US embassy cable - 04ANKARA3499

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 06 ANKARA 003499 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR PM A/S BLOOMFIELD, EUR/SE AND EUR/RPM; OSD FOR 
DASD HOEHN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/05/2014 
TAGS: MARR, PREL, TU 
SUBJECT: GLOBAL FORCE POSTURE REVIEW:  STATIONING OF F-16S 
IN TURKEY WILL REQUIRE HIGH-LEVEL POLITICAL APPROVAL 
 
REF: A) ANKARA 3255 B) ANKARA 3005 C)03 ANKARA 7612 
 
(U) Classified by Ambassador Eric S. Edelman.  Reasons:  1.5 
(B and D). 
 
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SUMMARY 
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1. (S) An inter-agency delegation led by State PM A/S 
Bloomfield consulted with MFA and TGS officials June 17 on 
the USG's latest thinking on the Global Defense Posture (GDP) 
review.  A/S Bloomfield said the purpose of the visit was to 
continue the consultations that began last December, to 
provide details of specific proposals under consideration, 
and to solicit Turkey's views on whether proposals involving 
Turkey (i.e. stationing up to two F-16 squadrons in Turkey) 
were worth pursuing further.  A/S Bloomfield and DASD Hoehn 
stressed in all of their meetings that no decisions had been 
made.  TGS DCHOD GEN Basbug, while not outright dismissing 
the F-16 proposal, stated on numerous occasions that a 
decision to allow the US to station fighter aircraft in 
Turkey would be outside of the DECA, would be "100 percent 
political," and therefore would not "involve" TGS.  U/S Ziyal 
was more negative, saying that such a decision would require 
the "very highest political decision, beyond the GOT and 
Parliament to include even the President, and would be 
subject to public opinion."  Ziyal cautioned that if asked, 
Turkey would need to consider the request within the larger 
context of the US-Turkey relationship, making clear that 
Turkish disappointments over Iraq, the PKK and on the 
economic front (including QIZs) would factor into such a 
decision.  Basbug and Ziyal pressed the delegation for 
specifics (i.e. number of aircraft, desired location, 
operational purpose, and scenarios under which they would be 
used).  Ziyal offered to try to provide us a more developed 
judgment before the NATO Summit on how Turkey would respond 
to a request to station F-16s in Turkey.  On separate 
matters, Basbug said that USAFE's proposed MOU on Weapons 
Training Deployments (which TGS earlier had rejected) remains 
open for discussion, and opined that EUCOM's request to 
establish a multi-directional cargo hub at Incirlik Air base 
(IAB) in support of OEF and OIF operations appeared 
"workable" at first glance (septels).  End summary. 
 
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GLOBAL DEFENSE POSTURE:  SECOND ROUND OF CONSULTATIONS 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
2. (C) An inter-agency delegation led by Assistant Secretary 
of State for Political-Military Affairs Lincoln Bloomfield 
consulted with senior Turkish officials June 17 on the USG's 
latest thinking on the Global Defense Posture (GDP) review. 
The delegation included Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense 
for Strategy Andy Hoehn, EUCOM J5 Deputy Director RADM 
William Goodwin, OSD Commander Randy Hendrickson, and 
EUR/RPM's Nathaniel Heller.  The delegation held meetings 
with Turkish General Staff (TGS) DCHOD GEN Basbug, MFA U/S 
Ziyal, and an MFA/TGS delegation led by MFA Deputy U/S Ilkin 
and TGS Chief of Strategy MG Arslan.  Ambassador, DCM and 
other members of the Mission also attended the meetings. 
 
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MESSAGE 
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3. (S) A/S Bloomfield opened the meetings with Basbug and 
Ziyal by saying the purpose of the visit was to follow up on 
the consultations led by State U/S Grossman last December 
(ref c) and to share our latest thinking on Global Defense 
Posture (GDP) review.  Whereas the first round of 
consultations were broad in scope, A/S Bloomfield said the 
purpose of the second round was to discuss specific proposals 
under consideration within the US.  He stressed that the 
delegation was not here to make any formal requests; no 
decisions had been taken.  Before doing so, the 
Administration believed it was important for our Allies to 
share with us their thinking on the proposals under 
consideration.  The GDP review process would be more 
successful if it takes into consideration the views and 
concerns of our partners.  It was important that our allies 
understand and support the need for militaries to move 
quickly and decisively to confront new challenges and 
threats, and that proper legal and political arrangements be 
in place to allow us to do so. 
 
4. (S) DASD Hoehn said that Washington had consulted with 
EUCOM Commander GEN Jones since the first round of 
consultations.  GEN Jones is considering options for 
relocating assets, including one that might involve Turkey: 
the possible relocating of two F-16 squadrons currently 
stationed in Germany.  Hoehn noted there are three options 
under consideration:  keeping the aircraft in Germany, 
returning them to the US, and moving them further south and 
east from Germany.  On the latter option, Hoehn noted that 
one location under consideration is Turkey.  There were a 
number of advantages to US-Turkey military relations from 
stationing the aircraft in Turkey, including increased 
opportunities for training and US/Turkey cooperation in 
future operations.  Hoehn stressed that no decisions had been 
made.  Before GEN Jones and others make a recommendation to 
the President, it would be useful for Turkish officials to 
share their judgments with us and advise whether stationing 
the aircraft in Turkey was an idea worth pursuing.  Hoehn 
reminded Ziyal and Basbug of a point made during the December 
consultations on the importance of ensuring that flexible 
arrangements are in place to allow the US to use its assets 
in a decisive and timely manner.  Bloomfield added that US 
respected the sovereign rights of its allies and was 
committed to operating within their legal boundaries.  If 
there are political or legal constraints that would make it 
impossible for us to use our assets, it would be useful for 
us to know before we make a recommendation to the President. 
Similarly, if the issue should not be pursued further, it 
would be important for us to know. 
 
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STATIONING OF F-16s A POLITICAL DECISION 
----------------------------------------- 
 
5. (S) Basbug thanked the delegation for the briefing.  He 
said it was important for him to understand fully US thinking 
on the GDP review, especially concerning the possible 
stationing of fighter aircraft in Turkey.  Basbug confirmed 
that VCJCS GEN Pace had briefly mentioned during their 
meeting in Washington in March 2004 that the US was 
considering relocating F-16s and that Turkey was one option 
under consideration.  GEN Jones reportedly also discussed 
with TGS CHOD GEN Ozkok his personal views on necessary 
changes in force structure that would be required to confront 
future challenges and threats. 
 
6. (S) Basbug said he had a number of questions regarding 
stationing F-16s in Turkey: 
 
--Is the US considering stationing the aircraft at Incirlik 
Air Base (IAB), or at other bases as well? 
 
--Is the US considering stationing the aircraft on a 
temporary or permanent basis? 
 
--Would the aircraft be used for training or for operations? 
 
--If the aircraft are to be used for operations, what are the 
scenarios under which the US envisages using them? 
 
--If they are to be used for training, would that training 
take place at IAB?  Konya?  Outside of Turkey? 
 
7. (S) DASD Hoehn responded that the US was interested in 
training in Turkey -- whether or not F-16s are stationed 
here.  But training could be a bridge to other areas of 
cooperation.  The US was considering stationing the F-16s in 
Turkey on a permanent basis, and using the aircraft for both 
training and for operations.  They could also be deployed 
from Turkey to other locations for training or operations, or 
conduct operations from Turkey.  This could be within a NATO 
context or outside of a NATO context.  Ambassador added it 
was difficult to say definitely in the abstract exactly how 
these assets might be used.  If our training experiences are 
positive and it is possible to train out of Konya, the US 
might wish to station the assets at IAB and deploy them to 
Konya to train.  If a NATO mission comes up, the US and 
Turkey may decide to work together.  If a non-NATO mission 
were to come up, the US and Turkey could discuss how to 
proceed. 
8. (S) Basbug said the use of IAB depends on the 1980 Defense 
and Economic Cooperation Agreement (DECA).  He opined that 
operational plans for IAB should be based on NATO operational 
plans.  Turkey,s support for reconstruction and humanitarian 
operations in Afghanistan and Iraq was different.  This 
cooperation was in line with UNSCRs and a Council of 
Ministers decree -- not the DECA.  Basbug said his 
understanding was that stationing F-16s in Turkey was outside 
of the DECA; a decision to allow the stationing of F-16s is 
"purely a political decision."  Basbug said he was uncertain 
how the US intended to proceed.  If asked by the government, 
TGS will provide its advice, he said.  He repeated that "this 
is a political decision.  GFP is 100 percent political.  If a 
request does not fall within the DECA, it does not involve us 
(TGS)." 
 
9. (S) On next steps, the Ambassador said (and A/S Bloomfield 
and DASD Hoehn confirmed) that Administration officials would 
digest the information provided by allies during this second 
round of consultations and provide recommendations to the 
Secretary of Defense.  The Secretary would then review the 
 
SIPDIS 
recommendations and then present a final set of 
recommendations to the President.  If the Secretary were to 
recommend stationing the F-16s in Turkey and the President 
were to approve that recommendation, the USG would then 
submit a formal request to the Turkish government.  When 
asked when this would happen, A/S Bloomfield said we were 
nearing the end of the consultation process and that final 
decisions could be taken within weeks or months. 
 
10. (S) In a separate meeting later that day, Ziyal thanked 
the delegation for coming to Ankara and for sharing its 
thinking on the GDP review.  He said the decision to consult 
in advance of presenting formal requests was "wise" and he 
appreciated the opportunity to provide his views.  Ziyal said 
that in the absence of details, he could only offer an 
"initial gut reaction": 
 
--US and Turkey have a harmony of views on the threats and 
challenges of the future, but not on how to confront them. 
We need to converge our interests. 
 
--Any US request will be considered within the larger context 
of our overall relationship.  Particularly, Turkey's 
disappointment over the USG's handling of recent developments 
in Iraq (and its cooperation with Turkey), combined with its 
failure to follow through on its commitment regarding the 
PKK, will factor into any decision.  The U.S. didn't make 
good on what is now a surreal discussion of QIZ's.  The US 
needs to consider this and clear the underbrush before the 
two sides can discuss any proposals. 
 
--To the extent we know your thinking and you convey it to us 
in a transparent manner, we can consider your requests.  But 
we need to know the details, your perceptions (number/types 
of assets, troops, purposes, operations, scenarios) before we 
can give you our perceptions. 
 
--We have certain legal constraints. 
 
--Some proposals might work; others may not.  Training will 
be easier, but even then we need to look at possible impacts 
on civilian areas. 
 
--If the US is asking whether it will get "blanket authority" 
to use IAB, this is not possible.  This would have to go to 
Parliament, and Parliament will not approve this. 
 
--The DECA is broken.  Only one part of the DECA -- access to 
Turkish bases for the US military -- is functioning. 
(Comment:  The implication is the economic aid, security 
assistance and defense cooperation elements are not working. 
End comment.) 
 
11. (S) Ziyal suggested that the US tell Turkey exactly what 
it is considering proposing, including the details.  Turkish 
officials could then review the information, and, if 
necessary, the two sides can sit down and discuss the matter 
further.  While reiterating this was his initial "gut 
reaction," Ziyal said he personally did not see anything 
wrong with the US submitting a proposal. 
 
12. (S) DASD Hoehn then offered to provide more specifics 
regarding the USG's thinking on possible changes in force 
posture in Europe, including those possibly involving Turkey. 
 The US planned to relocate two heavy divisions from Germany 
to the US; keep many of the key HQ elements in place; move 
new capabilities like the Stryker Brigade forward; and expand 
training in Eastern Europe with new allies like Bulgaria, 
Romania and Poland.  Two squadrons of F-16s might also be 
moved from Germany to either the US or to a location south 
and east of Germany.  One option under consideration was 
Turkey.  In addition to the F-16s, the US was interested in 
conducting Weapons Deployment Training (WTDs) in Turkey; 
exploring whether the US might be able to support the 
establishment of a training Center of Excellence at Konya; 
and additional training opportunities for NATO forces with 
the establishment of NATO's Air South in Izmir.  When asked 
if the F-16s might go "east," Hoehn said that would depend on 
whether the dialogue in Turkey matures. 
 
13. (S) After thanking Hoehn for the additional information, 
Ziyal said that request to station fighter aircraft in Turkey 
would require the "very highest level of political approval. 
The government, parliament, even the president would have to 
approve this."  Ziyal opined that the more NATO is involved, 
the better.  MFA Deputy U/S Ilkin added that the less 
parliament is involved in any issues, the easier. 
 
14. (S) Ziyal closed the meeting by agreeing to try to 
provide the US with a more informed view on the potential 
request concerning F-16s before GEN Jones discusses the issue 
with GEN Ozkok on the margins of the NATO Summit. 
 
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LARGER MEETING 
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15. (S) Following the meeting with U/S Ziyal, A/S Bloomfield 
and others briefed a larger MFA/TGS delegation.  Below is a 
summary of the questions raised by the MFA/TGS delegation and 
the responses provided by A/S Bloomfield and DASD Hoehn: 
 
Q: Is there any relationship between training and deployment 
under the GDP review? 
 
A: DASD Hoehn said USAFE would like to continue to train in 
Turkey -- whether or not we deploy aircraft to Turkey.  It is 
important for our forces to train together in Turkey and 
elsewhere.  If our forces do not train together, they likely 
will not perform well during operations.  If the US were to 
station fighter aircraft in Turkey, the US would want to 
train here as well.  Hoehn said it was important to address 
the challenges of deploying assets to training or operations 
environments, including the logistics element. 
 
Q:  If the F-16s are stationed at IAB, where would they train? 
 
A:  DASD Hoehn said they could train out of IAB, Konya and 
elsewhere (outside of Turkey). 
 
Q:  What if any is the relationship between stationing of 
aircraft at IAB, WTDs at Konya and plans for AFSOUTH at 
Izmir?  Will AFSOUTH be dual hatted? 
 
A:  DASD Hoehn said that Air South would have some 
responsibility for defining the training needs of NATO 
forces.  If all three elements (fighters at Incirlik, WTDs at 
Konya, Air South in Izmir) were in place, there would be 
possible benefits to training opportunities for the US, 
Turkey and NATO forces. 
 
Q:  What are the boundaries of "flexibility" that you keep 
referring to? 
 
A:  Based on the world's dynamic threat environment, A/S 
Bloomfield said the US does not want its flexibility limited 
by current rules.  The GFP review is looking many years out. 
Not knowing the nature of the threats and challenges down the 
road, we need to ensure that we have the flexibility to 
respond in a timely and decisive manner.  We need to know in 
advance if there will be any limitations on our posture and 
our ability to use our assets.  One of the aims of these 
consultation is to identify any possible constraints that may 
exist.  We need to work out arrangements that will allow the 
defense transformation to work and be successful.  We need 
political and legal arrangements in place that reflect the 
solidarity among allies to use military force in a timely and 
decisively manner when necessary.  Those possibilities that 
meet the political and military tests will be briefed and 
possibly recommended to the President.  If restraints are too 
severe, it will drive us in a different direction. 
 
Q: Are there any other assets (other than the two F-16 
squadrons) that you are considering locating in Turkey? 
 
A:  DASD Hoehn replied that at this time there were none. 
However, it was impossible to know what challenges and 
threats will confront us 5-10 years down the road.  He noted 
that five years ago, no one would have imagined that the NATO 
SYG would have listed Afghanistan as NATO's number one 
priority. 
 
Q:  Does the US envision using IAB as a cargo hub for future 
operations other than OEF or OIF? 
 
A:  A/S Bloomfield said that the US does not envisage, as 
part of GDP review, using IAB as a permanent cargo hub for 
our operations around the world.  Our desire to use IAB in 
support of OIF and OEF operations is based on current 
operational requirements; in contrast, changes envisaged as 
part of GFP are long-term.  (Comment:  septel reports initial 
comments offered by TGS DCHOD GEN Basbug and MFA DDG for the 
Americas Ilicak on EUCOM's request to use Incirlik as a 
temporary cargo hub in support of OEF and OIF operations.  We 
intend to follow up with GOT officials to ensure they 
understand that we may approach Turkey with additional 
requests involving Incirlik, unrelated to the GFP, as 
operational requirements arise.  End comment.) 
 
Q:  Do you plan to re-locate ground forces to other countries 
nearby? 
 
A:  DASD Hoehn said we are not envisaging new stationing of 
ground troops.  However, the US will be looking for new 
training operations, pre-positioned equipment, but not 
permanent stationing. 
 
Q:  Are you looking to move fighter aircraft other than the 
two F-16 squadrons? 
 
A:  No. 
 
Q: What are the priorities of the GDP? 
 
A:  DASD Hoehn said strengthening the harmony of views among 
allies of the challenges ahead; flexibility to confront new 
challenges, with allies themselves setting the parameters; 
lighter, more mobile forces; and pre-positioning of equipment. 
 
Q:  Are you looking to establish new legal arrangements? 
 
A:  A/S Bloomfield said that while we are not looking to 
establish new legal arrangements, we invite our allies to 
advise us if their existing arrangements are adequate to 
allow us to do what we are considering.  It is important for 
us to hear whether our friends believe that existing 
political and legal arrangements allow them to meet their 
security needs.  If Turkey were to advise us that new legal 
arrangements would be needed in the event we wished to 
station F-16s here, it would be an important input to have. 
Similarly, if Turkey were to tell us that the existing legal 
arrangements are satisfactory, it would also be important to 
know. 
 
16. (u) A/S Bloomfield cleared this cable. 
EDELMAN