US embassy cable - 04ANKARA3553

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NATO IN IRAQ: PRELIMINARY TURKISH VIEWS

Identifier: 04ANKARA3553
Wikileaks: View 04ANKARA3553 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Ankara
Created: 2004-06-24 05:30:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL IZ TU
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 003553 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/14/2014 
TAGS: PREL, IZ, TU 
SUBJECT: NATO IN IRAQ:  PRELIMINARY TURKISH VIEWS 
 
REF: A. USNATO 602 (NOTAL) 
 
     B. BAGHDAD 742 
 
Classified By: Political Military Counselor Timothy A. Betts. Reasons 1 
.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (C)  Summary:  Initial Turkish reaction to a NATO role in 
Iraq is positive, although no decisions on the GOT's position 
have yet been made.  An MFA official told us that he saw 
merit in the Alliance offering training both inside and 
outside Iraq.  He was sympathetic to French arguments that 
the alliance had no authority to train civilian police but 
was open to the idea that this training could be somehow 
included.  He also thought Turkey would take no position on 
whether it was better to have a separate statement on Iraq or 
to fold the subject into the communique.  End Summary. 
 
2. (C) MFA Deputy Director General for NATO Fatih Ceylan told 
PolMilCouns on June 23 that Ankara had yet to take a firm 
position on Iraqi PM Allawi's request for NATO assistance in 
training security forces, but he thought the idea was an 
attractive method of "projecting soft power."  MFA took note 
of the difference between the PM's request for assistance 
"inside Iraq" and the "flexibility" contained in the NATO 
SYG's food for thought paper that noted the options of the 
Alliance training Iraqis in Iraq, in member countries or in 
partners territories.  Ceylan thought a more flexible 
approach would be "in the interests of the alliance," 
suggesting that the alliance could even use Centers of 
Excellence, like the Ankara PfP Training Center. 
 
3. (C) While military training for Iraq was a suitable 
activity for NATO, Ceylan said he was less sure about 
civilian police training.  The Alliance had no program to 
train civilian police, although some members had gendarmeries 
which conceivably could be used for that role.  PolMilCouns 
noted that as ISAF expanded in Afghanistan, police training 
could be inherited by the alliance, setting a precedent for 
police training in Iraq.  Ceylan agreed. 
 
4. (C) On how the Summit would document the issue, Ceylan 
said he was aware of the discussion in Brussels over whether 
to have a separate statement on Iraq or to fold it into the 
summit communique.  He thought Turkey would not take a 
position, seeing either as equally effective. 
 
5. (U) Baghdad minimize considered. 
EDELMAN 

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