US embassy cable - 04THEHAGUE1515

C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 001515 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EB/ESC/TFS/GLASS, S/CT/NAVRATIL, IO/PHO/PEREZ, 
INR/EC/BROOKS, EUR/UBI, EUR/ERA, NEA 
TREASURY FOR ZARATE AND OFAC/NEWCOMB 
NSC FOR MRUPPERT 
JUSTICE FOR OIA/FRIEDMAN 
BRUSSELS ALSO FOR LEGATT 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/17/2009 
TAGS: ETTC, PTER, LE, XM, NL, EUN 
SUBJECT: TERRORIST FINANCE: EVOLVING DUTCH POSITION ON EU 
DESIGNATION OF HIZBALLAH 
 
REF: STATE 128139 
 
Classified By: DCM Daniel Russel.  Reason 1.5(d) 
 
1. (C) The Dutch government has moved much closer to 
supporting EU designation of Hizballah in its entirety.  The 
"official" GONL position is that Hizballah is a political 
movement with a terrorist branch;the Dutch maintain that the 
political movement is represented in parliament in Lebanon, 
plays a role in the political process in Lebanon and the 
Middle East, and therefore should not be designated in its 
entirety.  However, the Dutch have consistently supported 
designation of the Hizballah "terrorist branch" (Hizballah 
External Security Organization).  Dutch Foreign Minister Bot 
foreshadowed a possible change in the Dutch position on April 
20 when he departed from his interagency agreed talking 
points and told a parliamentary committee that he "is of the 
opinion that (Hizballah) should be on the (EU) list" but 
needs more facts to convince the other 24 EU member states 
that the political and terrorist branches cannot be 
differentiated.  Bot has asked the Dutch security service 
(AIVD) to quickly come up with more proof of Hizballah's 
integrated nature.  Significantly, during his April trip to 
Damascus, Bot reports that he told the Syrians "in firm 
language that Hizballah cannot have a foothold there."  Dutch 
officials have also told us that the GONL might be able to 
"sponsor" the U.S. Barakat designation (reftel) in the EU 
clearinghouse process (especially given Barakat's links with 
the "terrorist side" of Hizballah). 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
2. (SBU) Having led EU efforts to designate the entirety of 
Hamas, it will be difficult for the Dutch to argue that 
Hizballah should be treated differently.  Nevertheless, 
having more "facts" at their disposal on the integrated 
nature of the Hizballah will make it easier for the Dutch to 
change their formal position.  The Dutch position is probably 
also governed by tactical considerations -- there seems to be 
no compelling reason for a change in position at this moment 
and coming out fully in favor of Hizballah designation at 
this moment make it more difficult for them to craft an EU-25 
consensus, especially during the 7/1-12/31 Dutch EU 
presidency.  Nevertheless, it appears that when the time is 
auspicious, the Dutch will change their position to favor 
Hizballah designation. 
SOBEL