US embassy cable - 04DUBLIN883

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BURMA PRESENTS UNITY CHALLENGE TO EU 25

Identifier: 04DUBLIN883
Wikileaks: View 04DUBLIN883 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Dublin
Created: 2004-06-09 14:03:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL PGOV BM ASEAN
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DUBLIN 000883 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/09/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, BM, ASEAN 
SUBJECT: BURMA PRESENTS UNITY CHALLENGE TO EU 25 
 
REF: A. STATE 120720 
 
     B. DUBLIN 641 
 
Classified By: DCM Jane B. Fort for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
SUMMARY 
 
1.  (C)  Irish government concerns about the continuing 
detention of Aung San Suu Kyi and the lack of participation 
by pro-democracy groups at the constitutional convention will 
not result in public statements soon.  Ireland continues to 
work indirectly through its Asian partners.  Upcoming Asia-EU 
meetings (ASEM) present difficult options for the EU 25 on 
whether, and how, to attend meetings where the ASEAN side 
expects to seat Burma as a quid pro quo for meeting the 
formally enlarged EU.  End Summary. 
 
2.  (U)  Poloff delivered demarche based on Reftel A to 
Caitriona Ingoldsby of the Asia and Oceana Section of the DFA 
on June 8.  DFA principals who cover Burma have been 
traveling.  Ingoldsby promised to share points with Cliona 
Manahan-Leslie, Director of the office, and Niall Brady, 
member of her staff, who are now in Brussels for an EU Asia 
directors meeting July 9 in the run up to the General Affairs 
and External Relations Council (GAERC) meeting next week. 
 
3.  (C)  Cautious Ireland, equally concerned by the detention 
of Aung San Suu Kyi and the exclusion of pro-democracy groups 
from the convention, has no plans to comment publicly on 
Burma yet.  Irish influence and access to the Burmese 
government is limited and Ireland's experience is that 
"shouting loudly by the EU drives Burma into its shell," 
Ingoldsby said, so Ireland has worked indirectly through 
Asian partners.  Demarches and parallel efforts by Irish 
special envoy Ambassador Robert Campbell in capitals have 
borne no fruit and the lack of progress from Rangoon has 
"surprised everybody" and "made constructive engagement 
difficult," Ingoldsby complained. 
 
4.  (C)  The calendar will force more overt EU action.  The 
crux of the issue is the bloc admission of the ten new EU 
states to ASEM (Asia Europe Meeting), which the EU expects, 
versus the bloc admission of the three new ASEAN states, 
Laos, Cambodia and Burma, which ASEAN demands as a quid pro 
quo.  The last ASEM meeting of Foreign Ministers in Dublin in 
April (reftel B) adjourned hopeful that anticipated progress 
on Burma would ease the expansion issue.  Now disappointed, 
the EU, formally 25 States since May 1, feels it faces its 
first test of unity, Ingoldsby revealed. 
 
5.  (C)  Ingoldsby said that GAERC will ponder Burma and the 
ASEM dilemma it presents.  The EU needs a common position on 
group participation before ASEM ministerials in July and 
September in the Netherlands and the next ASEM Summit October 
8-9 in Hanoi; several options seem to be on the table: 
 
     a)  The EU refuses to meet with ASEM if Burma is 
included.  Ingoldsby said the EU would work hard to avoid 
this outcome so as to maintain the larger good of the ASEM 
meetings. 
 
     b)  The EU goes to the ASEM meeting as 15, thereby 
forcing ASEAN to exclude Burma and the other two.  Ingoldsby 
refused to be drawn on EU discussions of this difficult 
option, saying it was "up to partners."  She noted that the 
simmering discussions of a "two tier Europe" would make this 
option most difficult for the new EU 10 to accept as "an 
awful precedent so early on." 
 
     c)  The EU goes to the ASEM meeting as the troika, with 
ASEAN sending some form of parallel representation. 
Ingoldsby agreed that this option might formally preserve the 
ASEM format while keeping the Burma issue on the table. 
 
     d)  The EU goes as 25, ASEAN comes with Burma, and the 
issue is mooted. 
 
COMMENT 
 
6.  (C)  ASEAN ministers are reportedly as surprised and 
disappointed by current events in Burma as the Irish, who 
clearly feel stymied.  Irish quiet diplomacy, dependent on 
time, is bumping up against constraints imposed by formal 
ASEM meeting calendars.  Excluding the newly-admitted EU 10 
from ASEM meetings, to make a point on Burma, seems unlikely 
to gain consensus among the EU 25. So it remains a question 
of whether the EU sees its broader relationships with Asia 
bound up in ASEM or whether the ASEM vehicle will be 
sacrificed to make a point on Burma. 
KENNY 

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