) Spain believes that it is important for the EU to send a positive signal to China, given the importance of the growing commercial interests between the two, and doubts that any actual arms sales will take place due to EU Code of Conduct restrictions. While the GOS says that no date has been set, our interlocutors acknowledge that some in the EU would like the lifting of the embargo to take place this December. Regarding the threat posed by sales of advanced arms to China, the GOS places the blame for tensions in the region on Taiwan. Embassy delivered the demarche solo, as after agreement to deliver the demarche jointly with our Japanese colleagues, the Japanese embassy in Madrid later received instructions from the Japanese MFA not to accom pany us. 2. (C) We delivered reftel demarche on June 25 to Enrique Mora, Director of the MFA's Office of EU Foreign Policy and Common Security. DCM is reinforcing our concerns with Deputy Foreign Minister Bernadino Leon. We had initially reached an agreement with the Japanese Political Counselor in Madrid, Kyoko Koga, to deliver the demarche jointly. However, when Ms. Koga contacted her MFA superiors in Tokyo, she was told that they had just received our talking points that morning in Japan, and that after studying the document, they were declining to accompany us on the demarche. 3. (C) Mora stated that Spain continues to disagree with us on the trend in human rights in China, as they view the situation as improving. He said that maintaining the arms embargo had become "ridiculous" and that China did not belong in the league of other countries that the EU denies arms sales (Haiti, Sudan, etc.). He noted that the EU was now the largest trading partner with China, surpassing the US and Japan, and that the EU needed to send a positive signal to China in order to keep building their "strategic relationship". Mora acknowledged that some EU countries were pushing to announce the lifting of the embargo at the December EU-China summit, but said that no date had been fixed. He added that some EU states, such as Denmark, may want to make the lifting of the embargo subject to certain conditions, such as the release of political prisoners or decreasing the use of the death penalty. 4. (C) When we pressed on the threat posed by sales of advanced weaponry to China, especially given past Chinese actions, threats and posturing, Mora blamed Taiwan, replying that the situation "only heats up when the Taiwanese heat it up". He compared Chinese remarks and posturing to Spain's position over Gibraltar (though when we made the comparison that Spain does not practice invasions of Gibraltar or conduct missile tests in the area, he agreed that Chinese behavior was different). We also noted Chinese territorial and maritime claims against Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines, to which Mora acknowledged that the situation was more than just about Taiwan. 5. (C) Mora stressed Spain's continuing belief that the EU Code of Conduct would prohibit any actual arms sales to China, and noted Russia as an example. He said that the lifting of the embargo would only be symbolic, but that the symbolism was important to improve relations with China and that bringing China into the world community would increase security. 6. (C) Mora acknowledged our offer to provide intelligence briefings on trends in PRC military modernization, but did not express an interest in receiving the briefings, saying only that he would pass the offer along. ARGYROS
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