US embassy cable - 04LAGOS1210

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 LAGOS 001210 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
PARIS AND LONDON PASS AFRICA WATCHERS 
DIA/J2 PASS GHAYES 
ENERGY PASS CGUY 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/12/2014 
TAGS: PGOV, PINS, PINR, EPET, KDEM, PHUM, EINV, ASEC, CASC, NI 
SUBJECT: NIGER DELTA: CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT IN WARRI 
 
REF: A. LAGOS 1204 
     B. 2003 LAGOS 2535 
 
Classified By: Joseph Gregoire for reasons 1.4 (b), (d), and (e). 
 
1.  (C) Introduction and summary. This is the second in a 
series of four cables addressing the security, political, and 
humanitarian situations in the Niger Delta, based on a field 
visit by Poloff and Econoff to Warri June 7 and 8. This cable 
addresses the recent cease-fire agreement and the Ijaw and 
Itsekiri ethnic groups' political demands. Now that they 
have brokered a cease-fire, the youth leaders are moving 
toward the goal of healing and eventually transformation of 
the conflict to final resolution.  Continued USG involvement 
in the area, more robust funding of USG-funded 
non-governmental organizations (NGO) involved in the peace 
talks, and increased humanitarian assistance might go a long 
way toward enabling a more stable environment for peaceful 
resolution of the conflict.  End introduction and summary. 
 
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CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT 
-------------------- 
 
2.  (U) In early May 2004 Ijaw and Itsekiri "youths" formed 
the Warri Itsekiri/Ijaw Grassroots Peace Front (WIIGPF) and 
declared a cease-fire on June 1 with respect to fighting that 
broke out in March 2003.  The agreement begins with a quote 
by Abraham Lincoln: "My greatest concern is not whether you 
have failed, but whether you are content with failure."  The 
quote reflects the tone of the document and possibly the mood 
of the Ijaw and Itsekiri youths who wrote it.  They now seem 
to have grown tired of the conflict and its effect on their 
society.  The youth leaders claim to recognize that through 
their actions they have "depleted human and natural 
resources, relentlessly scared away investments, recklessly 
rendered our people homeless, and have ushered in a period of 
unrest characterized by a rise in crime..." 
 
3.  (U) In their June 1 agreement, the Ijaw and Itsekiri 
youth leaders referred to the April 23 attack on a Chevron 
Nigeria Limited (CNL) contracting group that resulted in the 
death of five people including two AMCITS (ref A), and called 
on their communities to assist Joint Task Force (JTF) 
Operation Restore Hope in apprehending the perpetrators.  The 
youths asserted that the "people at the grassroots" are the 
only ones who can resolve the political differences, and 
stated they have created a "mechanism" to address these 
"differences and restore enduring peace." They also 
explicitly warned "any persons or groups engaged in unlawful 
activities that times have changed and that the rules are 
clear."  Regardless of ethnicity, they affirmed, "the law 
will take its due course."  They concluded the document by 
giving credit to Delta State Governor James Ibori and JTF 
Commander BG Elias Zamani for facilitating the agreement, and 
renewed WIIGF's resolve to enforce it. 
 
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BEHIND THE SCENES: YOUTHS AND ELDERS 
------------------------------------ 
 
4.  (C) The term "youths" in the Niger Delta and African 
context can be misleading.  The youths are middle-aged men 
who are leaders of their communities.  They are young only in 
comparison to the elders, the traditional rulers and leaders 
who are a generation or two older.  This socio-cultural 
distinction has influenced handling of the conflict. 
Traditionally, the Ijaw and Itsekiri elders acted as brokers 
for their tribes.  As a group, the elders have tended to 
focus on perceived wrongs dating to the beginning of the 
colonial era in 1890 and have exercised limited control over 
the militant youths.  As the recent conflict raged, the youth 
leaders involved in the ethnic fighting, illegal oil 
bunkering, and attacks on oil installations began to 
dissociate themselves from the elders.  The youth leaders now 
hold sway over their own constituents and appear to be 
bringing the elders into the fold, out of cultural respect 
and political necessity.  Various sources have told us that 
the elders have been effectively cut out of decision making, 
however, which facilitated reaching the cease-fire agreement. 
 
 
5.  (C) Sam Ken (protect), a militant Ijaw youth leader and 
key architect of the cease-fire agreement, told Conoffs that 
the elders are no longer a factor in negotiations.  He 
asserted that the JTF and Delta State Government recognize 
this fact and now work directly with the youths.  Zamani 
(protect) confirmed Ken's assertions that the JTF now deals 
only with the youth leaders.  He said bypassing the elders 
facilitated the cease-fire, but in recognition of their 
cultural status he will "pay attention" to them and bring 
them along if need be.  One Ijaw chief has voiced displeasure 
with the agreement, but Zamani is confident that he can bring 
him around whereas Ken said he has no choice but to abide by 
the agreement.  Daniel Reyenieju, a militant Itsekiri youth 
leader and co-author of the agreement, told Conoffs that the 
Itsekiri elders were also out of the loop. 
 
------------------------- 
CEASE-FIRE IMPLEMENTATION 
------------------------- 
 
6.  (C) As stated in the cease-fire agreement, the rules have 
changed and anyone not abiding by the agreement will be 
"brought to book."  Some criminal militant youth leaders who 
failed to abide by the agreement were killed recently (ref 
A). The Ijaw and Itsekiri youth leaders who have endorsed the 
agreement have gotten public opinion behind the cease-fire. 
Through the auspices of the U.S.-based International 
Foundation for Education and Self-Help (IFESH), Ijaw and 
Itsekiri leaders have gone into the creeks with IFESH 
officials to publicize the agreement and bring their 
constituents along in the political process. Zamani told us 
their initiative has been well received. 
 
7.  (U) Numerous Ijaw and Itsekiri youth told Conoffs that 
the NGOs, the Delta State Government, and the JTF peace 
initiatives have been well received and continue to have a 
positive impact on moves to resolve the conflict.  Two NGO 
peace initiatives funded by the USG and focused on conflict 
resolution provide a forum for Ijaw and Itsekiri youths and 
elders to discuss their views.  IFESH's peace dialogue has 
evoked the most favorable response from participants.  IFESH 
has also implemented USG- and ChevronTexaco-funded 
humanitarian aid and sustainable development projects in the 
region.  Academic Associates Peace Works (AAPW) also receives 
funding from USAID and DRL (ref B).  AAPW's Warri Peace Forum 
was the first of its kind in the region and is credited by 
many people for having created an atmosphere of open 
dialogue.  The impact of these USG-funded NGO and GON peace 
initiatives is clear.  Of the six youth leaders who signed 
the June 1 cease-fire agreement, one leader participated in 
all four peace initiatives, two leaders in three of them, and 
three in two of the initiatives. 
 
----------------- 
POLITICAL DEMANDS 
----------------- 
 
8.  (C) Although a cease-fire has been agreed, addressing the 
political and economic grievances (septel) of the Ijaw and 
Itsekiri that fuel conflict is a bigger hurdle.  The core 
Ijaw grievance is the perceived political disenfranchisement 
in the Warri Local Government Areas (LGAs) of Warri South, 
Warri Southwest, and Warri North.  Ken said the Ijaw are 
mainly concerned with Warri Southwest and North.  (Warri 
South is predominantly Itsekiri and partly inhabited by many 
Itsekiri villagers who fled their homes along the Benin River 
as a result of recent conflict.) Ken said the Ijaw could 
accept an agreement with the Delta State Government to create 
additional wards within the LGAs.  He said the Ijaw could 
accept having fewer wards in Warri North, but insisted that 
Warri Southwest be re-organized so that each ethnic group had 
ten wards where the Ijaw perceive themselves to be more 
populous.  Ken insisted that under this arrangement, the 
chairmanships of Warri North and Warri Southwest would rotate 
between the Ijaw and Itsekiri at each election cycle.  When 
asked by Conoffs if such a practice would be democratic, Ken 
said there were no "free and fair" elections in Nigeria, 
making the point moot.  Rotation would be agreed upon at the 
primaries since both ethnic groups are predominantly 
represented by the ruling People's Democratic Party. If the 
Ijaw could do what they want, Ken said they would carve an 
additional LGA out of each of the two contested LGAs 
dominated by the Ijaw.  But the gerrymandered creation of new 
LGAs can be done only by the federal government, whereas 
wards can be created by state governments. 
 
9.  (C/NF) Besides creating new wards and gerrymandering 
LGAs, Ken wants development committees instituted in each 
LGA. Ken proposes that such committees receive forty percent 
of the LGA share of the federation account, which is largely 
derived from oil revenues.  The committees would use the 
revenue to develop the Warri LGAs, which, Ken said, have been 
grossly neglected by the Delta State Government and the GON. 
When asked how he might persuade the GON to agree to these 
demands, Ken replied that if the GON did not comply, he could 
create a situation such that the GON would be required to 
declare a state of emergency, as it did recently in Plateau 
State. 
 
10.  (C) Reyenieju, an Itsekiri militant youth leader and 
co-author of the cease-fire agreement, was more pragmatic in 
stating Itsekiri demands to Conoffs.  He said there is a 
continued need to restore and reinforce the rule of law and 
to reaffirm the GON's responsibility to maintain security in 
the region.  Aware of competing Ijaw political demands, 
Reyenieju did not express support for the creation of LGAs or 
wards.  Instead, he called for elections reflecting the 
combined will of the people, and said he would accept the 
results, pointing out that the Ijaw had boycotted the last 
federal election and had not registered to vote.  He said 
nothing about development committees or the federation 
account, but underscored the need for the Itsekiri internally 
displaced persons to return to their homes and for donors to 
address the economic plight of the region (septel). 
 
11.  (C/NF) COMMENT. The USG-funded peace iniatives and the 
$50,000 in humanitarian aid provided shortly after the 
beginning of the conflict last year have created much 
goodwill toward the USG among the youth leaders and area 
residents.  However, both the Ijaw and Itsekiri have an 
exaggerated sense of USG influence on the GON, as was evident 
from their plea to Conoffs that the USG press the GON into 
action.  Now, the cease-fire agreement appears to be in 
effect and to be receiving broad support.  The youth leaders, 
especially the Ijaw, have shown they have the political will 
and means to ensure others keep in tow (ref A).  Both the 
Ijaw and Itsekiri leaders seem to be looking at the conflict 
comprehensively, and are implementing principles of conflict 
resolution to cope with it.  Now that they have brokered a 
cease-fire, the youth leaders, particularly with the aid of 
IFESH, are moving toward the goal of healing and eventually 
toward transformation of the conflict to its final 
resolution.  Continued USG involvement in the area, more 
robust funding of IFESH and AAPW, and increased humanitarian 
assistance (septel) might go a long way toward enabling a 
more stable environment for peaceful resolution of the 
conflict.  END COMMENT. 
HINSON-JONES