US embassy cable - 04ANKARA3511

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 003511 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/21/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PTER, MARR, TU, IZ, AF 
SUBJECT: TGS CONCERNS ABOUT KIRKUK, PKK AND AFGHANISTAN 
 
(U)  Classified by Ambassador Eric S. Edelman:  Reasons: 1.4 
(b) and (d). 
 
1.  (S)  Ambassador met with DCHOD Ilker Basbug at latter,s 
request  on June 21 for a tour d'horizon of current issues in 
the lead in to the President's visit to Ankara and the NATO 
Istanbul Summit.  Basbug clearly wanted to make several 
points related to Iraq and U.S. Turkish relations. 
 
KIRKUK 
------------ 
 
2.  (S)  Basbug noted that the Turks are concerned about 
developments around Kirkuk as the June 30 transfer of 
sovereignty approaches.  They have received numerous reports 
from both open source and intelligence that Kurds are 
planning activities to change the ethnic composition and 
balances of the city.  For Turkey, he said, this is a major 
issue that affects Turkish national interest.  He noted that 
Foreign Minister Gul had made a public statement (following a 
meeting with the Iraqi Turkoman Front leader) outlining 
Turkish concerns earlier in the day.  Kurdish ambitions are 
to take over Kirkuk.  If they succeed it will be the first 
step in creation of an independent Kurdish state.  Turkey 
cannot merely watch such a situation develop.   Kurdish 
groups justify their rights to Kirkuk under the TAL by 
reference to the small part of the province that was under 
their control as of March 19, 2003, he added.  Other parts of 
the TAL give Kirkuk and Baghdad special status to be 
determined later, the Kurds can't have it both ways, 
insisting on their rights in the TAL but ignoring other parts 
of the document.  No one should make a judgment that Turkey 
would stand idle in the face of such steps.  Basbug worried 
that there could be tragic miscalculations leading to 
terrible consequences. 
 
3.  (S)  The Ambassador indicated we had warned the Kurds 
repeatedly about the potential explosiveness of the situation 
in Kirkuk and the need to proceed to resolve the grave 
injustices that had been carried out there in an ordered, 
fair and transparent manner.  And that they would need to 
consider their relations with Turkey, the impact on their 
relations with the U.S. and the internal impact on their 
reliance on the TAL.  Furthermore, he encouraged Basbug to 
take advantage of the upcoming contacts with Kurdish leaders 
(Talabani arrived the same day and Barzani may be in Ankara 
in the coming weeks) to make sure Turkish views are 
understood. 
 
PKK 
------ 
 
4.  (S)  Basbug said he didn't want to go into the issue of 
PKK in Iraq since it represented a frustrating subject in 
relations with the U.S. which the military wanted to develop, 
not harm.  He wondered why the U.S. had not taken further 
action, not a major military action, but clear signs of 
political intent.  However, he noted that there has been a 
clear increase of PKK/Kongra Gel activity in southern Turkey. 
 Twenty servicemen and up to eight village guards have been 
killed in the last two months.  He said it would be 
complicated to explain the many influences that led to this 
upsurge.  But he thought in addition to the domestic Turkish 
developments and the divisions within the PKK leadership (he 
asked whether the U.S. was in contact with Osman Ocalan), 
there was a link with the developments in northern Iraq, 
particularly Kurdish intentions in Kirkuk.  Someone, he said, 
was encouraging the PKK to leave Iraq for Turkey; there were 
now double or triple the number of militants in Turkey that 
there had been last year (he cited a number of 1500).  It was 
difficult to see the aims of the renewed violence.  Turkey's 
military could deal with the increased terrorism, but boys 
were dying as a result.  MG Kalyoncu noted that the PKK was 
important for our overall relationship.  When leaders wanted 
to work together with allies in the future, it would be 
necessary to demonstrate what their cooperation had 
accomplished. 
 
5.  (S)  The Ambassador pointed out the range of steps the 
U.S. had taken against the PKK/Kongra Gel: our designation, 
the EU's identification of the group as terrorists, 
engagement with Iraqi officials on the nature of PKK/Kongra 
Gel which led to Iraqi FM Zebari's statements condemning them 
at the OIC meeting.  Furthermore, the Ambassador noted that 
we had offered SRO assets to gather intelligence, but had 
heard that the MFA had concerns about the impact on relations 
with Iran or  Syria.  (Basbug confirmed the TGS had similar 
concerns as well as a negative reaction to the statement that 
the data could not be used for "unilateral" operations in 
Iraq.)  He noted that we would have to continue to work 
together, within the limits of circumstances and 
developments, on the issue of the PKK/Kongra Gel terrorists. 
 
AFGHANISTAN 
--------------------- 
 
6.  (S)  In reviewing the elements of the President's 
upcoming visit and the agenda for the NATO summit, the 
Ambassador thanked General Basbug for Turkey's willingness to 
deploy the HRF in Istanbul for command of ISAF in February 
2005.  Basbug noted there was one condition, that the follow 
on force (identified in the SHAPE informal rotation plan as 
Italian) be fully agreed and committed before the Turks 
deployed.  They didn't want another deployment that stretched 
months beyond its original intent as occurred when they 
commanded ISAF 2. 
 
7.  (U)  Baghdad and Kabul minimize considered. 
EDELMAN