US embassy cable - 04ABUDHABI1992

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 09 ABU DHABI 001992 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/15/14 
TAGS: PINS, PREL, PTER, PGOV, TC 
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR CENTCOM COMMANDER, GEN ABIZAID, 
JUNE 2004 
 
CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR WAHBA; REASON: 1.5 (B) AND (D) 
 
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WELCOME 
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1. (U) GENERAL ABIZAID:  WELCOME BACK TO THE UAE.  WE HAVE 
REQUESTED MEETINGS FOR YOU WITH ABU DHABI CROWN PRINCE 
SHAYKH KHALIFA BIN ZAYED AL NAHYAN, AS WELL AS WITH ABU 
DHABI DEPUTY CROWN PRINCE AND UAE ARMED FORCES CHIEF OF 
STAFF LT GEN SHAYKH MUHAMMAD BIN ZAYED AL NAHYAN (MBZ). 
BOTH SHAYKHS WILL BE INTERESTED TO HEAR YOUR VIEWS ON THE 
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN. 
 
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BACKGROUND 
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2. (S) UAE SUPPORT FOR THE U.S. IN THE REGION REMAINS 
SOLID.  THE EMIRATI LEADERSHIP HAS TRIED IN EARNEST TO 
ACCOMMODATE EVERY U.S. REQUEST FOR COOPERATION AND 
ASSISTANCE.  THIS ENTAILS SOME POLITICAL RISK AS THE 
LEADERSHIP QUIETLY ALLOWS U.S. KC-10 AND KC-135 TANKERS, U- 
2 RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT, GLOBAL HAWK UNMANNED AERIAL 
VEHICLES, AND (UP UNTIL RECENTLY) C-130 SUPPLY AIRCRAFT TO 
CONDUCT OIF/OEF/HOA SUPPORT OPERATIONS FROM BASES WITHIN 
THE UAE.  ADDITIONALLY, THE EMIRATIS HAVE GRANTED OVER 
60,000 AIRCRAFT OVERFLIGHT AND LANDING CLEARANCES ANNUALLY 
SINCE OEF BEGAN.  FURTHER, THE PORTS OF JEBEL ALI AND 
FUJEIRAH ARE INDISPENSABLE TO U.S. NAVY MARITIME 
INTERDICTION OPERATIONS, RESUPPLY AND SUSTAINMENT, AND 
COMBAT SUPPORT EFFORTS ACROSS THE REGION.  UAE SPECIAL 
OPERATIONS FORCES ARE ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN COMBAT OPERATIONS 
IN AFGHANISTAN, AND UAE INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS ARE DEPLOYED 
TO BAGHDAD AND BAGRAM.  DESPITE SOME RECENT SETBACKS IN 
MAJOR FOREIGN MILITARY SALES OFFERS (MOST NOTABLY THE 
EMIRATI REJECTION OF FIVE RE-FURBISHED E-2C AIRBORNE EARLY 
WARNING AIRCRAFT IN APRIL 2004), OUR MILITARY TO MILITARY 
RELATIONSHIP IS VITAL AND REMAINS STRONG. 
 
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SUGGESTED THEMES 
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3. (C) WE ARE WORKING TO ARRANGE MEETINGS FOR YOU WITH BOTH 
THE CROWN PRINCE OF ABU DHABI, SHAYKH KHALIFA BIN ZAYED, 
AND THE DEPUTY CROWN PRINCE OF ABU DHABI AND CHIEF OF STAFF 
OF THE UAE ARMED FORCES, SHAYKH MOHAMED BIN ZAYED.  IN YOUR 
MEETINGS WITH THE CROWN PRINCE AND SHAYKH MOHAMED, WE 
RECOMMEND THAT YOU THANK THE UAE FOR ITS STRONG AND 
CONTINUING SUPPORT FOR OEF AND OIF, AND POLITICAL AND 
HUMANITARIAN EFFORTS TO SUPPORT STABILITY IN AFGHANISTAN 
AND IRAQ.  THE CROWN PRINCE WILL BE MOST INTERESTED IN 
HEARING YOUR ASSESSMENT OF: 
 
-- THE COMING TRANSITION PERIOD IN IRAQ, INCLUDING THE 
ROLES OF THE COALITION FORCES AND THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT; 
 
-- OUR TRAINING OF THE IRAQI MILITARY AND POLICE, AND YOUR 
ASSESSMENT OF THEIR ABILITIES TO ASSUME GREATER 
RESPONSIBILITIES FOR SECURITY; 
 
-- STRATEGIES FOR FALLUJAH AND FOR DEALING WITH MOQTADA AL- 
SADR; 
 
-- PROGRESS ON RESTORING STABILITY IN AFGHANISTAN; 
 
-- THE SITUATION IN SAUDI ARABIA. 
 
4. (S) WITH SHAYKH MOHAMED, WE RECOMMEND THAT YOU EXPLORE 
IN GREATER DETAIL THE ISSUES MENTIONED ABOVE, AS WELL AS 
RAISE THE FOLLOWING ISSUES: 
 
-- ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE IRAQI INTERIM GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING 
THE EXPECTED RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE NEW U.S. EMBASSY AND 
THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT, AND COALITION FORCES; 
 
-- ARRANGEMENTS FOR BROADER PARTICIPATION IN THE 
MULTINATIONAL FORCE; 
 
-- ASK MBZ FOR HIS VIEWS ON IRAQI RECEPTIVENESS TO ARAB 
TROOPS (NOTE: SHAYKH MOHAMED TOLD THE AMBASSADOR THAT ARAB 
TROOPS WOULD ONLY GO TO IRAQ IF BLESSED BY THE ARAB LEAGUE. 
END NOTE.) 
 
-- ASSURE MBZ OF U.S. COMMITMENT TO SAUDI ARABIA.  (MBZ AND 
OTHER SENIOR EMIRATIS HAVE CAUTIONED THAT OUR SUPPORT AT 
THIS TIME IS CRUCIAL FOR THE SAUDIS BUT NEEDS TO BE SUBTLE 
AND BALANCED.) 
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TERRORISM FINANCING 
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5. (C) THE UAEG HAS CRACKED DOWN ON POTENTIAL 
VULNERABILITIES IN THE FINANCIAL MARKETS SINCE 9/11, AND 
IMPLEMENTED LEGISLATION IN JANUARY 2002 CRIMINALIZING MONEY 
LAUNDERING AND TERRORIST FINANCING.  IT IS IN THE PROCESS 
OF CONSIDERING A SEPARATE TERRORIST FINANCE LAW TO ADDRESS 
SOME OF THE PROBLEMS THE CENTRAL BANK HAS HAD WITH 
INVESTIGATING TERRORIST FINANCING AND FREEZING THE ACCOUNTS 
OF TERRORISTS.  AS OF THE END OF 2003, THE UAEG HAS FROZEN 
MORE THAN 3.13 MILLION DOLLARS IN 18 BANK ACCOUNTS IN THE 
UAE, AND HAS WORKED WITH US TO BLOCK FINANCING A NUMBER OF 
NAMED TERRORIST ENTITIES.  THE CENTRAL BANK ALSO HOSTED A 
CONFERENCE ON THE HAWALA INFORMAL MONEY TRANSFER SYSTEM IN 
APRIL.  THE UAE RECOGNIZES THE NEED TO PROTECT ITS 
FINANCIAL SYSTEM FROM USE BY TERRORISTS.  A TERRORIST 
ATTACK HERE WOULD NEGATE THE LEADERSHIP'S EFFORTS TO 
PROMOTE THE UAE, AND DUBAI IN PARTICULAR, AS A TOURIST 
DESTINATION AND HAVEN FOR FOREIGN INVESTMENT. 
 
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MEDIA CONCERNS 
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6. (U) AL ARABIYYA, THE DUBAI-BASED ARABIC SATELLITE NEWS 
STATION COMPETING WITH AL JAZEERA FOR VIEWERS, STIRRED UP 
CONTROVERSY WITH SENSATIONALISTIC BROADCASTS OF COALITION 
OPERATIONS. 
 
A. (U) WE HAVE EXPRESSED STRONG OBJECTIONS TO BOTH THE 
UAE GOVERNMENT AND THE DIRECTOR OF THE DUBAI MEDIA CITY, 
REGARDING AL ARABIYYA'S LACK OF OBJECTIVITY.  AL ARABIYYA 
AND NUMEROUS MEDIA GIANTS, SUCH AS CNN AND REUTERS, OPERATE 
FROM DUBAI MEDIA CITY BECAUSE THE UAEG AND DUBAI ALLOW THEM 
TO BROADCAST WITHOUT CENSORSHIP.  AL ARABIYYA IS OWNED BY 
WEALTHY SAUDI BUSINESSMAN WALEED BIN IBRAHIM AL IBRAHIM, A 
BROTHER-IN-LAW OF KING FAHD, AND A PRINCIPAL SHAREHOLDER OF 
MIDDLE EAST BROADCASTING CORPORATION (MBC), AL ARABIYYA'S 
PARENT COMPANY.   OTHER AL ARABIYYA INVESTORS REPORTEDLY 
INCLUDE KUWAITI BUSINESSMEN AND A KUWAITI ROYAL FAMILY 
MEMBER, AHMED AL FAHED AL SABAH. 
 
B. (C) THE UAE LEADERSHIP TELLS US THEY ARE NOT IN A 
POSITION TO SHUT DOWN THE STATION OR CANCEL RESIDENCY VISA 
PERMITS WITHOUT DESTROYING DUBAI'S FREE-ZONE REPUTATION. 
BUT SHAYKH MOHAMMED AND OTHER UAE LEADERS HAVE REPEATEDLY 
STRESSED THEIR CONCERN ABOUT THE NEGATIVE IMPACT OF BOTH AL 
ARABIYYA AND AL-JAZIRA.  THE EMIRATIS HAVE WORKED BEHIND 
THE SCENES TO ENSURE THAT AL ARABIYYA STATION'S NEW 
MANAGEMENT IMPROVES REPORTING STANDARDS AND OBJECTIVITY. 
UAE LEADERS ARE OPTIMISTIC THAT THE STATION WILL SOON 
EXERCISE MORE PROFESSIONAL AND OBJECTIVE STANDARDS. 
 
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DUBAI AND COUNTER-PROLIFERATION 
------------------------------- 
 
7. (S) DURING A MARCH VISIT TO THE UAE, ASSISTANT SECRETARY 
OF STATE JOHN WOLF URGED UAE LEADERS TO TAKE ACTION AGAINST 
COMPANIES AND INDIVIDUALS SUPPORTING A.Q. KHAN'S 
PROLIFERATION NETWORK IN DUBAI.  DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND 
MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS SHAYKH HAMDAN BIN 
ZAYED AL NAHYAN PLEDGED COMPLETE COOPERATION TO SHUTDOWN 
THE KHAN NETWORK, AND DUBAI CROWN PRINCE AND UAE MINISTER 
OF DEFENSE SHAYKH MOHAMMED BIN RASHID AL MAKTOUM (MBR) 
UNDERTOOK TO FULFILL A NUMBER OF OUR OUTSTANDING REQUESTS 
IMMEDIATELY, NAMELY APPREHENDING B.S.A. TAHIR'S BROTHER WHO 
WAS RESIDENT IN DUBAI, AND MAKING HIM AVAILABLE TO U.S. 
INVESTIGATORS FOR QUESTIONING; AS WELL AS CLOSING DOWN SMB 
COMPUTERS AND TURNING OVER COMPUTER EQUIPMENT AND OTHER 
ASSETS (E.G., FILES) TO USG AUTHORITIES FOR INVESTIGATION. 
UAE AUTHORITIES CONTINUE TO WORK WITH U.S. INVESTIGATORS TO 
DISCERN THE FULL SCOPE OF KHAN'S ACTIVITIES IN THE UAE. 
A/S WOLF'S TRIP FOLLOWED THE SUCCESSFUL LAUNCH OF THE 
STATE/NP-LED EXPORT CONTROLS AND RELATED BORDER SECURITY 
ASSISTANCE (EXBS) PROGRAM IN THE UAE.  THE USG AND THE UAEG 
HAVE AGREED ON A ROBUST EXPORT CONTROL TRAINING PLAN, WHICH 
WE BEGAN TO IMPLEMENT IN DECEMBER 2003.  SINCE THAT TIME, 
THE USG HAS PROVIDED FOUR COURSES TO THE UAEG ON BOTH LEGAL 
ASPECTS OF AN EXPORT CONTROL PROGRAM AND ON HOW TO DETECT 
AND INTERDICT THE COMPONENTS OF WMD.  THE UAE IS IN THE 
PROCESS OF DRAFTING ITS OWN EXPORT CONTROL LAW. 
 
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PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE (PSI) 
--------------------------------------- 
 
8. (U) SENIOR UAE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS HAVE EXPRESSED 
INTEREST IN HOW THE UAE COULD PLAY A ROLE IN PSI.  MBZ TOLD 
THE AMBASSADOR THAT THE UAE IS INTERESTED (IN PRINCIPLE) IN 
A SHIP BOARDING AGREEMENT WITH THE U.S.  UAE ARMED FORCES 
GHQ IS CURRENTLY REVIEWING A DRAFT AGREEMENT AND WE EXPECT 
TO OPEN DISCUSSIONS ON PSI WITH THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF'S 
OFFICE SOON. 
 
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NARCOTICS IN THE UAE 
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9. (U) ALTHOUGH NOT A NARCOTICS PRODUCING NATION, THE UAE 
IS A TRANSSHIPMENT POINT FOR TRAFFICKERS MOVING ILLEGAL 
DRUGS WESTWARD FROM THE MAJOR DRUG-PRODUCING COUNTRIES, 
INCLUDING AFGHANISTAN, IRAN, PAKISTAN, AND INDIA.  FREQUENT 
REPORTS OF SEIZURES OF ILLEGAL DRUGS IN THE UAE DURING THE 
PAST YEAR UNDERSCORE THIS CONCLUSION, ALTHOUGH MOST 
SEIZURES HAVE BEEN OF "SOFT" DRUGS LIKE HASHISH, NOT "HARD" 
DRUGS LIKE HEROIN.  NEWS STORIES ABOUT DRUG SMUGGLING, 
DEALING, AND USAGE WERE REPORTED IN THE LOCAL PRESS IN 
2003.  IN ADDITION TO THE COUNTRY'S GENERALLY LAISSEZ-FAIRE 
ATTITUDE TOWARD COMMERCIAL TRADE--THOUGH CERTAINLY NOT 
DRUGS--THERE ARE SEVERAL FACTORS THAT PROMOTE UAE'S ROLE AS 
A WAY-STATION, INCLUDING ITS PROXIMITY TO MAJOR DRUG 
CULTIVATION REGIONS IN SOUTH ASIA; 700 KILOMETERS OF OPEN 
COASTLINE; AND RELATIVE AFFLUENCE AMONG THE LOCAL 
POPULATION.  PUBLISHED STATISTICS ON NARCOTICS SEIZURES AND 
DOMESTIC ADDICTION REVEAL A GROWING DRUG PROBLEM AMONG UAE 
AND THIRD-COUNTRY NATIONALS WHICH, WHILE NOT SIGNIFICANT BY 
AMERICAN STANDARDS, IS NOTABLE GIVEN THE COUNTRY'S HARSH 
DRUG LAWS.  A MINISTRY OF HEALTH REPORT IN LATE 1998 
ASSERTS THAT THERE WERE APPROXIMATELY 12,500 DRUG ADDICTS 
IN THE COUNTRY OF 3.1 MILLION PEOPLE. 
 
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REGIONAL AID AND SUPPORT 
------------------------ 
 
10. (U) IRAQ: SENIOR UAEG OFFICIALS HAVE BEEN PARTICULARLY 
SUPPORTIVE OF OUR BROADER REGIONAL OBJECTIVES IN IRAQ AND 
AFGHANISTAN.  UAE ASSISTANCE TO IRAQ, BOTH PLEDGED AND 
DELIVERED, HAS BEEN SIGNIFICANT. AS A FOUNDING MEMBER OF 
THE CORE GROUP ON IRAQ'S RECONSTRUCTION, THE UAEG PROVIDED 
SPECIFIC PROPOSALS FOR IRAQ'S ECONOMIC RECOVERY AND HOSTED 
A FOLLOW-ON DONORS CONFERENCE IN FEBRUARY 2004.  DURING 
FORMER SECRETARY BAKER'S VISIT TO THE UAEG IN JANUARY 2004, 
ABU DHABI CROWN PRINCE SHAYKH KHALIFA AGREED TO FORGIVE THE 
BULK OF IRAQ'S $4 BILLION DEBT TO THE UAE. 
 
11. (U) AFGHANISTAN: THE UAE HAS PROVIDED MILLIONS OF 
DOLLARS IN FINANCIAL AID AND ASSISTANCE-IN-KIND TO THE 
AFGHAN INTERIM AUTHORITY, AND REMAINS ACTIVELY INVOLVED IN 
RECONSTRUCTION AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE.  THE UAEG 
PLEDGED $30 MILLION IN ECONOMIC AID AND A FURTHER $6 
MILLION IN HUMANITARIAN AID AT THE JANUARY 2002 TOKYO 
CONFERENCE, AND WE EXPECT THE UAE AID PACKAGE TO EXCEED THE 
$150 MILLION UAE HAS ALREADY SPENT. 
 
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IRAN: TENSION PERSISTS 
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12. (S) RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UAE AND IRAN REMAIN STRAINED. 
THE EFFORT TO REACH SOME COMPROMISE ON THE ABU MUSA ISLAND 
ISSUE CAME TO A NEAR HALT IN LATE SPRING/EARLY SUMMER OF 
2003.  THE EMIRATIS HAVE MADE CLEAR TO US THAT THEY ARE 
DEEPLY SUSPICIOUS OF IRAN'S TERRITORIAL/MILITARY AMBITIONS 
IN THE GULF, PARTICULARLY WITH RESPECT TO TEHRAN'S NUCLEAR 
AND WMD ACQUISITION POLICY AND HAVE CONSISTENTLY SUPPORTED 
A TOUGH APPROACH BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND IAEA. 
TO ADD TO THE TENSIONS BETWEEN THE UAE AND IRAN, IT HAS 
BEEN REPORTED TO US THAT OVER TWO MONTHS AGO, TWO UAE COAST 
GUARD PATROL SHIPS AND CREW WERE BEING DETAINED IN BANDER 
ABBAS.  THE REASONS FOR THIS ARE UNCLEAR AND THE EMIRATIES 
HAVE REMAINED QUIET ABOUT IT.  LIKEWISE, EARLY JUNE HAS 
WITNESSED AN UPSURGE IN DETENTION OF FISHING VESSELS FOR 
OPERATING TOO CLOSE TO OIL WELLS IN THE GREATER ABU MUSA 
AREA WHICH BOTH SIDES CLAIM. THE EMIRATIS ARE WORRIED ABOUT 
IRANIAN DESIGNS IN IRAQ AND HAVE URGED US TO HELP PREVENT 
IRAN FROM MEDDLING IN IRAQ'S DOMESTIC AFFAIRS.  THE 
EMIRATIS BELIEVE THAT THE IRANIANS ARE ACTIVELY SEEKING A 
FOOTHOLD IN THE SUNNI IRAQ COMMUNITY AS WELL AS WITH THE 
SHI'A. 
 
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THE MILITARY RELATIONSHIP 
------------------------- 
 
13. (U) OUR MILITARY-TO-MILITARY RELATIONSHIP WITH UAE IS 
ACTIVE AND STRONG.  UNTIL RECENTLY, OUR KEY INTERLOCUTOR 
WITH THE UAE MILITARY HAD BEEN UAE ARMED FORCES CHIEF OF 
STAFF LIEUTENANT GENERAL SHAYKH MOHAMMED BIN ZAYED AL 
NAHYAN (MBZ).  FOLLOWING HIS APPOINTMENT TO THE ROLE OF ABU 
DHABI DEPUTY CROWN PRINCE, MBZ HAS BEEN LESS INVOLVED IN 
DAILY MILITARY ISSUES, AS HIS NEW DUTIES HAVE DEMANDED MORE 
AND MORE OF HIS ATTENTION.  INSTEAD, MBZ HAS DEFERRED MOST 
MILITARY MATTERS TO HIS CAPABLE AND INTELLIGENT DEPUTY, 
MAJOR GENERAL HAMAD MOHAMMED THANI AL RUMAITHY.  THIS IS A 
POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT, IN THAT THE US-UAE MILITARY-TO- 
MILITARY RELATIONSHIP HAS NOW BEEN INSTITUTIONALIZED WITH 
GHQ, AND IS NO LONGER RELIANT UPON THE PERSONAL 
AVAILABILITY AND DIRECT INVOLVEMENT OF MBZ.  MAJOR GENERAL 
HAMAD THANI IS A KEEN ORGANIZER AND HAS EFFECTIVELY 
ENERGIZED HIS STAFF TO BEGIN COORDINATING THE MYRIAD ISSUES 
OF OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP. 
 
14. (U) UNFORTUNATELY, THE INAUGURAL JOINT MILITARY 
COMMISSION (JMC), SCHEDULED FOR MAY 2004, WAS POSTPONED AT 
OSD REQUEST DUE TO A SCHEDULING CONFLICT WITH THE QATAR 
MILITARY COOPERATION COMMISSION (MCC).  IN A SHORT-NOTICE 
ATTEMPT TO DECONFLICT THE TWO HIGH-LEVEL MEETINGS FROM AN 
ISLAMIC RELIGIOUS HOLIDAY, WE WERE FORCED TO POSTPONE THE 
UAE JMC IN FAVOR OF THE PREVIOUSLY-CONFIRMED DATES FOR THE 
QATAR MCC.  DESPITE OBVIOUS DISAPPOINTMENT AT UAE GHQ 
(FOLLOWING EARNEST PREPARATIONS FOR THE EVENT), DEPUTY 
CHIEF OF STAFF MAJOR GENERAL HAMAD THANI GRACIOUSLY 
ACCEPTED OUR REQUEST TO POSTPONE THE JMC, AND SUGGESTED 11 
- 12 OCT 2004 AS THE NEXT OPPORTUNITY FOR THE FORUM.  WE 
ARE AWAITING OSD CONFIRMATION OF THOSE DATES. 
 
15. (U) THE SUCCESS OF THE RECENT INAUGURAL CLASS OF THE 
GULF AIR WARFARE CENTER (GAWC) IS ONE OF THE HIGHLIGHTS OF 
THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP.  USAF AND UAE AIR FORCE HAVE 
BEEN WORKING THE CONCEPT SINCE MAY 2000.  UAE IS PROVIDING 
STATE-OF-THE-ART FACILITIES AND THE U.S. (ALONG WITH THE 
U.K.) IS PROVIDING COURSEWARE AND DEDICATED INSTRUCTORS, AS 
WELL AS ROUTINE PARTICIPANTS.  THE INAUGURAL CLASS 
CONCLUDED IN FEBRUARY 2004 AND SUCCESSFULLY VALIDATED THE 
INITIAL CONCEPT.  THE SECOND CLASS GRADUATED ON 26 MAY 2004 
AND IMPLEMENTED A SYLLABUS REFINED BY THE LESSONS OF THE 
INAUGURAL COURSE.  FUTURE CLASSES WILL EXPAND GAWC 
PARTICIPATION TO OTHER GCC COUNTRIES AND FRANCE, AND THE 
UAE AIR FORCE COMMANDER IS CONSIDERING FURTHER EXPANSION TO 
POSSIBLY INCLUDE JORDAN AND EGYPT.  MEANWHILE, CENTAF AND 
UAEAF ARE COORDINATING A DRAFT US-UAE MEMORANDUM OF 
AGREEMENT DETAILING FUTURE GAWC COOPERATION. 
 
16. (S) AL DHAFRA AIR BASE REMAINS A KEY COMPONENT OF OUR 
RELATIONSHIP WITH UAE AND IS VITAL TO THE ABILITY OF 
CENTCOM AND CENTAF TO PROJECT COMBAT POWER IN THE AOR.  AL 
DHAFRA IS CURRENTLY THE HOME TO THE 380TH AIR EXPEDITIONARY 
WING, WITH MORE THAN 1100 CENTAF PERSONNEL, OPERATING 
TWELVE KC-135 AND FOUR KC-10 AIR REFUELING TANKERS, AS WELL 
AS SIX U-2 SURVEILLANCE AIRCRAFT AND ONE GLOBAL HAWK 
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE.  UAEAF HAS ACCOMMODATED VIRTUALLY 
EVERY REQUEST FOR PERIODIC INCREASES IN FORCES AT AL 
DHAFRA, AS MANDATED BY OUR FLUCTUATING OPERATIONS TEMPO. 
WE ARE PRESENTLY COORDINATING THE CONSTRUCTION OF A 
SEPARATE, DEDICATED U.S. AIRCRAFT PARKING RAMP AND 
REFUELING HYDRANT SYSTEM.  CONGRESS AUTHORIZED THIS MILCON 
PROJECT IN THE 2003 GWOT SUPPLEMENTAL.  WE EXPECT TO 
OBLIGATE FUNDS AND BEGIN CONSTRUCTION THIS MONTH. 
ADDITIONALLY, UAEAF IS FUNDING THE CONSTRUCTION OF A NEW 
U.S. CANTONEMENT AREA WITH STATE OF THE ART DORMITORY 
FACILITIES.  THE NEW CANTONEMENT AREA WAS DESIGNED TO U.S. 
SPECIFICATIONS AND WILL ALLAY NUMEROUS FORCE PROTECTION 
CONCERNS, AND WILL ALSO MOVE CENTAF PERSONNEL FROM THE 
EXISTING TENTS, INHABITED SINCE 1991. 
 
17. (S) THE EMIRATI PORTS AT JEBEL ALI (ON THE ARABIAN 
GULF) AND FUJEIRAH (ON THE GULF OF OMAN) ARE ALSO CRUCIAL 
TO CENTCOM ACCESS AND FORCE PROJECTION IN THE REGION.  OVER 
620 U.S. NAVY SHIPS VISITED UAE PORTS LAST YEAR.  U.S. NAVY 
SEALS RECENTLY COMPLETED TRAINING DUBAI POLICE AND JEBEL 
ALI PORT POLICE ON SPECIAL TACTICS AND SHIPBOARDING 
PROCEDURES, IN ORDER TO BETTER PROTECT US NAVAL SHIPS IN 
UAE PORTS. 
 
18. (S) UAE DEPLOYED A 35-MAN SPECIAL OPERATIONS CONTINGENT 
TO BAGRAM AIR BASE IN MID-2003.  THESE TROOPS ARE ENGAGED 
IN ACTIVE COMBAT OPERATIONS AND SUFFERED THEIR FIRST 
CASUALTIES (WIA, RETURNED TO DUTY) ON 24 APRIL 2004.  UAE 
ALSO PLANS TO DEPLOY ITS SQUADRON OF SEEKER II UAVS TO 
BAGRAM BEGINNING IN LATE SUMMER 2004.  ALTHOUGH THIS 
DEPLOYMENT WAS DELAYED FROM THE ORIGINAL PLAN (DECEMBER 
2003), DUE TO ENVIRONMENTAL AND OPERATIONAL CONSTRAINTS AT 
BAGRAM, PREPARATIONS ARE ON-TRACK AND WE ARE WORKING THE 
DETAILS TO ENSURE SUCCESS. 
 
19. (S) WE HAVE RECENTLY ENGAGED IN SEVERAL INTELLIGENCE 
SHARING INITIATIVES WITH UAE.  MOST SIGNIFICANTLY, THE UAE 
DIRECTORATE OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SENT OFFICERS TO 
COALITION HEADQUARTERS IN BOTH BAGHDAD AND BAGRAM IN APRIL 
2004 TO PERFORM DUTIES AS JOINT OPERATIONS AND JOINT 
INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS.  U.S. INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES ARE 
ASSISTING THE UAE SPACE AND RECONNAISSANCE CENTER (SRC) TO 
CONSOLIDATE ITS MAPPING FUNCTIONS, AND THE NATIONAL 
GEOSPATIAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY IS DEVELOPING AIR PHOTO 
INTERPRETATION FAMILIARIZATION TRAINING FOR THE UAE SRC. 
FURTHER, CENTCOM HAS OFFERED TO PROVIDE TECHNICAL 
ASSISTANCE AND ADVICE TO THE UAE TO CREATE AN INTELLIGENCE 
FUSION CENTER THAT WILL GIVE THREAT INDICATIONS AND 
WARNINGS TO THE UAE LEADERSHIP.  THE UAE IS EVALUATING 
WHETHER TO TAKE THE NEEDED STEPS TO CONCLUDE A BILATERAL 
SIGINT AGREEMENT. 
 
20. (U) UAE CONCERN WITH LOGISTICS, SUPPLY, AND SUPPORT OF 
THEIR FORCES IN AFGHANISTAN HAVE LED TO RENEWED INTEREST IN 
AN ACQUISITION AND CROSS SERVICING AGREEMENT.  THE DIRECT 
PERSONAL INVOLVEMENT OF BOTH MBZ AND UAE AIR FORCE 
COMMANDER STAFF PILOT MAJOR GENERAL KHALID ABDULLA MOBARAK 
AL BUAINAIN HAS BEEN SIGNIFICANT, AND WE ARE MAKING 
PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETING AN AGREEMENT IN TALKS BETWEEN 
UAE GHQ, CENTCOM J4, AND USLO STAFF OFFICERS. 
 
21. (U) EXERCISE EAGLE RESOLVE 04 (ER 04) WAS CONDUCTED 15 
- 25 MAY 2004.  THE EMIRATIS HOSTED CENTCOM'S ANNUAL 
COOPERATIVE DEFENSE INITIATIVE EVENT FOR THE FIRST TIME, 
FOLLOWING THE HIATUS LAST YEAR DUE TO OIF.  THE THEME FOR 
ER 04 WAS THEATER AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE.  CENTCOM J3 AND 
SUPPORTING U.S. ORGANIZATIONS WERE ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN 
DEVELOPING THE SCENARIO AND PROCEDURES FOR THE EXERCISE, 
AND PROVIDED THE PREPONDERANCE OF PARTICIPANTS AND 
EXPERTISE.  UAE PREPARATIONS WERE ENTHUSIASTIC, 
PROFESSIONAL, AND THOROUGH, AND UAE OFFICERS PERFORMED 
ADMIRABLY, ESPECIALLY IN LEADERSHIP POSITIONS FOR THE AIR 
OPERATIONS CENTER AND REGIONAL OPERATIONS CENTR.  KUWAIT, 
BAHRAIN, AND QATAR WERE WELL-REPRESENTED AND PARTICIPATED 
CAPABLY.  OMAN PROVIDED TWO MID-LEVEL OFFICERS WHO 
STRUGGLED WITH THE BASIC CONCEPTS.  SAUDI ARABIA DID NOT 
SHOW UP FOR THE COORDINATION EXERCISE PORTION OF ER 04, BUT 
ARRIVED FOR THE EXECUTIVE SEMINAR AND DEBRIEFS.  EGYPT AND 
JORDAN BOTH PROVIDED OBSERVERS.  THE EXERCISE WAS A SUCCESS 
AND PRODUCED SEVERAL VALUABLE LESSONS REGARDING 
OPERATIONAL-LEVEL INTEROPERABILITY AND COORDINATION.  THERE 
ARE, AS OF YET, NO VOLUNTEERS TO HOST NEXT YEAR'S EXERCISE 
AND THE ISSUE WAS TABLED FOR FUTURE DISCUSSIONS. 
 
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CHALLENGES AND SETBACKS 
----------------------- 
 
22. (U) WE HAVE EXPERIENCED A NUMBER OF RECENT SETBACKS IN 
OUR MIL-TO-MIL RELATIONSHIP, MOST NOTABLY IN THE ARENA OF 
MAJOR WEAPONS SYSTEM SALES. 
 
23. (U) UAE ALLOWED THE OFFER EXPIRATION DATE (OED) ON THE 
LETTER OF OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE (LOA) FOR FIVE E-2C ADVANCED 
HAWKEYE AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING AIRCRAFT TO EXPIRE WITHOUT 
FORMAL NOTIFICATION ON 31 MARCH 2004.  A SUBSEQUENT 15-DAY 
GRACE PERIOD ALSO LAPSED WITHOUT FORMAL UAE COMMENT.  THIS 
FOREIGN MILITARY SALES (FMS) CASE HAD BEEN UNDER 
CONSIDERATION FOR SEVERAL YEARS, AND THE OED WAS REPEATEDLY 
EXTENDED OVER THE COURSE OF CHALLENGING NEGOTIATIONS. 
FOLLOWING OED, THE FIVE AIRCRAFT THAT HAD BEEN RESERVED FOR 
THE UAE WERE RETURNED TO THE USN FLEET, WHERE THEY ARE 
BEING DISMANTLED FOR SPARE PARTS. 
 
 A. (C) THE UAE REJECTED THE E-2C LOA DUE (OSTENSIBLY) 
TO TWO CONCERNS:  THE DIFFICULTY AND EXPENSE OF INTEGRATING 
A FRENCH DATA LINK SYSTEM (STRICTLY A COMMERCIAL VENTURE 
BETWEEN THE U.S. AND FRENCH MANUFACTURERS, AND THE UAE); 
AND UAE INSISTENCE UPON BLANKET APPROVAL FOR THE U.S. LINK- 
16 DATA LINK SYSTEM.  THIS LATTER ISSUE IS SIGNIFICANT, IN 
THAT UAE INTENDS TO INTEGRATE LINK-16 IN A NATIONAL COMMAND 
AND CONTROL ARCHITECTURE (STILL TO BE DEFINED), WHICH 
INCLUDES NUMEROUS FOREIGN-MANUFACTURED WEAPONS SYSTEMS.  IN 
TWO SEPARATE DISCUSSIONS WITH MBZ PRIOR TO THE OED, 
AMBASSADOR WAHBA STRESSED THE FOLLOWING CONSIDERATIONS: 
LINK-16 HAD BEEN APPROVED FOR THE UAE E-2C AND APPROVAL IS 
PENDING/LIKELY FOR THE F-16; THE U.S. RELEASE PROCESS DOES 
NOT PERMIT ANY BLANKET APPROVAL PROVISIONS, EVEN FOR OUR 
CLOSEST ALLIES (UK, NATO); AND THAT THIS ISSUE REMAINS THE 
PROPER PURVIEW OF THE COMMAND AND CONTROL INTEROPERABILITY 
BOARD (CCIB), WHICH WE HAVE REPEATEDLY ATTEMPTED TO 
SCHEDULE AND WHICH UAE CANCELLED ON SHORT NOTICE AT LEAST 
TWICE.  FURTHER, AMBASSADOR WAHBA STRESSED THAT THE 
AIRCRAFT WOULD NO LONGER BE AVAILABLE AFTER THE OED, AND 
THAT THE COST TO ACQUIRE THE SAME OR A COMPLIMENTARY SYSTEM 
IN THE FUTURE WOULD CERTAINLY BE MUCH HIGHER.  MBZ 
ACKNOWLEDGED THE AMBASSADOR'S POINTS AND INFORMED HER THAT, 
WITHOUT ASSURANCE FOR BLANKET RELEASE, THE DECISION HAD 
BEEN MADE TO REJECT THE OFFER. 
 
 B. (C) IN THE MEANTIME, THE AEW CAPABILITY OFFERED IN 
THE E-2C LOA REMAINS A PRESSING REQUIREMENT FOR THE UAE, 
AND ONE THEY WILL HAVE TO ADDRESS AT SOME POINT IN THE 
FUTURE.  THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THEIR F-16 FLEET WILL 
CERTAINLY BE DIMINISHED BY THE LOSS OF THE COMPLEMENTING E- 
2C CAPABILITY, AND EVEN IF THEY BEGIN NEGOTIATION ON 
ANOTHER AEW PLATFORM TOMORROW--EVEN ANOTHER E-2C PURCHASE-- 
IT WILL PROBABLY BE 3 - 5 YEARS BEFORE THEY CAN OBTAIN THE 
CAPABILITY THEY REQUIRE.  FINALLY, IN TERMS OF THEIR 
EXPRESSED LINK-16 ISSUE, THE UAE F-16 FLEET IS NOW ISOLATED 
AS THE ONLY PLATFORM IN THEIR INVENTORY CURRENTLY APPROVED 
FOR LINK-16 (RELEASE IN PRINCIPLE). 
 
24. (C) LINK-16 IS ONLY ONE OF SEVERAL VITAL 
INTEROPERABILITY ISSUES THAT CHALLENGE OUR FUTURE MILITARY 
INTERACTION WITH UAE.  OTHERS INCLUDE, BUT ARE NOT LIMITED 
TO:  COMSEC ACCOUNTS, FACILITIES, AND CUSTODIANS; LINK-11; 
AND DEVELOPMENT OF A VISION FOR A UAE NATIONAL COMMAND AND 
CONTROL ARCHITECTURE.  THESE ISSUES ARE IN THE ARENA OF THE 
CENTCOM-SPONSORED COMMAND AND CONTROL INTEROPERABILITY 
BOARD.  UNFORTUNATELY, UAE CANCELLED A PREVIOUSLY-SCHEDULED 
CCIB ON VERY SHORT NOTICE IN OCTOBER 2003, AND HAS FAILED 
TO RESPOND TO REPEATED CENTCOM AND COUNTRY TEAM OFFERS TO 
RE-SCHEDULE, MOST RECENTLY IN APRIL 2004.  THE CCIB IS ONE 
OF OUR MOST PRESSING ISSUES AND SHOULD BE STRESSED AT EVERY 
OPPORTUNITY DURING THE CDR'S VISIT. 
 
25. (C) IN FEBRUARY 2004 UAE ANNOUNCED A SURPRISE DECISION 
TO REJECT THE LOA FOR U.S.-BASED (TUCSON) F-16 TRAINING FOR 
THEIR SOON-TO-BE-ACQUIRED F-16 BLOCK-60 FLEET.  THE UAE AIR 
FORCE COMMANDER CITED NEW FISCAL CONSTRAINTS AS THE 
RATIONALE FOR THE DECISION.  IN RESPONSE, SAF/IA, LOCKHEED 
MARTIN, AND GENERAL ELECTRIC RAPIDLY ENGINEERED A REVISED 
OFFER IN MARCH 2004 THAT LOWERED THE COST OF THE PROGRAM 
SIGNIFICANTLY, BY REDUCING THE SCOPE AND SCALE (THOUGH NOT 
THE CALIBER) OF THE TRAINING.  UAE EXPRESSED SATISFACTION 
AND APPRECIATION FOR THE NEW OFFER.  SAF/IA PROVIDED THE 
REVISED LETTER OF OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE (LOA) IN MAY 2004, 
WHICH WILL EXPIRE ON 30 JUNE 2004.  WE HAVE JUST LEARNED 
THAT UAE IS REQUESTING A TWO MONTH EXTENSION ON THE LOA, 
WHILE THEY CONCLUDE THEIR DELIBERATIONS ON THE OFFER.  IT 
APPEARS THAT SAF/IA WILL APPROVE THE EXTENSION TO THE OFFER 
EXPIRATION DATE AS REQUESTED, BUT WILL ALSO REITERATE THE 
IMPLICATIONS THAT CONTINUED DELAYS IN SIGNING THE CASE WILL 
ONLY EXACERBATE AN ALREADY CRITICAL SITUATION.  IT IS A DAY 
FOR DAY SLIP IN THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE TRAINING SCHEDULE 
FOR EVERY DAY OF DELAY BEYOND 30 JUNE IN SIGNING THE CASE. 
THIS IS A REAL CONCERN, AS SEVERAL KEY PROGRAM MILESTONES 
ARE IMMINENT OR HAVE ELAPSED. 
 
26. (S) CONCURRENT WITH THE INITIAL UAE DECISION TO REJECT 
THE F-16 TRAINING CASE, WE LEARNED THAT UAE HAD TABLED 
THEIR DRAFT REQUEST TO ACQUIRE ATACMS/HIMARS.  THIS 
DECISION IS ALSO REPORTEDLY DUE TO THE COST OF THE WEAPON 
SYSTEM AND WAS CONFIRMED IN A CONVERSATION BETWEEN DEPUTY 
SECRETARY ARMITAGE AND MBZ ON 20 APRIL 2004.  MEANWHILE, WE 
 
SIPDIS 
HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO OBTAIN A COMMITMENT ON SEVERAL OTHER 
KEY FMS AND DCS PROGRAMS, INCLUDING THE AH-64 APACHE A-TO-D 
REMANUFACTURE AND HARPOON.  BOTH OF THESE LOAS EXPIRED 
WITHOUT COMMENT FROM UAE.  TAKEN IN CONJUNCTION WITH UAE 
PROPOSALS FOR SEVERAL OTHER LARGE, PENDING U.S. 
ACQUISITIONS (SUCH AS SIGINT AIRCRAFT, ENHANCED SEA SPARROW 
MISSILE, A LAND FORCES COMBAT TRAINING CENTER, AND REMOTE 
SENSING), WE BELIEVE UAE MAY BE EITHER OVER-EXTENDED IN 
THEIR DEFENSE BUDGET, OR THEY MAY HAVE REASSESED THEIR 
DEFENSE PRIORITIES ENTIRELY.  WE ARE ATTEMPTING TO 
UNDERSTAND UAE'S CURRENT AND FUTURE YEAR DEFENSE PRIORITIES 
IN ORDER TO ASSIST THEM WITH AN INTEGRATED AND EXECUTABLE 
ACQUISITION, OPERATIONS, AND MAINTENANCE PLAN.  OBTAINING 
SUCH AN UNDERSTANDING SHOULD BE A KEY CONSIDERATION FOR THE 
UPCOMING JMC, TENTATIVELY SCHEDULED FOR OCTOBER 2004. 
 
27. (C) DURING HIS RECENT VISIT TO WASHINGTON, 10 - 12 MAY 
2004, MBZ RAISED SEVERAL ISSUES THAT WE ARE WORKING TO 
ADDRESS.  DURING A MEETING WITH SECAF DR. ROCHE AND CSAF 
GENERAL JUMPER, MBZ ASKED FOR AN UPDATE ON THE STATUS OF 
LINK-16 RELEASE; EXPRESSED AN INTEREST IN POSSIBLY 
OBTAINING USAF A-10 ATTACK AIRCRAFT; AND REQUESTED AN 
INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF USAF F-16 INSTRUCTOR PILOTS (IPS) 
AND SENIOR MAINTENANCE NCOS OFFERED IN THE F-16 TRAINING 
LOA (FROM TWO TO EIGHT IPS, AND FROM THREE TO THIRTY FIVE 
NCOS).  IN A SUBSEQUENT MEETING WITH SECDEF, MBZ ALSO ASKED 
FOR AN UPDATE ON THE STATUS OF THE UAE REQUEST TO OBTAIN 
PREDATOR UAVS, AND REQUESTED AN INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF 
UAE SLOTS AT NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY, FROM ONE TO TWO. 
SAF/IA WILL LEAD A TEAM TO ABU DHABI TO BRIEF MBZ ON LINK- 
16, A-10S, F-16 SUPPORT PERSONNEL, AND PREDATOR, ON 26 JUNE 
2004.  OSD (P) IS STAFFING A RESPONSE TO INCREASE THE NDU 
AUTHORIZATIONS, AND WE ANTICIPATE AN ANSWER ON THAT ISSUE 
AT ANY TIME. 
 
28. (S) UAE STRONGLY DESIRES U.S. SUPPORT FOR REMOTE 
SENSING DATA, SYSTEMS, AND PRODUCTS.  THEY HAVE REQUESTED A 
DEDICATED TURNKEY COMMERCIAL REMOTE SENSING SATELLITE 
SYSTEM, WITH AN OPTION TO LEASE.  WITH THE PURCHASE OF F-16 
BLOCK-60S, UAE PARTICULARLY WANTS TO ENSURE COMPATIBILITY 
FOR MISSION PLANNING AND INTELLIGENCE INFRASTRUCTURE 
SUPPORT.  SPECIFICALLY, THEY HAVE REQUESTED A SYSTEM WITH 
PANCHROMATIC, MULTISPECTRAL, AND SYNTHETIC APERTURE RADAR 
CAPABILITIES.  PANCHROMATIC AND MULTISPECTRAL OPTIONS ARE 
INCLUDED IN THE CURRENT INTERAGENCY-APPROVED NEGOTIATING 
FRAMEWORK; SAR IS NOT.  STATE/NON-PROLIFERATION LED 
INTERAGENCY DISCUSSIONS WITH UAE IN SEPTEMBER 2003 TO 
DISCUSS THE ISSUE.  THE INTERAGENCY TEAM IS NOW CONSIDERING 
OPTIONS THAT MAY BE OFFERED IN SUPPORT OF THE UAE REQUEST, 
INCLUDING COMPETITIVE COMMERCIAL APPLICATIONS, AND WE ARE 
AWAITING GUIDANCE. 
 
29. (S) UAE DIRECTORATE OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE (DMI) 
SUBMITTED A FORMAL LETTER OF REQUEST (1 MAY 2003) TO 
PURCHASE TWO ELECTRONIC WARFARE (EW) AIRCRAFT (PROGRAM 
ENTITLED CANDY APPLE).  TO DATE, THE UAE REQUEST REMAINS IN 
THE INTERAGENCY COORDINATION AND RELEASE PROCESSES, AND OUR 
INDICATIONS ARE THAT IT IS UNLIKELY THAT UAE WILL RECEIVE 
APPROVAL FOR THE SYSTEM THEY REQUESTED.  UAE IS ANXIOUS TO 
PURSUE OFFERED FOREIGN ALTERNATIVES SHOULD AN EVENTUAL U.S. 
RESPONSE BE UNFAVORABLE.  WE RECENTLY LEARNED THAT THEY 
HAVE TRANSFERRED ONE OF THEIR BOEING 737 AIRCRAFT FROM 
EMIRI FLIGHT (DV SUPPORT) TO DMI, AND MAY BE IN 
NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE FRENCH FIRM THALES TO CONVERT THE 
AIRCRAFT TO A SIGINT PLATFORM. 
 
30. (C) ON 20 APRIL 2004 DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE ASKED 
MBZ IF UAE WAS STILL INTERESTED IN ATACMS.  MBZ REPLIED 
"YES, BUT WE ARE CONCERNED WITH THE COST," AND THAT ENDED 
THE DISCUSSION.  WE ARE AWARE THAT THE UAE RECENTLY TABLED 
A DRAFT LETTER OF REQUEST TO PURCHASE ATACMS, DUE TO THE 
COST OF THE WEAPON SYSTEM.  MORE SIGNIFICANTLY, UAE HAS NOT 
SIGNED THE ATACMS MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING (MOU), BUT 
HAS FORMALLY OFFERED SEVERAL "SUGGESTIONS" FOR CHANGES. 
MOST OF THESE SUGGESTIONS WOULD PROPERLY BE RESOLVED IN ANY 
EVENTUAL LOA AND ARE IRRELEVANT TO THE MOU.  HOWEVER, ON 
THE ISSUES OF MISSILE ACCOUNTABILITY AND PHYSICAL 
INVENTORY, THE UAE IS FIRMLY OPPOSED TO U.S. REQUIRMENTS 
FOR END USE MONITORING AND HAS REJECTED THE PRINCIPLE 
OUTRIGHT.  THIS POSITION WOULD REQUIRE THE RENEGOTIATION OF 
THE MOU TO REMOVE THE END USE MONITORING PROVISIONS, AND 
THIS IS NOT LIKELY.  WE HAVE ATTEMPTED TO EXPLAIN THE U.S. 
POLICY IN THE FOLLOWING TERMS:  THIS WEAPON SYSTEM IS AMONG 
OUR MOST SENSITIVE TECHNOLOGIES AND WE ARE ASKING THAT THE 
UAE PROVIDE ASSURANCE THEY WILL PROTECT THE INHERENT 
TECHNOLOGY JUST AS WE DO; THE ACCOUNTABILITY PROVISIONS OF 
THE POLICY ARE NO DIFFERENT THAN THOSE WE APPLY TO OUR OWN 
FORCES; THE UAE HAS NOT BEEN SINGLED-OUT FOR ANY UNIQUE 
PROVISIONS AND THE POLICY APPLIES TO ALL OF OUR PARTNERS 
WHO PURCHASE SUCH TECHNOLOGY; AND, THE INVENTORY 
REQUIREMENTS ARE NOT AS OBTRUSIVE AS THE UAE MIGHT FEAR. 
UNFORTUNATELY, WE REMAIN AT AN IMPASSE. 
 
31. (C) WE HAVE ENCOUNTERED A NEAR IDENTICAL PROBLEM OF 
ACCOUNTABILITY AND CONTROL ASSURANCES FOR A PROPOSED DIRECT 
COMMERCIAL SALE OF NIGHT VISION DEVICES (NVDS), DUE TO A 
RECENT CHANGE IN U.S. EXPORT POLICY.  THE EMIRATIS, 
ESPECIALLY LAND FORCES COMMANDER MAJ GEN SAEED MOHAMMED AL 
RUMAITHY, HAVE VEHEMENTLY REJECTED ANY PROVISIONS THAT 
WOULD PERMIT US TO INVENTORY THEIR NVDS AFTER THE SALE.  HE 
CITES THE FACT THAT UAE ALREADY POSSESSES THE EXACT SAME 
NVDS UNDER A PREVIOUS SALE, WITH NO REQUIREMENT FOR 
INVENTORY AND ACCOUNTABILITY. 
32. (U) THE EMIRATIS REMAIN VERY CONCERNED BY CHANGES IN 
U.S. VISA POLICIES SINCE 2001 AND HAVE FREQUENTLY VOICED 
THEIR CONCERNS IN SENIOR-LEVEL MILITARY FORUMS.  INCREASED 
U.S. SECURITY MEASURES AND BACKGROUND CHECKS ARE 
INTIMIDATING AND CONFUSING TO THE EMIRATIS.  DESPITE OUR 
BEST EFFORTS, THEY CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT THEY HAVE BEEN 
DENIED BONA FIDE MILITARY TRAINING OPPORTUNITIES, AND THEN 
ASSESSED HUGE FMS MISSED-TRAINING PENALTY FEES, WHILE VISA 
APPLICATIONS WERE EITHER DENIED OUTRIGHT OR HELD UP IN OUR 
SEEMINGLY INSCRUTABLE PROCESS.   THIS IS NOT THE CASE.  IN 
FACT, IN THE PAST TWO YEARS, THE EMIRATIS HAVE ONLY BEEN 
PENALIZED FOR MISSED TRAINING ON TWO OCCASIONS.  IN ONE 
CASE THEY DID NOT PROVIDE A CANDIDATE FOR A RESERVED 
MILITARY TRAINING COURSE AND THEN FAILED TO CANCEL THE 
COURSE; AND IN THE SECOND CASE THEIR CANDIDATE APPLIED FOR 
HIS VISA LESS THAN A WEEK PRIOR TO THE TRAINING, AND DID 
NOT RECEIVE THE VISA IN TIME TO ATTEND THE COURSE.  TOTAL 
PENALTY FEES FOR BOTH CASES WERE LESS THAN $40K.  WE HAVE 
WORKED HARD TO ADDRESS EMIRATI CONCERNS REGARDING THE 
LENGTH OF TIME AND THE UNCERTAINTY OF OBTAINING A U.S. 
VISA.  WE HAVE REASSURED THEM OF BOTH THE LEGITIMATE U.S. 
HOMELAND SECURITY ISSUES AND THE VALUE OF THEIR TRAVEL TO 
THE U.S. TO ATTEND MILITARY TRAINING AND CONFERENCES.  WE 
HAVE IMPLEMENTED A SYSTEM TO IDENTIFY THEIR TRAVEL 
CANDIDATES EARLY, SCREEN THEIR APPLICATIONS AND WALK THEM 
THROUGH THE CONSULAR PROCESS, AND WILL UNILATERALLY CANCEL 
SCHEDULED TRAINING AT OR PRIOR TO THE PENALTY DATE IF THERE 
IS NO QUALIFIED, READY-TO-TRAVEL CANDIDATE.  WE HAVE BEEN 
LARGELY SUCCESSFUL IN THIS EFFORT.  OUR GREATEST CHALLENGE 
NOW IS THE LINGERING "URBAN LEGEND" THAT A HIGH PERCENTAGE 
OF VISA APPLICATIONS ARE REFUSED AND AN APPARENT CULTURAL 
STIGMA THAT FAILURE TO OBTAIN A U.S. VISA DISHONORS THE 
INTEGRITY OF THE APPLICANT. 
 
33. (C) IN SUMMARY, WHILE WE HAVE ENCOUNTERED SOME SETBACKS 
IN MANY MAJOR WEAPONS SALES, OUR MIL-TO-MIL RELATIONSHIP 
REMAINS STRONG.  A FULL DISCUSSION OF UAE SECURITY CONCERNS 
AND PRIORITIES WILL PROVIDE US WITH THE OPPORTUNITY TO 
REFINE AND BETTER UNDERSTAND THE FUTURE OF OUR IMPORTANT, 
STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP. 
 
WAHBA