US embassy cable - 04KATHMANDU1147

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 001147 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SA/INS, PRM/ANE; LONDON FOR POL/GURNEY; NSC FOR 
MILLARD; GENEVA FOR PLYNCH; NEW DELHI FOR SNAIR 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/18/2014 
TAGS: PREF, PTER, PHUM, NP, BH, Bhutanese Refugees 
SUBJECT: BHUTANESE REFUGEES: DEBATE TO THE FORE IN NEPAL 
 
REF: A. KATHMANDU 230 
     B. KATHMANDU 1026 
     C. STATE 124885 
     D. KATHMANDU 1054 
     E. KATHMANDU 594 
 
Classified By: CDA Janet Bogue; Reasons 1.5 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (C)  SUMMARY:  For the first time, local integration and 
third-country resettlement of refugees have became a public 
topic of debate by UNHCR and Nepali officials.  Frustrated by 
inaction, a UNHCR official raised the subject in a press 
interview only to have his three-pronged plan for refugee 
settlement firmly repudiated by the Nepali Foreign Secretary. 
 Meanwhile, a quiet visit by the Assistant to the 
Under-Secretary of Political Affairs at the UN has revealed 
some new insights into Nepal's and India's concerns.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
 
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THE DISCUSSION TURNS PUBLIC 
=========================== 
 
2. (C) UNHCR Representative to Nepal Abraham Abraham, just 
back from Geneva, warned PolOff on June 16th that he had 
raised local integration and third-country resettlement 
publicly for the first time, and that the issue was likely to 
appear in the press.  Abraham noted that the ideas he had 
raised were not new, but the Government of Nepal's 
unwillingness to allow even a socio-economic and population 
survey of the refugees had stalled any movement on the Nepali 
side of the border.  True to Abraham's predictions, on June 
17, the Kathmandu Post (which also carried a Ruud Lubbers 
OpEd on refugees that failed to mention the Bhutanese) 
carried a front page article in which Abraham described the 
burden-sharing process (repatriation, local intergration and 
third-country resettlement) and hoped the approach would be 
"acceptable to all parties." 
 
3. (SBU) Repudiating the first public airing of the 
possibility of local integration, Foreign Secretary Madhu 
Acharya was quoted in the article as saying, "Anything 
leading to, suggestive of and indicating integration of the 
Bhutanese nationals in Nepal will not be acceptable to us." 
Acharya went on to say, "In fact, we will not accept any 
proposal that is obstructive to the repatriation of the 
refugees to their homeland.  Even the option of resettlement 
in third countries will discourage repatriation." 
 
======================= 
AS THE UN COMES CALLING 
======================= 
 
4. (C) Meanwhile, over the past 10 days, Tamrat Samuel, the 
Assistant to the Under-Secretray of Political Affairs at the 
UN has been in Kathmandu for quiet discussions on the 
insurgency and the Bhutanese refugees.  Matthew Kahane, the 
UNDP Resident Representative to Nepal, told the DCM on June 
18 that Samuel had met with Foreign Secretary Acharya, Indian 
Ambassador to Nepal (and soon-to-be Indian Foreign Secretary) 
Shyam Saran and others as part of a "low-key fact-finding 
mission" vis-a-vis the refugees.  Tamrat reportedly also 
conveyed the Secretary General's concerns that a lack of 
resolution of the refugee issue could have serious security 
implications for India, Nepal and Bhutan.  According to 
Kahane, Ambassador Saran made very clear to Samuel that the 
Indian Goverment was increasingly concerned about the impact 
that potentially radicalized refugees would have for Nepal, 
and by extension, for India (Ref D and E). 
 
5. (C)  Samuel's discussion with Nepali Foreign Secretary 
Acharya, on the other hand, reportedly focused more on the 
unfolding dynamic between Nepal and Bhutan.  Acharya 
allegedly told Samuel that the Bhutanese had informed the 
Government of Nepal that they would be willing to accept the 
report on the December 22, 2003 incident in the Khudunabari 
refugee camp except for one sentence, which states that the 
conditions for return to Bhutan must be acceptable to the 
refugees themselves.  Acharya indicated that he was reluctant 
to support this change for three reasons: 1) while Bhutan 
could respond, it was procedurally incorrect for the GOB to 
ask Nepal to change Nepal's version of the report; 2) Acharya 
believed the language of that particular sentence was correct 
and appropriate; and, 3) while the Government of Bhutan had 
made the request for the change four times by phone, they 
appeared unwilling to put the request in writing.  In any 
case, Acharya reportedly added, a Nepali decision on a 
response to the Bhutanese Government would have to wait for a 
new Nepali Foreign Minister to be appointed (the Prime 
Minister at present holds that portfolio). 
BOGUE