US embassy cable - 04MAPUTO834

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THINGS LOOK DIFFERENT FROM UP NORTH

Identifier: 04MAPUTO834
Wikileaks: View 04MAPUTO834 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Maputo
Created: 2004-06-24 08:37:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PGOV EAID PREF PTER ASEC MZ KISL RENAMO FRELIMO
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MAPUTO 000834 
 
SIPDIS 
DEPT FOR AF/S, INL/AAE, DS/ 
JUSTICE FOR ICITAP AND OPDAT 
PRETORIA FOR NLEA, DEA, USCS 
JOHANNESBURG FOR DHS 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/23/2014 
TAGS: PGOV, EAID, PREF, PTER, ASEC, MZ, KISL, RENAMO, FRELIMO 
SUBJECT: THINGS LOOK DIFFERENT FROM UP NORTH 
 
REF: A. A) MAPUTO 463 
 
B. B) MAPUTO 776 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Dennis Hankins for reason 1.4 (b and d) 
 
1. (SBU) Summary. Recent visits to Nampula and Cabo Delgado 
Provinces impressed upon embassy officers major challenges 
facing northern Mozambique and the need for continued USG 
attention to the region. Corruption, smuggling, porous 
borders and weak infrastructure compound high unemployment 
and a lack of economic development. In political terms, the 
FRELIMO government is aware that it needs to demonstrate 
economic results and investment in the region to avoid a 
defeat in this December's general election. The Muslim 
population is growing, approaching two thirds of the 
population in some areas, and commerce is almost entirely in 
the hands of South Asian Muslims. People and goods move 
freely in and out of the country, and the GRM has no capacity 
to control their movement. End summary. 
 
2. (C) A High Interest Area: A number of US interests 
converge in Mozambique's northern provinces of Cabo Delgado 
and Nampula. Reported reports of drug smuggling, alien 
trafficking, illegal entry of Pakistanis and Somalis raise 
concerns about the potential of the region as a headquarters 
for criminal and terrorist activities. The rapidly growing 
control of South Asians over key business sectors as well as 
active proselytizing activities by conservative Muslim groups 
add to the concerns. At the same time, the region has drawn 
some US investment interest in the transportation area and 
the potential exists for future investments in the tourism 
and minerals sectors. 
 
3. (U) Economically Lagging: Economic development in the 
northern provinces lags far behind that of southern 
Mozambique and the Maputo region. In contrast to booming 
construction and renovation taking place in the capital, 
Nampula appears run-down and neglected. Unemployment is high 
and most large businesses have been closed for years, or even 
decades. Plans for rehabilitation of the rail line from the 
port of Nacala to Malawi have stalled and the government 
ports and rail authority, CFM, has laid off numerous 
employees in preparation for long-delayed privatization. CFM 
will need to lay off many more in conjunction with an 
eventual Nacala Corridor concession agreement (Ref A). In 
Pemba, the capital of Cabo Delgado Province, some development 
is tangible in the tourism sector. Despite the enormous 
potential and some successful high-end tourism projects, 
further growth is hampered by weak infrastructure, in 
particular the lack of good health care facilities. The 
agricultural products that the region exports include 
cashews, timber, prawns, and cotton. Exports of marble and 
some other minerals have dropped significantly. (Ref B). 
 
4. (C) A Haven for Somalis and Other Aliens: During the 
June 1-3 visit by poloff and A/RSO to Nampula City and 
Nacala, it was clear that the Mozambican authorities have no 
capability, and little interest, in effectively controlling 
the flow of people and goods, in and out of the country. 
UNHCR officials at the refugee camp in Maratane confirmed 
that hundreds of Somali refugees have simply shown up at the 
camp, having crossed the border with Tanzania or entered 
through smaller ports in Cabo Delgado. Camp registration 
records only account for refugees entering the camp and there 
are no controls for monitoring those refugees that leave. 
Although records showed that the registered camp population 
numbered approximately five-thousand residents, UNHCR 
officials felt that the true population was only about 
four-thousand. In Pemba and Nampula, Somalis are now engaged 
in selling smuggled goods in the markets and also engage in 
illegal money exchange. Somalis who register at the camp 
seldom stay more than a few days, and many show up later at 
the border with Swaziland, destined for South Africa. A 
cabinet member of the Mayor's office and an aide to the 
Governor also confirmed that a growing number of Nigerians 
are engaged in business activities in the informal markets of 
Nampula. The Mayor's office in Nacala complained about the 
dominant position of South Asian businessmen in the local 
economy, in particular their practice of bringing a large 
number of family members from Pakistan and India to run and 
staff most of their businesses. 
 
5. (C) A Leaky Harbor: In a visit to the port of Nacala, 
embassy officers spoke with CFM Port Director Agostinho Langa 
and also met with Ussemane Julaia of Manica Freight Services. 
Julaia was very open and candid about the problems of 
corruption and smuggling present in Nacala, the most 
notorious port for illegal activity. Despite the recent 
contracting of a private security firm (with FRELIMO ties), 
theft from the port has not stopped. Also, as Langa 
explained, thirty-five percent of the traffic from the port 
is destined for Malawi, and thus avoids customs inspection. 
Julaia and Langa both confirmed that it is easy for train 
cars to be emptied out at isolated rail sidings and 
transported to other parts of Northern Mozambique or on to 
South Africa. Ships at the dock are also boarded by persons 
in crafts as small as rowboats. Maritime patrols in the 
harbor are nonexistent. There appears to be a thriving black 
market of such illegally imported goods from Dubai and other 
ports of origin. Additional, authorities concede that 
narcotics trafficking is prevalent, using these or other 
methods of transit. 
 
6. (C) Growing Muslim Influence: Traveling around Pemba or 
on the road from Nampula to Nacala, it is common to find 
small mosques built by the African Muslim Agency. Large new 
mosques have been constructed, both in the north and in 
Maputo, with funds from successful Muslims in Mozambique and 
with outside funding from the Gulf states. Some schools and 
other social services are visibly funded by Muslim 
organizations, including training centers to prepare 
Mozambican students for study abroad in Sudan. Pemba is a 
good example of the power of the Muslim business community, 
with all major shops owned by Osman Jacob, an embassy contact 
with close ties to FRELIMO. Jacob, and his son who is 
responsible for operations of most of his businesses, both 
told embassy officers that corrupt practices and bribery are 
essential to successfully running both legitimate and illegal 
business in the region. The illegal export of precious 
hardwood from Cabo Delgado, Nampula, and Zambezia provinces 
by East Asian-controlled enterprises is but one example. 
 
7. (C) Comment: The prevalence of corruption, lax security, 
and a large Muslim business community in the northern 
provinces combine to accentuate fears among the diplomatic 
community, government officials, and well-informed private 
businessmen that an increasingly conducive environment for 
international terrorists exists in the region. Uncontrolled 
flows of Somalis, Nigerians, refugees from Central Africa, 
and South Asians with long-standing ties to Mozambique or 
South Africa are one area of concern. The ability of 
economic migrants and narcotics traffickers alike to move 
freely across Mozambique's borders is heightened by 
corruption among GRM officials. The sea border in the North 
is particularly susceptible to undetected maritime traffic. 
 
8. (C) Comment Continued: In the past year, the Mission 
has significantly increased its resources devoted to 
developments in the north. Ambassador, Econ/Pol, Consular 
and RSO have made repeated visits despite the high cost and 
distance involved (a four hour flight to Pemba). Public 
Affairs supports the Musa Bin Bique University in Nampula (a 
moderate, generally Muslim, institution) and Mission 
personnel have held public diplomacy meetings with Muslim 
leaders as well as high school students. End comment. 
HANKINS 

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