US embassy cable - 04DJIBOUTI825

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 DJIBOUTI 000825 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/16/2014 
TAGS: PTER, EAID, EFIN, PREL, PGOV, DJ 
SUBJECT: EACTI: PRIORITIZATION OF DJIBOUTI CT PROGRAMS 
 
REF: STATE 112122 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR MARGUERITA D. RAGSDALE 
FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) 
 
1. (C) In response to reftel, Embassy Djibouti sections and 
agencies reviewed East Africa Counter-Terrorism Initiative 
(EACTI) objectives and supporting programs.  Embassy provides 
the following list of objectives and supporting programs in 
order of priority: 
 
a. (C) EACTI objective - Limit Freedom of Movement to 
Transnational Terrorists. 
 
(i) (C) Coastal Security.  Given that al-Qaida and other 
terrorists are transiting the Red Sea to the Horn of Africa 
and beyond, we propose developing a coastal security program 
for Djibouti that will bolster its capacity to deny 
terrorists freedom of movement in the littoral waters 
surrounding Djibouti.  This program will include capacity 
building for surveillance and interdiction of maritime 
traffic in the region.  Program source - Foreign Military 
Financing. 
 
(ii) (C) Terrorist Interdiction Program (TIP).  TIP assists 
the Government of Djibouti (GODJ) in securing its borders by 
limiting terrorists' capabilities to cross international 
boundaries to stage terrorist attacks and escape undetected. 
Through a series of networked computers and peripherals 
installed at airport entry and departure points, transit 
lounges and key sea and land border points, the TIP will 
bolster Djibouti's ability to identify arriving or transiting 
passengers suspected of having terrorist connections. 
Additionally, it will allow the GODJ to determine quickly who 
may be hastily leaving the country after an incident. 
 
(iii) (C) Safe Skies For Africa (SSFA).  The SSFA program 
seeks to improve sub-Saharan aviation infrastructure by 
targeting the now seven selected "hub" countries for advanced 
technical assistance in meeting the international aviation 
safety and security standards of the International Civil 
Aviation Organization (ICAO).  Djibouti has regular flights 
coming from and going to Hargeisa, Yemen, Dubai, Addis Ababa, 
Asmara and Paris.  Djibouti's airport currently primarily 
serves military uses, but would like to expand its passenger 
travel.  New economic ventures, such as the Doraleh Port, may 
lead to an increase in passengers and freight.  If Djibouti's 
air freight and passenger services do not meet current safety 
standards, it could deter incoming investors.  Increased 
training and security equipment at the airport can benefit 
Djibouti's economic performance at the same time that it 
ensures that all routes into Djibouti are secured and safe. 
 
(iv) (S) Border Security.  Djibouti shares a border with 
Somalia.  This same border is only 12 kms from the only U.S. 
military base in Africa.  It is critical to Djiboutian and 
U.S. interests to improve the ability of Djibouti to monitor 
and patrol its frontiers.  Recent intelligence reports 
indicate al-Qaida is operating along the Djibouti-Somalia 
border, portending critical implications for U.S. force 
protection.  Proposed program would include training as well 
as transportation and communications equipment.  Program 
source - Foreign Military Financing. 
 
(v) (C) Anti-Terrorism Training Assistance (ATA).  The ATA 
program is focused on enhancing the policing skills of GODJ 
security services to prevent or combat a terrorist action. 
Through a series of training programs geared specifically at 
countering terrorism, the ATA program increases a country's 
ability to defend itself against terrorism while providing 
greater security for U.S. personnel.  Special courses in 
airport and border security bolster the GODJ's ability to 
control its borders and enforce immigration law. 
 
b. (U) EACTI Objective - Counter Extremist Influence. 
 
(i) (U) Public Diplomacy Program.  Public diplomacy program 
activities influence Djiboutian, French and regional public 
opinion and decision-making consistent with U.S. national 
interests.  Increased interaction between the American and 
Djiboutian communities fosters goodwill and provides a venue 
for promoting programs and values that counter extremist 
influences.  Encouraging and framing Djibouti's success as a 
Muslim, Somali-speaking, American ally is key to the success 
of EACTI as well as our overall Mission Plan.  This takes 
many forms including distribution of books and other written 
materials supporting EACTI goals, increased person-to-person 
and cross-cultural interaction and television and radio 
broadcasts. 
 
(ii) (U) Self-Help.  The Self-Help program's goal is to 
encourage communities to better their own situation, while 
improving the U.S. relationship with host country nationals. 
Self-Help is one of the most visible and direct forms of U.S. 
assistance.  Embassy Djibouti has had more than 30 successful 
community development projects over the past two years. 
These projects go beyond giving financial assistance to the 
government.  They provide local communities with activities 
for children, places to study and tutor, vocational training, 
better resources for farming and greater access to water. 
The inaugurations of successful projects and programs have 
great impact on the hearts and minds of Djiboutians, more so 
than grants to the government. 
 
(iii) (U) Democracy and Human Rights Fund (DHRF).  The DHRF 
is an annual allotment from USAID that gives Posts the 
ability to fund small, short-term projects proposed by the 
government and private secret groups to promote human rights, 
good governance, political pluralism and democracy.  The 
funds have been especially useful in Djibouti for promoting 
awareness in the public sector and government awareness of 
human rights.  DHRF funds have also been vital in past 
legislative elections and in encouraging rights of the child. 
 
(iv) (C) Voice of America (VOA).  Radio and television 
broadcasts are the most effective means of reaching a mass 
audience in this largely illiterate country.  They further 
American values and goals consistent with EACTI and the 
Mission Performance Plan.  In addition to their shared 
culture, Djibouti's close proximity to Somalia, southern 
Ethiopia, Sudan and Yemen makes it a natural launching point 
for programs that will reach across the borders of this small 
state.  For example, our current VOA feeds are in English 
(VOA) and Arabic (Radio Sawaa) and cover an arc from Sudan to 
Saudi Arabia. 
 
c. (C) EACTI Objective - Enhance Regional Counter-Terrorism 
and Law Enforcement Capabilities. 
 
(i) (U) International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA). 
Although ILEA is designed to address international crime, its 
focus on developing mid-level management for law enforcement 
and other criminal justice officials, is critical to the 
overall ability of the GODJ police force to prevent or 
counter a terrorist act.  The ability of the host nation to 
deploy an effective and professional police force is 
detrimental to countering terrorism in a region ripe with 
political instability and deteriorating communities. 
 
(ii) (U) The ATA program complements ILEA by providing 
specialized training in fields to which the GODJ would not 
normally be exposed.  Courses in post-blast investigation, 
senior crisis management, VIP protection and officer survival 
are just some of the courses that have helped bring the GODJ 
security services into a new era of law enforcement. 
 
(iii) (U) International Military Education and Training 
(IMET).  The IMET program serves to professionalize the 
Djiboutian military, expose Djiboutian officers to the United 
States and make the Djiboutian military more interoperable 
with the U.S. military. 
 
(iv) (U) Counter-Terrorism Fellowship.  This additional 
funding for education and training is very useful to continue 
the professionalization of the Djiboutian military and expose 
senior military and civilian leaders to U.S. strategic 
thinking in relation to the GWOT. 
 
2. (U) Post is aware that future funding of all programs will 
be reflective of the national interest as it evolves. 
However, given Djibouti's strategic location, key role in 
regional stability and high level of support for the U.S.-led 
war on terrorism, we believe most programs in Djibouti should 
be maintained at current funding levels. 
 
3. (U) Shortfalls and Additional Requirements. 
 
a. (C) Coastal Security.  Current FMF funding will allow the 
Djiboutian Coast Guard to procure boats for coastal patrol, 
interdiction and boarding operations.  Additionally, Djibouti 
will be able to construct small naval stations in the remote 
regions to ensure continual military presence in the littoral 
waters.  However, Djibouti's coastal security program 
requires radar to be effective.  Current FMF funding is not 
adequate to procure the necessary radar. 
 
b. (C) Somali Language Broadcasts.  Somalia is a known harbor 
for extremists.  We believe that increasing our Somali 
language output, especially through VOA, would be an 
effective means of reaching an important target population. 
VOA currently lacks the transmitter to reach Somalia, 
although the current station is amenable to and appropriately 
placed for such an addition.  A Somali language feed need not 
represent a change in policy as Djibouti is largely 
Somaliphone and would be a consumer of said products; 
therefore, such a feed would not qualify as direct 
engagement.  That said, the Department of State currently 
produces few, if any, Somali language products. 
 
c. (C) The training programs designed for the GODJ, as 
implemented through ATA and ILEA, are without a doubt one of 
the best dollar-for-dollar investments the U.S. Government 
(USG) has in countering terrorism in the Horn of Africa. 
Unfortunately, training is only a portion of what the 
Djiboutian security services require to maintain a 
professional police force.  The skills acquired through USG 
training can only go so far without the use of proper 
equipment.  The GODJ suffers from a depleted economy and is 
unable to procure adequate equipment for the security 
services.  Items such as handcuffs, radios, ballistic vests, 
riot batons, shields, helmets, ammunition for training and 
many other basic tools of the trade in their inventory are 
either obsolete or non existent.  The GODJ Security Services 
are in dire need of physical resources that are commensurate 
with the level of training received.  It would be in the best 
interest of the USG's counter terrorism program to provide 
either the actual resources or a monetary grant to procure 
essential equipment. 
RAGSDALE