US embassy cable - 04YEREVAN1345

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 YEREVAN 001345 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958:  DECL:  6/16/14 
TAGS: PREL, PBTS, MOPS, AM, AJ 
SUBJECT:  Armenian-Azeri border clash 
 
Ref:  State 130470 
 
Classified by Ambassador John Ordway.  Reasons:  1.5 (B, 
D). 
 
1.  (C)  Following receipt of reftel, DAO assistant spoke 
with the CHOD, Gen-Lt. Haratunyan, and Ambassador spoke to 
Ambassador Kasprzyk and Acting Foreign Minister Shugarian. 
The CHOD claimed that the Azeri side had initiated the 
outbreak of hostile action a week ago, and then on the 
night of June 14/15 began shelling an Armenian village. 
The Armenian side "shot back."  At 02:00 Ambassador 
Kasprzyk called the CHOD while monitoring on the Azeri 
side.  The CHOD said he had told Kasprzyk that if the 
Azeris continued the shelling, Armenia would take the hill 
that apparently was the original Azeri position before they 
moved forward a week ago.  Haratunyan said that the 
Armenian MOD had been unable to establish any contact with 
the Azeri side, and was using Ambassador Kasprzyk to pass 
messages to Baku.  He did not provide any timeline (or 
deadline) for the threatened Armenian forward movement. 
 
2.  (C)  Ambassador spoke to Kasprzyk by phone shortly 
after he had completed his June 14/15 monitoring mission. 
Kasprzyk, en route to Tbilisi, said that it had not been 
quiet the previous night.  The monitoring that had just 
been completed had established that one Armenian officer 
had been killed, while on the Azeri side a woman and a 
child had been injured.  In addition, livestock on the 
Azeri side had been killed.  Kasprzyk said that he could 
not determine which side had started the firing the night 
before.  He theorized that the Armenians had subjected the 
Azeri village of Mazamly to a barrage as a means of 
psychological pressure, and that the casualties were the 
result of rounds that had actually landed in the village. 
The attack clearly had frightened and enraged the 
villagers.  8-10 of them came to the monitoring site (2 km 
from the village).  Aggravated by "untactful" remarks by 
the Azeri military escorts, the villagers were 
extraordinarily hostile.  The Azeri military decided to 
leave the scene before the villagers engaged in violent 
action against them. 
 
3.  (C)  The Armenian side requested, through the field 
monitors, a face-to-face meeting with the Azeri local 
commander.  The Azeris refused, and requested a discussion 
with the Armenian local commander via the OSCE radio 
connection.  The Armenian side refused.  The Azeri side 
then indicated that they would be willing to have a face- 
to-face meeting.  This, however, requires the approval of 
the Minister of Defense.  Although Kasprzyk told the 
Ambassador he was very doubtful the Minister would agree, 
he planned to pursue this option with the Minister on June 
16.  (The Minister is out of the country, and is returning 
the morning of June 16.) 
 
4.  (C)  Kasprzyk said that the situation was tense and 
very dangerous.  There is considerable and constant 
military movement, and both sides appear to be reinforcing 
their positions -- which are very close to each other. 
Each side, he believes, feels it is in a corner and neither 
side wants to retreat. 
 
5.  (C)  The Armenians recently realigned the main road 
between Noyembrian and Idjevan.  The new route takes inter- 
city traffic out of range of Azeri positions.  (The road 
had come under Azeri fire periodically over the past year.) 
Kasprzyk theorized that the Azeri side believed its 
leverage had been reduced by the road realignment, and 
decided to regain its leverage by moving closer to the 
Armenian pumping station.  (Note:  Kasprzyk did not know 
whether the station was in Armenia or Azerbaijan, but said 
that it is located between the lines that had been 
maintained by the two armies.)  The workers manning the 
pumping station had fled when the Azeris moved closer, and 
the Armenians were unwilling to lose the water supply for 
five villages. 
 
6.  (C)  Ambassador spoke to Deputy Foreign Minister 
Shugarian, and passed on the points provided reftel.  He 
emphasized that the situation was tense and fraught with 
danger of escalation.  The U.S. expected that both sides 
would refrain from taking any actions that would exacerbate 
the situation, and especially refrain from any further 
firing.  Shugarian said he would get in touch with the MOD 
and President's Office to pass on the message. 
 
7.  (C)  French Ambassador Cuny telephoned the Ambassador 
to say that Paris was also very worried about the 
situation, and offered to join in a co-chairs demarche to 
the Armenian side. 
 
ORDWAY