US embassy cable - 04CARACAS1998

C O N F I D E N T I A L  CARACAS 001998 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
STATE FOR WHA, WHA/AND 
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR DCHA/OTI-RPORTER 
NSC FOR SHANNON AND BARTON 
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/16/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, VE 
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH VICE PRESIDENT RANGEL 
 
 
Classified By: AMB. CHARLES S. SHAPIRO. REASONS 1.5(B) AND (D). 
 
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Summary 
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1.  (C)  On June 16, the Ambassador met with GOV Executive 
Vice President Jose Vicente Rangel.  Rangel stated that 
Chavez and his supporters would accept the results of any 
referendum and would act as a democratic opposition if they 
lost.  He said that the integrity of Venezuela's electoral 
institutions has been proven by events and challenged the 
opposition to commit in advance to accepting the results of a 
referendum if it loses.  The Ambassador stressed the 
importance of international observers to maintaining 
confidence in the electoral process; Rangel said that 
observers would be permitted but their presence would need to 
be "regulated" appropriately.  He asserted that Chavez's 
supporters were "galvanized" for the coming referendum while 
the opposition was in disarray.  He called for rebuilding the 
U.S.-Venezuelan bilateral relationship, highlighting 
excellent counter-narcotics cooperation.  The Ambassador said 
that, if, as has been discussed on a preliminary basis, 
Rangel's chief of staff visits Washington, he will be 
received appropriately.  However, he stressed, Chavez's 
personal attacks on President Bush have had a very negative 
effect.  End summary. 
 
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Referendum On Track 
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2.  (C)  On June 16, the Ambassador, accompanied by A/DCM, 
met with GOV Executive Vice President Jose Vicente Rangel, 
who was accompanied by chief of staff Amb. Rene Arreaza. 
Rangel led off by offering President Chavez's greetings and 
best wishes for the Ambassador and his family.  The 
Ambassador thanked him and said that he now expected to 
remain in Venezuela through the August 15 recall referendum. 
He noted that President Chavez was now describing the 
referendum as "an achievement of the revolution" since it was 
enshrined in the Bolivarian Republic's constitution. 
 
3.  (C)  Rangel said that he looked forward to winning the 
"ratification" of Chavez's tenure in office, and that he 
hoped that following the victory, the opposition would accept 
the results.  If the opposition won, the current government 
would form a democratic opposition.  "For fifty years, we 
were in opposition; we know how to do it,"  he asserted, 
adding that the opposition, to judge by its behavior, did not 
know how to behave when it was out of power in a democracy. 
Rangel added that he wanted the opposition to state publicly 
that it would accept the results of the referendum, win or 
lose, but it had refused to do so thus far.  He would like to 
see a joint ceremony between the opposition and the 
government accepting the process's legitimacy. 
 
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Observers OK, But Must be Regulated 
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4.  (C)  The Ambassador responded that the possibility of 
alternation in power was essential to democracy, and 
established in the Bolivarian constitution.  The USG had made 
clear, including in statements from the Secretary, that it 
would accept the results of a fair and transparent process. 
However, the fact was that there was a great deal of 
skepticism on the opposition's part regarding the conduct of 
electoral institutions; for that reason international 
observers were crucial to maintaining a credible process. 
The Ambassador of the European Union had told him that the EU 
had a mandate to send up to 140 observers to Venezuela once 
it had received an invitation.  In response to Rangel's 
suggestion of a joint ceremony with the opposition blessing 
the electoral process, the Ambassador asked if there was any 
dialogue going on.  Rangel answered negatively, making clear 
that opposition acceptance beforehand of whatever outcome the 
referendum process produced was the pre-condition of any such 
 
dialogue.  The GOV, he added,  has been "snakebitten" by 
undemocratic opposition conduct in the past and is not going 
to talk to it without such a commitment on its part. 
(Comment:  The opposition has no reason to approve the 
conduct of the National Electoral Council ahead of time, and 
is not going to do so.  End comment.) 
 
5.  (C)  Rangel stated that the legitimacy of Venezuela's 
National Electoral Council had been validated by the 
successful conduct of the recall referendum and "reparo" 
process.  Observers would, he went on, be invited to the 
referendum; however, their presence needs to be "regulated" 
so that they are there as observers and not "protagonists." 
He said that the National Electoral Council, not the GOV 
itself, would decide on such regulations; it was looking at 
how observation is structured in other Latin American 
countries such as Mexico. 
 
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Campaign Going Great 
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6.  (C)  Asked how he saw Chavez's effort to win the 
referendum going, Rangel said that the President's supporters 
were thoroughly "galvanized," as shown by a recent massive 
rally.  The opposition ("which is convinced that he is a 
dictator") was caught off-guard by his acceptance of the 
referendum.  While leadership of the pro-Chavez "Comando 
Maisanta" campaign organization has been named, the 
opposition has yet to do the same. 
 
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Bilateral Relations 
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7.  (C)  Rangel said that U.S.-Venezuela relationship needed 
to return to a more normal basis, and that the two countries 
had lots of work to do together.  He asked rhetorically how 
long Venezuela would have to put up with such things as the 
USG's recently released Trafficking in Persons Report which 
singled out Venezuela as a poor performer when there was no 
reason to think the situation here was any worse than it was 
in Colombia or Brazil which received better evaluations.  He 
also mentioned the declassification of a DOD report from 2002 
which alleged (apparently based on press accounts) that the 
GOV had been colluding with the FARC.  He noted that 
Venezuelan police had just conducted a massive drug seizure 
(six tons of cocaine), and said that the GOV wanted to 
continue cooperation in this area. 
 
8.  (C)  The Ambassador said that he appreciated 
counter-narcotics cooperation.  In terms of the overall 
bilateral relationship, President Chavez's evident decision 
to campaign against President Bush rather than the 
opposition, and his insulting personal remarks against him 
were very poorly received in Washington.  Rangel said that 
this is something "that could be discussed."  The Ambassador 
said that there had been consideration of the suggestion that 
Rangel's chief of staff, Amb. Rene Arreaza, and MFA chief of 
staff Temir Porras come to Washington for discussions.  If 
the GOV chose to send them, they would be received at 
appropriately senior levels.  Rangel said that, while a final 
decision had not been made by President Chavez, there was "a 
good disposition" in this matter.  He also said that he was 
prepared to be helpful if the Ambassador and his staff were 
having difficulties meeting with appropriate GOV officials. 
 
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More on Bilateral Relations 
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9.  (C)  Chief of Staff Arreaza later called the Ambassador 
to say that Rangel had liked the idea of broadening the 
international observation by inviting the EU and UNDP as well 
as the OAS and the Carter Center.  He added that at a June 13 
cabinet meeting (without Chavez) the consensus was that 
Chavez should stop attacking President Bush personally since 
these attacks were in fact helping the opposition. 
 
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Comment 
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10.  (C)  Rangel, who can be caustic and contemptuous, was on 
his best behavior.  (This is the first time that a meeting 
between him and the Ambassador occurred at his initiative.) 
He seemed confident that Chavez could win the referendum 
process, derided the opposition as unprepared, and seemingly 
looked forward to the perceived opportunity that a Chavez 
victory in the recall referendum could give to reconstructing 
U.S.-Venezuelan relations on the GOV's terms  --  acceptance 
of the Bolivarian revolution and all its works. 
SHAPIRO 
 
 
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      2004CARACA01998 - CONFIDENTIAL