US embassy cable - 04ROME2280

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ITALIAN ELECTIONS: A SETBACK FOR BOTH BERLUSCONI AND PRODI

Identifier: 04ROME2280
Wikileaks: View 04ROME2280 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Rome
Created: 2004-06-14 16:57:00
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Tags: PGOV IT ITALIAN POLITICS ITALY NATIONAL ELECTIONS
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS  ROME 002280 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV, IT, ITALIAN POLITICS, ITALY NATIONAL ELECTIONS 
SUBJECT: ITALIAN ELECTIONS:  A SETBACK FOR BOTH BERLUSCONI 
AND PRODI 
 
REF: A. ROME 2245 
     B. 03 ROME 2674 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED; NOT FOR INTERNET DISTRIBUTION. 
 
------------------- 
SUMMARY AND COMMENT 
------------------- 
1.  (SBU)  Based on close-to-final results from the European 
Parliament and local elections, center-right and center-left 
ran almost a dead heat in Italy, with vote shifts occurring 
within coalitions.  Voters rebuked Prime Minister Berlusconi; 
his Forza Italia party dropped fairly significantly. 
European Commission President Romano Prodi did not do so 
well, either, however.  The "Prodi List" coalition of 
moderate center-left parties fared little different from its 
1999 showing.  Small parties gained, notably Communist 
Renewal (RC) on the left and Union of Christian Democrats of 
the Center (UDC) on the right.  There was little evidence of 
a backlash stemming from opposition to Italy's involvement in 
Iraq. 
 
2.  (SBU)  Taken as a predictor for national elections, the 
voting emphasizes the left's inherent instability.  A 
center-left government in Italy can only win a majority if 
moderate parties form a coalition with far left parties such 
as RC and the Greens.  A center-right coalition is more 
stable )- but this one is going to have to work to keep its 
electorate.  Berlusconi is under pressure to acknowledge UDC 
and larger coalition partner National Alliance's stronger 
showings.  Some reallocation of government spoils and 
priorities is certain, but coalition allies have indicated a 
willingness to work with Berlusconi to avoid constituting a 
new government.  END SUMMARY AND COMMENT. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
NO LANDSLIDES, JUST COALITION REGROUPING 
---------------------------------------- 
3.  (SBU)  Their hoped-for landslide in favor of the 
center-left in Italy's European Parliament and local 
elections did not happen, undermining Romano Prodi's vaunted 
leadership and ability to unite the center and moderate left. 
 Forza Italia also fell, challenging Silvio Berlusconi's role 
as the center-right's primary vote getter.  Votes shifted 
from one party to another within coalitions, with overall 
totals on the left and right staying much the same as in 1999 
European Parliament elections.  (NOTE:  Final tallies are not 
yet in, but the implications are clear and allow us to 
analyze the election's impact.  We will report details of 
returns septel when final results are in.) 
 
4.  (SBU)  On the center-right, Forza Italia (FI) lost ground 
against coalition partners National Alliance (AN, Deputy 
Prime Minister Fini's party) and UDC.  While UDC's results 
appear more significant, AN's are also noteworthy.  The 
party's results are about the same as last time, but AN lost 
a splinter faction, Alessandra Mussolini's Social 
Alternative.  While it's not clear how much of Mussolini's 
paltry 1.2 percent came from AN's far-right flank, it is 
evident Fini increased AN's draw in the center, and likely 
from FI )- a long-term goal.  The Northern League also went 
up slightly )- a victory especially in light of the serious 
and prolonged illness of party leader Umberto Bossi.  In sum, 
the governing coalition seems to have received about the same 
percentage of the vote as in the 1999 European elections. 
 
5.  (SBU)  Considering the extreme personalization of his 
electoral campaign, leading the ticket in every district and 
confidently predicting FI would earn 25 percent of the vote, 
Berlusconi the campaigner and coalition leader took a blow. 
He is under pressure (starting even with last year's local 
elections, Ref B) to acknowledge UDC and AN's stronger 
showings.  Some government reallocation is certain, although 
coalition allies have indicated a willingness to work with 
the PM to avoid formation of a new government.  (Berlusconi 
wants to avoid a full cabinet reshuffle, which would require 
a new authorization vote in Parliament.  He wants his current 
Government, already the longest-serving in post-war Italy, to 
continue into 2006, thereby setting another record as the 
first post-war government to serve its full term.)  The 
center-left may seek to use a reshuffle to push for a vote of 
confidence, but it lacks the means to force a Government 
fall.  The Government retains its Parliamentary majority and 
ultimately will call the shots. 
 
6.  (SBU)  A shift in Government priorities is also possible, 
perhaps milder tax reduction, more welfare and support to 
southern Italy, or other moves in keeping with AN's and UDC's 
more populist programs -- although these demands will clash 
 
 
with the Government's need to bring economic revitalization. 
Finally, Berlusconi may have to break with his character and 
seek to work more as part of a team with his coalition 
partners.  While we aren't certain he can do it, he needs to 
try less grandstanding and more coalition building.  The good 
news for the Government is that Italy did not register the 
large anti-government vote seen in other European countries, 
nor did Berlusconi suffer the defeat of Blair, Chirac, and 
Schroeder.   There will be some reorganizing, but the 
Government will likely live to see the end of its five-year 
term. 
 
7.  (SBU)  On the center-left, the "Prodi List's" break with 
tradition to run as a coalition failed to garner a hoped-for 
windfall.  It, too, scored about the same as its member 
parties did in 1999, like the left overall.  Prodi's 
inability to break an unstated threshold of some 33-35 
percent calls into question his leadership of a moderate, 
reformist center-left and his ability to unite the moderates 
and those further left.  There are few on the scene who could 
lead a united left coalition, and these elections may make 
the prospects for forming one in the next national elections 
more challenging.  (Rome Mayor Walter Veltroni, who handled 
the recent visit of President Bush with balance and tact, may 
be positioning himself as a possible challenger.  He has 
earned the respect of even some of Rome's center-right 
voters, allowing ample freedom to the left without ignoring 
centrists.) 
 
8.  (SBU)  On the left, Communist Renewal was the notable 
winner, gaining perhaps two percentage points over its 1999 
performance, an approximately fifty-percent increase.  The 
elections once again confirmed that any center-left coalition 
remains hostage to the parties of the far left -- RC, the 
Greens, and the Italian Communist Party (PDCI) -- which 
together garnered some 11 percent of the vote.  These groups, 
in turn, are beholden to pacifist and more extreme leftist 
social groups.  This also underscores the inherent 
instability of a center-left government.  The untenable (from 
the perspective of a responsible national government) demands 
of RC were what ultimately brought down the 1996 Prodi 
government. 
 
--------------------- 
WHAT DREW THE VOTERS? 
--------------------- 
9.  (SBU)  Italians voted in record numbers compared to their 
European counterparts, with a turnout of some 73 percent. 
(High voter turnout is the norm in Italy; previous EP 
elections registered 70.8 percent voter turnout.)  This 
turnout was not motivated by interest in European issues, but 
by domestic interests.  Opposition to Italy's involvement in 
Iraq does not appear to have weighed on the elections as much 
as had been expected, although an effort to send a vote in 
favor of "peace" may have accounted for some of the left vote 
going to Communist Renewal, the Greens and others that 
consistently opposed Italy's involvement in Iraq.  Left 
voters wanted first and foremost to "send Berlusconi home." 
Some may have also sought to send a message to the Democrats 
of the Left (DS), the majority component of which has been 
seeking a more centrist path and has thus not taken a 
clear-cut stand on leftist (not only Iraq) issues.  Given the 
decision by DS, Daisy, Italian Socialists, and the European 
Republicans to run under a single ticket, it is difficult to 
say which entity lost votes.  The fact remains, however, that 
RC, PDCI, and the Greens all gained. 
 
10.  (SBU)  Center-right voters in the end seemed to show 
appreciation, not disdain, for the Government's 
accomplishments, but there was also a distinct rebuke to 
Berlusconi.  This could have been prompted by his perceived 
arrogance, a perceived inability to follow through on 
campaign pledges, or a perception that FI is more responsible 
than its partners for failing to improve Italy's economic 
performance.  In the end, Italians voted for the parties they 
like; they did not heed the call of Berlusconi and Prodi to 
ignore the little parties and increase the "bipolarization" 
of the Italian political system.  A "bipolar" scene may make 
for less political chaos, but it apparently doesn,t make for 
a happy Italian electorate. 
 
Visit Rome's Classified Website: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/rome/index.cf m 
 
SEMBLER 
 
 
NNNN 
	2004ROME02280 - Classification: UNCLASSIFIED 


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