US embassy cable - 04BRUSSELS2589

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 BRUSSELS 002589 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
DHS FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY LOY; DOJ FOR CRIMINAL DIVISION 
BRUCE SWARTZ; STATE FOR EUR PDAS RIES 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECON, EU, PTER, USEU BRUSSELS 
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR JUNE 25 VISIT OF DHS DEPUTY 
SECRETARY ADMIRAL LOY 
 
 
SIPDIS 
 
REF: BRUSSELS 01749 
 
1.  Summary:  You are coming to Brussels during a time of 
transition in the European Union as it absorbs 10 new member 
states and moves towards a new Parliament, new Commissioners 
and possibly a new Constitutional Treaty.   At the same time, 
the EU is in the waning days of the Irish Presidency, and a 
US/EU Summit will be taking place in 
Ireland on the same day you will be visiting Brussels.  Since 
the March bombings in Madrid, the EU has taken a fresh look 
or has revisited the question of the adequacy of its efforts 
to protect EU citizens from terrorism threats, as well as 
appointed a special coordinator for terrorism.  Still, 
misunderstanding remains high in the Commission, Parliament, 
Member States and among the European population to some of 
the measures we consider essential to combat terrorism 
activities.  DHS'  ability to successfully and fully 
implement many of the security measures aimed at protecting 
the U.S. from incoming terrorist threats will depend on 
winning EU support.  Your visit can be most helpful in this 
effort. 
 
2.  The past year has shown how prickly the EU can be when 
confronted with the fait accompli of U.S. homeland security 
measures that affect the transatlantic movement of people and 
goods.  Issues such as PNR, CSI, and Air Marshals have all 
required careful managing, and future DHS measures, such as 
CAPPSII and US VISIT, need similar attention.  The Europeans 
in general do not feel the threat of international terrorism 
as sharply as we do, nor do they share the sense of urgency 
in implementing measures we see as essential.  They are 
afraid the U.S. is moving forward blindly, indifferent to the 
effects of our measures on the rights of the individual. 
Differences among the EU member states themselves in regards 
to the scope and urgency of the threat, as well as the 
division of responsibilities between the EU and the Member 
States, make it difficult for the EU to act in unison or with 
the speed required.  The message we need to deliver is:  The 
threat of international terrorism is real and global.  The 
U.S. is taking measures it deems necessary for our security 
and wants to work with the EU and its Member States to ensure 
that those measures are as effective as possible and 
minimally disruptive to the legitimate movement of people and 
goods.  We believe that the threat is not limited to the U.S. 
and are willing to work with the EU as it takes measures to 
protect itself.  The U.S. is committed to building its 
security in a way that protects the rights of the individual 
and in conformity with democratic principles.   End Summary. 
 
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 A Period of Major Change Underway 
--------------------------------------- 
 
3.  There is a sense of flux and change that permeates the EU 
at this moment.  At the beginning of May, the EU finalized 
its largest and most challenging enlargement, welcoming ten 
new members to the Union.  These ten countries, all 
significantly poorer and for the most part ardently 
transatlantic in their outlook, are likely to change the 
dynamic of the Union precisely at a time when many other 
changes are in the offing.  However, we should not expect 
that the entry of these new members will somehow tilt the EU 
to automatically become more pro-U.S. 
 
4.  The Commission, the EU's executive body, has already 
become a lame duck because of the end of this term in office. 
  Several of the most influential Commissioners have already 
announced they will not return to ministerial posts.  The 
situation of Antonio Vitorino, the Portuguese Commissioner 
who manages the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) portfolio is 
uncertain, but he is a long-shot candidate to replace Romano 
Prodi as President of the Commission.  (You will meet with 
Director General Jonathan Faull who reports to Commissioner 
Vitorino.) 
 
5.  In June, voters across Europe went to the polls to elect 
a new European Parliament.   The European Parliament has 
limited powers, since it cannot initiate legislation 
independently, and must await proposals from the Commission. 
Still, it is playing a growing role in protection of European 
standards, and has been an especially tough nut to crack on 
questions of data privacy, where a majority believes our 
efforts on border controls, biometrics, and use of Passenger 
Name Records (PNR) threaten to violate individual liberties. 
We do not anticipate any short-term changes in the attitudes 
of the Parliament to our border security program, 
 
6.  Finally, the Irish Presidency is also in the home stretch 
of efforts to finalize negotiations on a complicated 
Constitutional Treaty that aims at streamlining the 
decision-making  apparatus of a Union of 25 Member States. 
As part of this effort, the UK is attempting to protect a 
"red line" on national authority over criminal prosecution 
that gets to the heart of Europe-wide efforts to fully 
integrate its investigative and prosecutorial efforts 
directed at crime and terrorism:  Will final competency lie 
on the European level, or remain in the hands of national 
governments?  This has implications for the US as we attempt 
to move forward our own counter-terrorism efforts. 
 
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Split Authority 
-------------- 
 
7.  The EU is responsible primarily for trade and customs and 
the movement of people, goods and services.  The individual 
Member States making up the Union are responsible for 
judicial, law enforcement, intelligence gathering, defense 
and security.  Cooperation between the individual  Member 
States varies.  Overall cooperation between all 25 can be 
hampered by mistrust, different views of the threat and their 
vulnerability, and  different capabilities.  We may be 
tempted in dealing with the Europeans to seek out individual 
Member States rather than with the EU as a whole, but this 
approach too has its drawbacks.  The Container Security 
Initiative (CSI)  was a good example where we negotiated  in 
good faith with individual member states only to find out 
that the Commission claimed that the Member States did not 
have the authority to enter into such agreements. (The 
Commission is ultimately responsible for customs issues.) 
 
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Cooperation on Combating Terrorism 
-------------------------------------- 
 
8.  Following the Madrid bombings, the EU has tried to 
tighten its own counter-terrorism efforts, naming a senior 
Coordinator to oversee the process.   The Council has 
suggested setting up a nascent intelligence-sharing unit to 
help improve EU-wide responsiveness and awareness of internal 
terrorist threats.  This work is overseen by the Political 
and Security Committee (PSC) , a relatively new element of 
the EU that is responsible for the day-to-day efforts of the 
EU to establish a Common Foreign and Security Policy for the 
25-nation Union.  You will be addressing this group on Friday 
morning, and the audience will provide a useful opportunity 
to offer an overview of our homeland security efforts, and 
especially where they intersect with international 
cooperation. 
 
9.  DHS'  ability to successfully implement many of the 
security measures aimed at protecting the US from incoming 
terrorist threats will depend on winning EU support. Over the 
past year, we have seen how difficult winning this support 
can be.  DHS has had to deal with the EU on several sensitive 
issues related to implementation of counter terrorism 
measures aimed at protecting the U.S.:  CSI, PNR, Air 
Marshalls, Bioterrorism, and CAPPSII.  In each case, the 
complexity of the EU institutions and split authority between 
the European Commission and the 25 Member State national 
governments complicated our ability to reach agreement fast. 
Complicating our task is that European leaders and the public 
lack a sense of urgency and view the international terrorist 
threat as far less serious than the U.S.  Since many in 
Europe do not share our perception of the degree of the 
threat, and because of their history of fascism and 
communism, they are more reluctant to take steps that they 
perceive as diminishing in any way the privacy and human 
rights of individuals.  This led to a long, drawn-out 
negotiation on PNR.  In fact, we only started to make headway 
when we encouraged the law enforcement and judicial side of 
the Commission to take an interest in the negotiations. 
 
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Cooperation on Border Management Issues 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
10.  The EU has been keen to enhance our transatlantic 
dialogue on border issues 
 and is appreciative of high level visits such as yours. 
Passport and visa policy 
issues are two areas which may yet cause friction between the 
U.S. and the EU. 
Should the 10/26/2004 passport deadline be extended by only a 
year, most visa 
waiver countries in the EU will not be in compliance.  At a 
June 8 JHA Council 
meeting, the EU approved the mandatory inclusion of digitized 
photographs in all 
25 Member State passports, with an option for a secondary 
biometric identifier 
(fingerprints).  The projected timeline for all EU Member 
States to begin 
incorporating biometrics in their passports is December 2005. 
 
 
11.  New Member States not on the visa waiver program (VWP) 
continue to press 
for the EU to demand reciprocity or else impose a visa 
requirement on U.S. 
citizens traveling to the Schengen area.  The Commission 
seeks to delay this 
confrontation by hinting to these Eastern European states 
that 2007 may be a more 
realistic target when they are fully certified to comply with 
Schengen border 
regulations.  You should welcome these efforts to improve 
border controls, but 
remind EU interlocutors of the legislative parameters -- 
including visa refusal 
rates of under 4 percent -- as a starting point for VWP 
consideration.  Related to this VWP 
discussion is the on-going re-certification process for 
existing VWP countries.  Any movement to suspend or remove a 
current EU Member 
State from VWP would most likely result in a visa reciprocal 
visa requirement for 
all U.S. citizens traveling to the Schengen area. 
 
12.  The EU, particularly the incoming Dutch Presidency, has 
expressed concern 
about negative public reaction to enrolling VWP travelers in 
the US VISIT program 
as of September 30.  On the one hand are practical concerns 
about slow downs at 
ports of entry given the increased number of visitors being 
enrolled in US VISIT. 
On the other hand are possible negative reactions to 
fingerprinting and photographing 
visitors at our borders. 
 
13.  The U.S. and EU have just concluded a joint mission to 
Interpol to further an 
EU-led initiative to exchange data on lost and stolen 
passports.  You should welcome 
the EU's commitment (to be formally adopted on June 18) to 
require all 25 Member 
States to immediately transfer all legacy and new data on 
lost and stolen passports 
to Interpol.  You should seek to build on this program by 
encouraging the EU to 
consider exchanging border lookout data with the U.S. and/or 
other forms of 
information sharing to deter terrorism or illegal 
immigration. 
 
---------------------- 
What We Need to Do 
---------------------- 
 
14.  Your visit can be most helpful in our efforts to foster 
greater U.S./EU cooperation in these areas.  In your meetings 
with the PSC and DG Faull, we need to keep the EU focused on 
the scope of the danger and to emphasize that our measures 
are meant to protect us and them.  We must point out that we 
are as devoted to human rights and democratic principles as 
they are;  that it is in our interest to be able to move 
swiftly to deal with specific threats; that we want our new 
senior-level Policy Dialogue on Border and Transport Security 
to be where we raise and solve differences and search for 
ways to reach our objectives; and that the many expert-level 
dialogues between the U.S. and the EU are valuable and we 
want to keep them up. 
 
SCHNABEL