US embassy cable - 04DJIBOUTI815

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DJIBOUTI AND PROPOSED COUNTER-TERRORISM FORCE

Identifier: 04DJIBOUTI815
Wikileaks: View 04DJIBOUTI815 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Djibouti
Created: 2004-06-14 14:15:00
Classification: SECRET
Tags: PREL MARR MASS MCAP MOPS PTER DJ
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T DJIBOUTI 000815 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF, AF/E, AF/RSA AND S/CT 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/14/2014 
TAGS: PREL, MARR, MASS, MCAP, MOPS, PTER, DJ 
SUBJECT: DJIBOUTI AND PROPOSED COUNTER-TERRORISM FORCE 
 
REF: A. STATE 122629 
     B. DJIBOUTI 549 
     C. STATE 112122 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR MARGUERITA D. RAGSDALE. 
REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). 
 
 1. (S) This cable reflects the views of the Ambassador, 
Office of Regional Affairs, Regional Security Office, United 
States Liaison Office and the Commander of the Combined Joint 
Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA). 
 
2. (S) Post appreciates the Department's concern outlined in 
Ref A and wishes to clarify any misunderstanding created by 
Ref B.  Under the Ref B proposal, all counter-terrorism (CT) 
programs in Djibouti are not being placed under the military. 
 Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) training and programs under 
the Terrorist Interdiction Program (TIP) will continue as 
currently operating.  Additionally, no new programs are 
envisioned or requested by Post.  The Djiboutian military has 
requested, and will receive, two Blanket Order Training (BOT) 
cases as part of its Border and Coastal Security programs. 
Post will use these BOT cases to purchase a variety of 
training that supports the stated goals of the Border and 
Coastal security programs.  Post would not, and could not, 
direct the Djiboutian Government (DJG) to pursue any 
particular course of action. 
 
3. (S) That said, the Djiboutian military (including the 
Gendarmerie, which falls under its jurisdiction) has 
approached Post and CJTF-HOA on several occasions outlining 
the need, and the current lack of capacity within the 
Djiboutian military, to support and augment other agencies of 
the Djiboutian government in the event of a terrorist act. 
Post and CJTF-HOA have advised the DJG that specific training 
on CT for the military cannot be pursued until the role of 
the Djiboutian military in CT activities is clearly defined. 
A recent ATA program review noted that the single greatest 
inhibitor to effective CT operations in Djibouti was lack of 
coordination among the various security agencies at the 
national level. We have stated to the DJG the importance of 
clearly defining the roles of its military organizations in 
support of CT operations.  With such coordination, and a 
clear delineation of roles, the military could receive 
training that would be in support of current U.S.-sponsored 
CT programs. 
 
4. (S) Post emphasizes that Ref B is not a request for 
additional programs or monies.  BOT cases are standard tools 
of the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) system and Djibouti's 
BOT cases will be used to support the goals of the East 
Africa Counter-terrorism Initiative as they are currently 
stated.  Post agrees with the Department that greater 
coordination among elements involved in CT activities is 
valuable.  If the DJG creates a national CT Task Force that 
includes portions of the Djiboutian military, post will 
inform the Department. 
RAGSDALE 

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