US embassy cable - 04MADRID2181

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 002181 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/09/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, SP 
SUBJECT: SPANISH DEFENSE MINISTER PREVIEWS POSSIBLE 
AFGHANISTAN INCREASE 
 
REF: A. STATE 111287 
 
     B. MADRID 1864 
     C. MADRID 1867 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Kathleen M. Fitzpatrick for reasons 
1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
1.  (C)  Ambassador Argyros, accompanied by DCM and PolCouns, 
met June 8 with Spanish Defense Minister Jose Bono to 
reinforce NATO's and the USG's requests for Spanish support 
in augmenting ISAF and coalition operations in Afghanistan. 
As Bono's schedule permitted this meeting only several weeks 
after receipt of Ref A, Embassy had conveyed our points 
earlier to senior officials in Zapatero's office and at the 
MFA.  We understand that OSD officials also shared our views 
with the Spanish Embassy in Washington and with lower level 
Spanish MOD officials (Ref B and C).  Ambassador Argyros 
stressed to Bono the importance of a robust Spanish response, 
both for NATO and for the success of ISAF in Afghanistan. 
 
2.  (C) Bono reiterated, as Spanish officials have been 
telling us for several weeks, that no decision would be taken 
on Afghanistan increases until after the June 13 European 
Parliamentary elections, in which the Socialist party and the 
government seek a major victory in order to vindicate the 
March 14 national election results just after the Madrid 
terrorist attacks.  However, Bono said that Spain likely 
would commit transportation capabilities such as helicopters 
and an advanced medical unit.  Bono said that Spain also 
likely would augment current troop levels to same 800. 
(Comment:  We thought there was some "fuzzy math" here yet to 
be determined.)  Bono told the Ambassador he could not say 
any of this publicly yet, adding that the MFA had also to 
approve the increase.  He said the government would "consult" 
with the Spanish Parliament. 
 
3.  (C) Bono said the Spanish public and others needed to be 
reminded that Afghanistan was not "just about Bin Laden," but 
about ridding the country of the Taliban and getting a handle 
on drug trafficking in the region.  He said these broader 
issues were also very important (note: we have seen recently 
in the Spanish press an apparent attempt by the GOS to lay 
the groundwork for a decision to augment Spanish troops in 
Afghanistan). 
 
4.  (C)  However, Bono repeatedly stressed that the USG, 
including Secretary Rumsfeld, must understand that any 
increase in the Spanish presence in Afghanistan would not be 
undertaken to "make up for" withdrawal of Spanish troops from 
Iraq.  Bono said that this was also important for the Spanish 
public.  The Ambassador underscored that the USG fully 
understood this point and was not making such a connection. 
 
 
5.  (C)  Both Bono and the Ambassador agreed on the need to 
move forward after difficult rhetoric during Spain's national 
election and European Parliament campaigns, US disappointment 
over Spain's rapid decision to withdraw its troops from Iraq 
and other irritants.  Bono posited that it might be useful 
for him to meet with Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld during the 
NATO Summit in Istanbul in order to dispel the image of 
difficulties in the US-Spanish relationship and between him 
and Secretary Rumsfeld personally.  Bono stressed he was not 
necessarily asking for a meeting, but wanted us to think 
about the idea.  The Ambassador undertook to convey this 
thought to Washington. 
 
6.  (C)  At the close of the meeting, Bono raised recent 
local press reports related to a possible drawdown of Spanish 
civilian personnel at the naval base at the Rota Naval Base 
in Andalucia.  The Ambassador explained the context of the 
USG's global force posture review and said that no decisions 
regarding Spain or other nations had been taken yet.  Bono 
also raised several other issues related to the base, and he 
and the Ambassador agreed to remand these to lower levels to 
work out. 
 
7.  (C)  While noting he had said nothing publicly on the 
issue, Bono mentioned press reports alleging Secretary 
Rumsfeld, during his recent trip to Asia, had mentioned a 
possible continuing terrorist threat to Spain following the 
March 11 attacks.  The Ambassador said that he personally had 
read every readout of Secretary Rumsfeld's comments in 
Singapore, Japan and on the aircraft and he had not specified 
a threat to Madrid.  The Ambassador stressed that Rumsfeld 
had quite rightly noted the need to remain vigilant after the 
attacks in the US September 11, the Madrid bombings and the 
terrorist attacks in Istanbul and Bali. 
 
8.  (C)  Comment:  Bono is a media hound and we don't yet 
know how much of what he says is for the good of the GOS or 
for his own personal aggrandizement.    He readily admitted 
to the Ambassador he has much to learn as Minister of 
Defense, and has had a very short time to do so. However his 
lack of experience has not stopped him from making public 
pronouncements.  We do not know how much to expect from the 
MOD under his leadership. Our first reaction is not to 
believe anything until we see it and not to expect much until 
he has a better grounding of his portfolio. 
ARGYROS