US embassy cable - 04RANGOON728

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BURMA: DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER MAKES RARE EMBASSY VISIT

Identifier: 04RANGOON728
Wikileaks: View 04RANGOON728 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Rangoon
Created: 2004-06-09 10:18:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PGOV PTER BM
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 000728 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV 
COMMERCE FOR ITA JEAN KELLY 
TREASURY FOR OASIA JEFF NEIL 
USPACOM FOR FPA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/08/2014 
TAGS: PGOV, PTER, BM 
SUBJECT: BURMA: DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER MAKES RARE EMBASSY 
VISIT 
 
REF: RANGOON 719 AND PREVIOUS 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: COM CARMEN MARTINEZ FOR REASONS 1.4 (B,D) 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY: A SURPRISE, BUT WELCOME, MEETING BETWEEN THE 
CHIEF OF MISSION AND THE DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER WAS MORE 
SIGNIFICANT FOR ITS OCCURRENCE THAN ITS CONTENT. 
NONETHELESS, DURING THE CORDIAL 30-MINUTE EXCHANGE THE COM 
PRESSURED FOR A ROLE FOR THE NLD IN THE "ROAD MAP FOR 
DEMOCRACY," AND HEARD VERIFICATION OF GOB INTENTION TO SIGN 
THREE ADDITIONAL UN COUNTERTERRORISM PROTOCOLS, THE LATEST 
GOB PERSPECTIVE ON THE ONGOING NATIONAL CONVENTION, AND 
ASSURANCES THAT THE SPDC REMAINED IN REGULAR CONTACT WITH 
ASSK.  WE HOPE THIS IS THE FIRST OF MANY SUCH INFORMAL 
SESSIONS AFTER A LONG STRETCH IN WHICH SENIOR GOB OFFICIALS 
HAVE BEEN VERY RELUCTANT TO MEET.  END SUMMARY. 
 
BETTER ON COUNTERTERRORISM 
 
2. (SBU) THE CHIEF OF MISSION (COM) TOOK ADVANTAGE OF THE 
FIRST EVER VISIT TO THE EMBASSY BY DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER 
(DFM) KHIN MAUNG WIN (A 1985 FULBRIGHTER AND GRADUATE OF 
SAIS) TO DISCUSS SEVERAL KEY BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL 
ISSUES.  THE DFM HAD COME ON THE AFTERNOON OF JUNE 9TH TO 
SIGN THE PRESIDENT REAGAN CONDOLENCE BOOK (SEPTEL), AND HE 
AGREED (AFTER A FEW MOMENTS OF INDECISION) TO COME UPSTAIRS 
FOR A GLASS OF SPRITE.  IT WAS THE FIRST VISIT OF A SENIOR 
GOB OFFICIAL TO THE EMBASSY SINCE A PREVIOUS DFM CAME IN 1994 
TO SIGN THE CONDOLENCE BOOK FOR THE LATE PRESIDENT NIXON. 
THE DCM AND A P/E OFFICER ALSO ATTENDED THE 30 MINUTE 
MEETING. 
 
3. (C) THE CURRENT DFM VERIFIED FOR US WORD WE'D HEARD LAST 
WEEK THAT BURMA WAS PREPARED TO SIGN THREE MORE OF THE 12 UN 
COUNTERTERRORISM PROTOCOLS.  BURMA IS A SIGNATORY TO EIGHT 
ALREADY, AND WILL LIKELY SIGN THE PROTOCOLS ON HOSTAGES, 
PROTECTED PERSONS, AND PLASTIC EXPLOSIVES BEFORE THE UNGA 
MEETING.  ACCORDING TO THE DFM, THE "POLITICAL APPROVAL" FOR 
WAS IN PLACE AND THERE WERE JUST SOME "PROCESSES" TO COMPLETE 
BEFORE THE FINAL SIGNING.  WHEN BURMA SIGNS THESE THREE ONLY 
THE SAFEGUARDING OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL PROTOCOL WILL REMAIN 
UNSIGNED. 
 
SAME ON CONVENTION 
 
4. (C) THE DFM BRIEFED ON A FEW KEY POINTS ON THE ONGOING 
NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION (NC).  WHEN THE COM FIRST 
ASKED ABOUT THE DFM'S ROLE, HE LET SLIP THAT "THANKFULLY" HE 
HADN'T BEEN DRAFTED INTO DAILY ATTENDANCE AT THE PRISON-LIKE 
NC SITE (REFTELS).  HE SAID, THAT THE NC PROCESS WAS MOVING 
ALONG THOUGH HE WOULDN'T HYPOTHESIZE ON WHEN THE FINAL 
GUIDELINES FOR THE DRAFTING OF THE CONSTITUTION WOULD BE 
COMPLETE. 
 
5. (C) THE COM ASKED IF THERE WAS ANY SIGNIFICANCE TO A 
RECENT SHIFT IN GOB COMMON-USE JARGON FROM NATIONAL 
"RECONCILIATION" TO NATIONAL "RECONSOLIDATION" WHEN 
DISCUSSING GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO DRAFT THE CONSTITUTION.  HE 
REPLIED THAT THIS WAS INDEED AN INTENTIONAL SHIFT, REFLECTING 
THE GOB'S DESIRE TO USE A "STRONGER" WORD TO DESCRIBE THE 
NEWLY VIGOROUS EFFORT TO NOT JUST RECONCILE ETHNIC AND BURMAN 
GROUPS, BUT MERGE THEM TOGETHER IN A MORE COHESIVE UNION.  TO 
US, THOUGH, IT SEEMS LIKE THE MASK SLIPPING TO REVEAL THE 
GOB'S REAL CONSTITUTIONAL INTENTIONS: BRING EVERYONE INTO THE 
FOLD WHETHER THEY LIKE IT OR NOT. 
 
6. (C) THOUGH THE JARGON HAS CHANGED, THE DFM ADDED, THE GOB 
IS STILL INTENDING TO BE FLEXIBLE AND UNDERSTANDING OF THE 
SPECIFIC DESIRES OF THE ETHNIC CEASE-FIRE GROUP DELEGATES. 
THOUGH THIS FLEXIBILITY MAY EXIST IN PRINCIPLE AND ALONG THE 
MARGINS, WE'VE SEEN NO EVIDENCE SO FAR THAT THE 
SPDC-CONTROLLED NC IS WILLING TO ENTERTAIN THE CORE DEMANDS 
OF THE CEASE-FIRE GROUPS FOR SOME KIND OF A FEDERAL SYSTEM 
(REFTEL). 
 
WORSE ON ASSK 
 
7. (C) THE COM ASKED WHETHER THE SPDC WAS CONTINUING ITS 
CONTACTS WITH AUNG SAN SUU KYI AND WHETHER OR NOT THE GOB 
VIEWED PARTICIPATION OF THE NLD IN THE NC AS STILL POSSIBLE. 
THE DFM SAID THAT CONTACT WAS ONGOING, THOUGH HE DID NOT KNOW 
THE SUBSTANCE OF THESE MEETINGS, BUT THAT IT WAS PROBABLY 
"TOO LATE" FOR THE NLD TO PLAY ANY MEANINGFUL ROLE IN THE NC. 
 THE COM CLEARLY TOLD THE DFM THAT NLD PARTICIPATION IN THE 
NC AND THE SPDC'S "ROAD MAP FOR DEMOCRACY" WAS ESSENTIAL FOR 
THE PROCESS TO HAVE ANY LEGITIMACY. 
 
COMMENT: GOOD MEETING, PREDICTABLE CONTENT 
 
8. (C) THOUGH LITTLE GOOD NEWS EMERGED FROM THE SHORT 
DISCUSSION, THE FACT THAT IT OCCURRED WAS VERY POSITIVE. 
NORMALLY THIS KIND OF HIGH-LEVEL MEETING OCCURS ONLY AFTER 
EXTENSIVE PREPARATORY WORK RESULTING IN A VERY STAGED AND 
CANNED EXCHANGE.  THE COM URGED THE DFM TO MAINTAIN MORE OPEN 
AND INFORMAL LINES OF COMMUNICATION WITH THE EMBASSY ON 
IMPORTANT BILATERAL ISSUES.  THE DFM AGREED, AND SEEMED 
EARNEST IN HIS DESIRE TO DO SO.  OF COURSE HE DOES NOT HAVE 
THE AUTHORITY TO MAKE GOOD ON HIS PROMISE.  END COMMENT. 
MARTINEZ 

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