US embassy cable - 04THEHAGUE1484

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MOLDOVA/TRANSNISTRIA: DUTCH RESPONSE ON STABILITY PACT

Identifier: 04THEHAGUE1484
Wikileaks: View 04THEHAGUE1484 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy The Hague
Created: 2004-06-16 14:15:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL PARM PBTS MD NL OSCE
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 001484 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/16/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PARM, PBTS, MD, NL, OSCE 
SUBJECT: MOLDOVA/TRANSNISTRIA: DUTCH RESPONSE ON STABILITY 
PACT 
 
REF: STATE 130336 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor M. Daly for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
1.  (C) Emboffs delivered reftel demarche June 15 to Frank 
van Beuningen, MFA OSCE policy coordinator, Willemijn 
Kallenberg MFA OSCE senior policy advisor, and Bas Wels, MFA 
lead on East European issues during the Dutch EU presidency. 
 
2.  (C) Before we presented our points, the Dutch noted 
similar concerns as in reftel.  They called the Moldovan 
proposal vague and said they were uncertain as to what the 
GoM wanted to achieve with it.  They found it "most striking" 
that the proposal addresses an internal problem by presenting 
a plan to external partners.  The Dutch believe that the GoM 
should begin by addressing Transnistrian authorities rather 
than the international community.  Given Russia's close ties 
with Transnistria, the Dutch found it odd that while 
appearing to circumvent the Transnistrians, the Moldovans 
have consulted with Russia. 
 
3.  (C) Despite the unorthodox approach, the Dutch think the 
basic Moldovan objective might be to "instill energy" to the 
five-sided negotiations, which they described as having come 
to a "full stop".  The Dutch were surprised at the absence of 
mention of the OSCE, and wondered if what was envisioned was 
a two-track process or something to replace the existing 
process.  They did not reject the possibility it would help 
the five-sided negotiations to move ahead, but added there is 
also the danger that Russia could use the proposal as 
additional reason for delay. 
 
4.  (C) The Dutch also believe it's possible that the 
proposal was simply a less than well-thought-out election 
ploy by President Voronin.  The Dutch have the impression 
that Voronin did not even consult his own foreign ministry 
about the proposal before going public, let alone coordinate 
with other potential signatories.  (They noted that a 
high-level Moldovan minister met with the Dutch the day the 
proposal was announced, and did not mention it to them.) 
 
5.  (C) Wels noted that the EU does not yet have a reaction 
to the U.S. proposal for a high-level meeting, but may reach 
a consensus by mid to late July.  There is concern from some 
member states that the U.S. proposal could undermine the OSCE 
role, while others think it would be a boost for the existing 
process. The Dutch asked about the substance of the U.S. 
reply to the initial Moldovan draft, and whether the current 
draft reflected changes suggested by the U.S.  Emboffs 
advised that the U.S. had not given an extensive commentary 
on the text, but rather that we had urged the GoM to consult 
with others. 
SOBEL 

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