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| Identifier: | 04THEHAGUE1548 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 04THEHAGUE1548 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy The Hague |
| Created: | 2004-06-22 12:05:00 |
| Classification: | UNCLASSIFIED |
| Tags: | PARM PREL CWC |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 001548 SIPDIS STATE FOR AC/CB, NP/CBM, VC/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN) NSC FOR JOECK WINPAC FOR LIEPMAN E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PARM, PREL, CWC SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): WEEKLY WRAP-UP FOR 18 JUNE 2004 This is CWC-79-04. --------------------------------------- P-5 AMBASSADORS MEETING ON UNIVERSALITY --------------------------------------- 1. (U) The Russian Federation hosted a June 15 meeting of P-5 Ambassadors in The Hague, noting that the idea originated in Moscow with Universality suggested as the first topic for discussion. Russia also noted the connection between the CWC and UNSC Resolution 1540 that increases the importance of CWC Universality. The UK suggested that attendees carefully consider whether a P-5 demarche to selected States not Party to the CWC might bring additional pressure for them to join the Convention. France noted that it thought the P-5 format useful and asked whether delegations could expand the discussion to challenge inspections and Libya conversion requests. Amb. Javits (U.S. Perm Rep) and the UK Ambassador replied that our first effort should be Universality. 2. (U) The Ambassadors discussed the Middle East and North Korea, and agreed that the situation in these areas is complex. Amb. Javits noted that he had sponsored a lunch for Arab ambassadors, from both States Party and States not Party, saying that not much of substance had been accomplished, but that the atmosphere was very positive. China noted that it had recently seen a positive change in Arab feelings regarding the CWC, and that confidence building efforts such as the U.S. lunch was a key first step. 3. (U) Russia then raised the workshops in Malta and Addis Ababa, noting that Moscow had lobbied heavily in Cairo and Damascus to get them to send reps to Malta. All delegations expressed concern regarding the lack of appropriate TS efforts in support of the Malta conference. Russian then relayed Syria's response to Moscow that CW could not be eliminated from the Middle East because of its direct link to the Israeli nuclear program. Moscow also reported that at an Arab League Foreign Ministers meeting, attendees agreed that they should move away from the CWC until Israel is ready to join the NPT. China said that if this report were true, it would significantly increase the challenge to the P-5 of promoting universality in that particular region. 4. (U) Attendees agreed to send to capitols the UK suggestion of P-5 demarches to determine if this was acceptable in principle. If so, then P-5 ambassadors could begin debate in a future meeting (date to be determined) regarding which states to be approached. -------------------------------- INDUSTRY CONSULTATIONS - SUMMARY -------------------------------- 5. (U) The following is a summary of the outcome of the June 14-18 industry consultations. The full report will be provided septel: -- Schedule 1 captive use remains under consideration due to differences in opinion over whether or not a decision clarifying the declarability of Schedule 1 'captive use' production is necessary. On one hand, since there is no evidence that such production exists, a decision seems ceremonial. On the other hand, even if there exists no such production, the knowledge and technology to produce such chemicals in captive use situations is widely available, particularly in the case of pharmaceutical manufacturing (e.g., pethidine). -- Discussions on low concentrations for Amiton, PFIB and BZ whittled down the proposed decision text to two open items: specific concentration percentages and whether States Parties should apply one percentage to all three chemicals or disparate percentages for each. -- With regard to discussions on Schedule 2 Facility Agreements, proposed EC-37 report language encouraging the TS to adopt more flexible criteria in determining not to conclude such agreements appears to have consensus. The discussions also produced agreed EC-37 report language for marking of Schedule 1 chemicals in the Handbook on Chemicals to indicate chemicals which have been declared in amounts greater than 100 grams by States Parties to the TS since entry into force. -- Discussions on other chemical production facilities (OCPF) site selection made progress in terms of a path forward for discussions, but made little progress on minimizing substantive differences regarding accommodation of State Parties' proposals or enhance transparency and/or accountability in the allocation of TS nomination points. ---------- ARTICLE XI ---------- 6. (U) Del rep and Iranian delegate Gholamhossein Dehghani met on the margins of the Article X consultation on June 14 to discuss the current status of the Article XI consultations. Dehghani noted the importance of fully implementing Article XI and regretted the long impasse that prevented delegations from moving forward on this issue, one of the four pillars of the CWC. Dehghani also wondered why no delegations had commented on the Iranian chemical transfers paper. 7. (U) Del rep replied that two issues might have hindered comment on the paper: first, not all states have fully implemented their Article VII obligations, which includes the issue of chemical transfers and export controls. This needed to be done by CSP-10. Once all states were in compliance with their obligations, states may be more confidant that transferred chemicals and equipment are being used for peaceful, legitimate enterprises. Second, the Iranian paper proposed that all transfers of toxic chemicals be declared as a confidence-building measure. Even if a government favored such a measure, states with large chemical industries would find the requirement too burdensome. 8. (U) Dehghani suggested that restricting Iran's proposal to declarations of transfers of scheduled toxic chemicals might make it more practical. Delrep noted that delegations would not support creation of a clearinghouse whose charter was to match up worldwide chemical transfers; the TS needed to be a cost-effective, lean, and efficient organization. Dehghani acknowledged that the Iranian suggestion of having a Global Cooperation Committee review transfer declarations had not received any support and asked if Washington perhaps had come ideas on how to build confidence regarding peaceful uses of chemicals. Delrep agreed to discuss the concept with Washington and would get back to Dehghani with ideas at a later date. ------------------- OCPF SITE SELECTION ------------------- 9. (U) Del requested comments on the Swiss/U.S. OCPF site selection proposal during the June 16 WEOG meeting. New Zealand supports it unconditionally; Germany and the UK reported that the issue remains under discussion in capitols, with it being viewed favorable but requiring some minor changes. Canada likes the method, and reported that the only issue that remains under consideration is whether the TS should provide States Parties with information regarding how it used its nomination points. 10. (U) Javits sends. SOBEL
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