US embassy cable - 04SANAA1458

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 001458 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FBI PASS TO UC RAPLH HORTON AND IOS DEBBIE MANCHAS, CTD/ETIU 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/31/2014 
TAGS: PTER, ASEC, PGOV, ETTC, PARM, YM, COUNTER TERRORISM 
SUBJECT: DNSA TOWNSEND 05/26/04 MEETING WITH ROYG SECURITY 
OFFICIALS 
 
REF: SANAA 1261 
 
Classified By: Ambassador E.J. Hull for reasons 1.5 (b. and d.) 
 
1. (S) Summary: On 5/26 DNSA Townsend reviewed CT cooperation 
with MOI al-Alimi, PSO Director al-Gamish and NSB Officer 
Saleh and highlighted recent inconsistencies in the 
relationship.  Dominating discussion, Alimi affirmed the 
strength of the CT partnership, and noted that differences of 
opinion do not diminish its strength.  Townsend sought 
enhanced intelligence sharing and access to CT detainees and 
trial suspects.  Declaring that all requests have been 
granted, Alimi agreed to look into information provided by 
Townsend that a Yemen CT detainee may be engaged in attack 
planning.  Townsend pressed the ROYG to facilitate pending 
extradition and rendition requests and raised concerns over 
Yemen's controls over small-arms.  In reply, Alimi offered 
access to the weapons storehouse and reviewed Yemen's efforts 
to halt weapons smuggling.  End summary. 
 
2. (S) Deputy National Security Advisor for Combating 
Terrorism Frances Townsend opened her 5/26 meeting with 
Minister of Interior Dr. Rashad al-Alimi, Political Security 
Director GEN Ghalib al-Gamish and National Security Bureau 
Officer Amar Saleh by saying that at times Yemen has been a 
"wonderful" partner, but at other times it is inconsistent. 
She stated that she traveled to Yemen to make cooperation 
stronger in the areas of intelligence sharing, renditions and 
arms trafficking.  Alimi said from the Yemeni perspective, 
Yemen and the U.S. are "standing together in this effort to 
stop terror."  Alimi expressed appreciation for Townsend's 
openness and transparency, but said that the ROYG had a 
different, more positive view of its cooperation.  He added, 
"different opinions do not detract from the partnership." 
 
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Intelligence Sharing; Trial and Evidentiary Access 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
3. (S/NF) Townsend cited "helpful" instances where USG 
officials were allowed access to detainees.  According to 
Townsend, these meetings were a direct result of FM Qirbi's 
February visit to Washington.  However, Townsend said, since 
March the ROYG has allowed no visits to detainees or 
terrorist trial suspects.  (Note: USS Cole suspects Badawi 
and Quso were re-captured in March.)  Alimi responded that 
all information on ROYG detainees suspected of terrorism is 
shared with the US and said that USG officials have conducted 
interviews.  Townsend interjected that "not everything" has 
been shared and said "repeated requests have been denied." 
Gamish offered that visits were granted, but that poor 
FBI/CIA coordination led to an unfair impression of 
cooperation. 
 
4. (S/NF) Townsend pursued the question of FBI access to 
suspects in the USS Cole trials and combined trials for four 
terrorist attacks (Ref A).  Both Gamish and Alimi maintained 
that the LEGATT should direct requests to visit trial 
suspects through the Prosecutor General's office, which 
controls suspects and evidence.  Townsend countered that USG 
officials should have been able to conduct interviews with 
the suspects when the Embassy asked, while the suspects were 
in PSO custody.  Townsend added, "this is not a fair way to 
treat a partner."  Gamish replied that the CIA had full 
access and complained that the USG did not coordinate its 
requests.  Townsend clarified the distinction between law 
enforcement and intelligence information requests, 
underscoring that both are necessary.  (Note: Now that the 
trials have begun, USG officials are unable to conduct 
interviews.) 
 
5. (S/NF) To emphasize the importance of intelligence 
sharing, Townsend illustrated the case of Mustafa al-Ansari, 
who was detained and released in Yemen.  Ansari later was 
killed perpetrating the 5/1 Yanbu terrorist attack.  Alimi 
replied that Ansari was detained in 1999 on counterfeiting 
charges, served a one-year jail sentence and was released. 
Gamish claimed the Saudis dismissed earlier 
information-sharing attempts because they believed the 
persons in question were religious clerics and not criminals. 
 Alimi and Gamish agreed that the Saudis took information 
more seriously after the May 2003 Riyadh attacks.  Townsend 
offered that information such as fingerprints and 
photographic evidence shared with partners could avert future 
terrorist attacks. 
 
6. (S/NF) Townsend highlighted particular concern over 
information that a ROYG detainee may be involved in planning 
a terrorist attack.  Townsend said if an attack occurred and 
was linked to planning in Yemen, "it would be a great tragedy 
and have terrible consequences for what should be a wonderful 
relationship."  Alimi replied that he did not believe such 
contact was possible, but he "expected" the U.S. to share 
information on terrorist threats.  Alimi promised to 
investigate the information provided. 
 
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Extraditions/Renditions 
----------------------- 
 
7. (S) Describing both national and personal significance to 
seeing the perpetrators of the USS Cole bombing brought to 
trial in the U.S., Townsend asked that Alimi "do everything 
in his power" regarding pending U.S. extradition requests for: 
 
-- USS Cole suspects Jamal Muhammad Ahmad  Ali al-Badawi and 
Fahd Muhammad Ahmad al-Quso; 
 
-- Jaber al-Bannah (Lackawana suspect and American citizen) 
 
Townsend also requested assistance in rendering Abu 
Atta/al-Sharqawi and Hadi Dulqum to 
third countries.  Alimi responded that extradition in Yemen 
is governed by its constitution, and that America should 
understand why a nation must respect its own constitution. 
(Note: The constitution prohibits extradition of Yemeni 
citizens.) 
 
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Alimi: Access to Weapons Buy-Back Warehouse 
------------------------------------------- 
 
8. (S) Turning to small-arms smuggling, Townsend raised 
concerns over large amounts of Polish and Chinese arms 
shipments to Yemen's Ministry of Defense.  Townsend said if 
one totaled the past three years of arms shipments, each 
soldier in Yemen would have 4 or 5 long-guns, not including 
previously-held MoD stockpiles.  Townsend continued that the 
USG has evidence that weapons traced back to Yemen's MoD were 
used in the May 2004 attack in Yanbu, Saudi Arabia; and 
MANPADS from Yemen were used in the 2002 attack in Mombassa, 
Kenya and the 2003 attack in Saudi Arabia, and the 2003 Hunt 
helicopter attack in Yemen.  Townsend commented that visiting 
storehouses is not sufficient, and said full accountability 
of weapons with serial numbers and inventory controls are 
necessary. 
 
9. (C) Townsend proposed that foreign assistance for Yemen's 
buy-back program would be easier to obtain if the ROYG could 
assure donors of ROYG inventory controls and security at 
storage facilities.  Alimi replied that "you may visit the 
warehouse tomorrow."  Alimi detailed recent ROYG actions to 
limit weapons smuggling, including the closure of the Saada 
arms-market, promulgation of legislation, and 6 billion 
Riyals spent in weapons buy-back. (Roughly 33 million USD.) 
 
10. (C) Noting that discussions with Saudi Arabia on 
arms-smuggling are underway, Alimi offered that Mohammed bin 
Naif was in Yemen that day to meet with National Security 
Bureau Officer Saleh to discuss this issue.  Alimi said that 
the ROYG has made repeated requests to Saudi Arabia to return 
captured Yemeni arms smugglers, but there has been no 
response.  Alimi added that they want Saudi Arabia to take 
its share of responsibility on this issue. 
 
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Zindani 
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11. (C) Townsend raised Yemen's obligations to freeze the 
assets of Sheikh Abdul Majid al-Zindani under UNSCR 1267 and 
said that there is no evidence yet of compliance.  Alimi 
referred her to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
 
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Comment 
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12. (S) Comment: The two hour meeting covered several, if not 
all, outstanding USG CT requests for cooperation.  Alimi and 
Gamish remained cordial even as difficult points on access to 
suspects/detainees and improved cooperation were discussed. 
Embassy Sanaa will follow up on assurances made in the 
meeting.  End comment. 
HULL