US embassy cable - 04CARACAS2081

C O N F I D E N T I A L  CARACAS 002081 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
NSC FOR CBARTON 
USCINCSO ALSO FOR POLAD 
STATE PASS USAID FOR DCHA/OTI 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/21/2014 
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, KDEM, VE 
SUBJECT: CHAVEZ V. CHAVEZ:  WHAT'S HIS PLAN? 
 
Classified By: Mark Wells, A/PolCouns, for Reasons 1.4(b) and (d). 
 
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Summary 
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1. (C) President Hugo Chavez is in full campaign mode for the 
August 15 referendum on whether he should finish his term. 
Smarting from the moral defeat of having to accept the 
referendum, Chavez has recast the referendum as an inevitable 
victory for his revolution.  His strategy rests on mobilizing 
lower class voters who have historically abstained from 
elections.  Chavez is beefing up spending in his "mission" 
social programs and registering poor voters via a massive 
identity card drive.  On the darker side, the GOV continues 
to harass opposition figures with flimsy criminal indictments 
and some detentions.  Failing that, there is a bag of dirty 
tricks from which Chavez can draw to manipulate the electoral 
process.  The campaign's best asset, of course, is Chavez 
himself, who remains a formidable communicator.  End summary. 
 
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Turning Defeat Into Victory 
--------------------------- 
 
2. (C) President Hugo Chavez was politically damaged by the 
convocation of the recall referendum against him, currently 
planned for August 15.  After vowing to his followers for 
more than a year that there would not be a referendum, Chavez 
surprised many by accepting the results of the signature 
drive mounted by the opposition to force the recall vote. 
Venezuela is thick with speculation over the fallout of 
Chavez's decision has had on his movement.  Though some stars 
have fallen -- most notably those of the previous campaign 
committee Comando Ayacucho -- Chavez has already regrouped 
and re-launched his campaign under the direction of the 
"Comando Maisanta."  (Chavez also called for one hundred 
thousand "electoral patrols" of citizens who will get out the 
vote.)  Chavez claimed that the mere calling of a referendum 
provided for by his own Bolivarian Constitution is a victory 
for the participatory democracy espoused by his revolution. 
 
3. (C) Fifth Republic Movement (MVR) Deputy Juan Barreto, 
himself a director in Comando Ayacucho, told poloff June 17 
that Chavez is in full charge of the referendum campaign and 
is confident of a 65-35 percent defeat of the opposition at 
the polls.  Barreto claimed, most unconvincingly, that the 
opposition had actually failed to obtain enough signatures to 
activate the referendum, and Chavez had given the National 
Electoral Council (CNE) the go-ahead to approve the 
referendum in order to deal a final blow to his political 
opponents.  Barreto dismissed allegations that Chavismo is in 
disarray, though admitted that military supporters had 
opposed going to the referendum.  Barreto said the Comando 
Maisanta is a front organization to put new faces out to the 
public, but asserted that Ayacucho political operatives 
(officials of the pro-Chavez parties) such as himself are 
quietly toiling away on the campaign. 
 
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Turnout, Registration Are Key 
----------------------------- 
 
4. (C) Barreto said that mobilizing lower class Venezuelans 
who historically have abstained from voting is the principal 
strategy for Chavez to win the referendum.  The GOV is aiming 
for an abstention rate of just 20 percent, well below the 
rates of recent years.  The pre-Chavez political system, 
Barreto said, discriminated against the poor by limiting the 
number of voting centers in their neighborhoods.  He claimed, 
for example, that middle class Baruta municipality in Caracas 
with 70,000 voters had more than 30 voting centers while the 
nearby Sucre area with one million lower class voters was 
given only 24 voting centers.  Barreto said the CNE would 
correct this problem when it issues the list of voting 
centers for the referendum. (Comment:  The CNE agreed June 23 
to add centers and expand others in poor areas.  The 
transmission network for the voting centers is already being 
installed, suggesting the CNE may not be able to shift easily 
 
large numbers of voting centers out of upper class areas.) 
 
5. (C) Barreto said the poor have also historically denied 
identity cards ("cedulas") due to costs associated with 
obtaining identity documents.  Barreto said the GOV's "cedula 
express" program -- which utilizes mobile units to issue 
cards -- had issued two million cards to lower class voters 
since January, with the ambitious goal of four million cards 
by July 10, when the voter registration rolls are closed. 
Barreto said workers in the mobile units have been 
registering each cedula applicant in the electoral registry. 
He also said that Cuban doctors working in the "Barrio 
Adentro" program flag patients without cedulas.  The 
patients, he said are later visited by members of the 
Francisco Miranda Front, the cadre of Venezuelan "social 
workers" trained in Cuba, to arrange their identity cards. 
(The CNE is also operating more than 600 registration sites 
around Venezuela.) 
 
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Missions on Steroids 
-------------------- 
 
6. (C) In his rhetoric, Chavez is putting his populist 
programs such as Mission Robinson (literacy) and Mission 
Sucre (college scholarships) on the line.  His message to 
voters is that the opposition will take away these programs 
if they return to power.  To a considerable degree these 
missions have been thinly disguised transfer payments to his 
key low-income constituents.  Chavez appears to be 
accelerating his efforts to put cash in the hands of would-be 
voters via the "Missions," though it is debatable how much 
more effectively these moneys can be distributed with less 
than two months remaining before the referendum.  Chavez also 
has to deal with the curious fact that some 233,000 
recipients of Mission benefits also signed the petition 
against him, suggesting that some votes, at least, are not 
for sale.  Another explanation is that Mission rolls have 
been vastly exaggerated because of fraud or number padding by 
Mission administrators, suggesting that Chavez's support in 
the Missions is less than advertised. 
 
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Running Against Uncle Sam 
------------------------- 
 
7. (C) Chavez's negative campaigning thus far has hit on the 
opposition as hapless agents of the USG.  Chavez relishes in 
claiming his true opponent is President Bush.  Barreto said 
that polls show the anti-U.S. message does not help and 
claimed the rhetoric would be softened.  Chavez, however, 
shows no signs of lessening his accusations that the U.S. is 
an imperial power on the verge of invading Venezuela. 
 
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Persecute The Opposition 
------------------------ 
 
8. (C) Questionable criminal indictments and detentions of 
opposition figures continue at a steady pace, evidence that 
the GOV will keep trying to discredit the opposition as 
undemocratic coup-plotters and try to keep key opposition 
leaders off-balance and preoccupied with their criminal 
defense.  Recent victims of this tactic include Sumate 
directors Maria Corina Machado and Alejandro Plaz, Gente de 
Petroleo leader Juan Fernandez, Army Gen. Manuel Rosendo, and 
Asamblea de Educadores leader Leonardo Carvajal.  Each plays 
a significant role in the Coordinadora Democratica (CD). 
Barreto claimed the GOV is attacking the leaders of the 
opposition's "Plan B," a civil rebellion to be launched, he 
said, after Chavez wins the referendum. 
 
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Fraud and Manipulation 
---------------------- 
 
9. (C) Chavez may also resort to manipulation or just 
downright fraud.  Chavez controls the CNE and has shown his 
willingness to change rules that do not favor him.  He may 
 
use this influence to delay the referendum (or the 
certification of its results) past August 19, when a 
presidential vacancy via recall would be filled by the Vice 
President.  These tactics may be a last resort, once the 
results of the referendum are known but not certified.  The 
new touch-screen electoral system may help facilitate fraud 
and manipulation.  The CNE approved in record time the 
contract for the Smartmatic-led consortium, one of whose 
members, Bizta, had received startup capital from the GOV. 
The deal smells of corruption -- and possibly fraud -- and 
puts in doubt the security of the referendum process.  We 
note that Chavez may not need to resort to fraud with the 
computerized system; an organizational and technical meltdown 
with the untested system could delay and possibly scuttle the 
referendum.  A June 23 announcement by CNE Director Jorge 
Rodriguez that he planned to install a system to 
electronically fingerprint to ensure people vote just once is 
also a concern for efficiency of the system. 
 
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Violence To Intimidate, Deteriorate 
---------------------------------- 
 
10. (C) We also cannot rule out the use of violence to 
frustrate the opposition's preparations and intimidate 
voters.  When the GOV realized the opposition was on the 
verge of a big win during the signature appeals, armed Chavez 
supporters menaced dozens of appeals centers and opposition 
information offices.  For example, when the CNE projected on 
June 3 that the presidential referendum would take place, 
armed gangs (reportedly the Tupamaros) sacked private media 
offices and violently assaulted an opposition deputy.  If as 
the referendum race unfolds it appears Chavez is headed for 
defeat, Chavez may unleash this kind of targeted violence on 
his opponents to destabilize the political situation, albeit 
at a high price in terms of the perception of legitimacy for 
his government, both domestically and abroad. 
 
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Blindfold, Delay the Referees 
----------------------------- 
 
11. (C) The CNE, Comando Maisanta, and GOV officials have 
called for strict limitations on international observers. 
Their argument is that observers have tried to undermine the 
authority of the CNE.  In truth, the Chavistas were incensed 
at the observers' critical press statements, like those of 
Jimmy Carter just after the signature appeals process. 
Chavez supporters will try to suppress the observers' 
interaction with the press, limit their access to 
information, and invite a slew of sympathetic observers to 
offset any negative press.  The CNE reportedly approved 
regulations June 23 that prohibit observers from making press 
statements, though the rules will not be finalized until 
officially published.  The rules also reportedly establish a 
special committee to oversee international observers run by 
CNE Director Oscar Battaglini, an outspoken critic of the 
OAS/TCC missions. 
 
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Charm Offensive:  Coincidence? 
------------------------------ 
 
12. (C) We are also suspect the GOV may be trying to look 
improve its image at home and abroad.  Vice President Jose 
Vicente Rangel met with the Ambassador June 16, for the first 
time at Rangel's request.  Rangel proposed that his chief of 
staff, Rene Arreaza, accompanied by MFA chief of staff Temir 
Porras, to visit Washington for meetings with the USG.  In 
counter-terrorism, the GOV announced June 23 it had captured 
21 alleged members of the FARC in Venezuelan territory who 
were returned to Colombian territory.  On the drug front, the 
GOV said June 22 it had dismantled a drug cartel operating in 
the interior, resulting in cocaine seizures of 6,156 kilos. 
These events may be a coincidence, but it sounds like the GOV 
is following the advice of its Washington consultant on how 
to win friends and influence people. 
 
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Comment 
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13. (C) The referendum pits Chavez against himself, an 
unenviable position for any politician.  But while 
politically wounded, Chavez is far from finished.  He is a 
tireless campaigner and talented communicator with nearly 
unlimited funds to spend over the next eight weeks.  His 
formula for boosting voter participation appears sound.  His 
populist message will probably not win over opponents but 
will be difficult to counter.  Chavez's thin bench of 
political advisors has proven to be incompetent, and hesitant 
to give Chavez the unvarnished truth, as shown by the 
signature drive and appeals process.  Hard-line and moderate 
supporters of Chavez will also continue to bicker among 
themselves.  Chavez's campaign re-shuffling has not 
eliminated these problems; "Comando Maisanta" is the same 
"Comando Ayacucho" with an image makeover.  Chavez is also 
prone to misreading political signs, especially where human 
rights and the international community are involved, which 
could hurt his domestic popularity.  The most dangerous 
scenario may be that if Chavez wakes up late in the campaign 
and figures that he is losing, under which scenario recourse 
to blatant fraud and intervention may be his last option to 
stay in office. 
 
SHAPIRO 
 
 
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      2004CARACA02081 - CONFIDENTIAL