US embassy cable - 04COLOMBO953

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 000953 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS; NSC FOR E. MILLARD 
 
PLEASE PASS TOPEC 
 
E.O. 12958:    DECL:  06-09-14 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, CE, NO, Political Parties, LTTE - Peace Process 
SUBJECT:  Recent meetings show the way forward for Sri 
Lanka peace process is troubled 
 
Refs:  (A) Colombo 915, and previous 
 
(U) Classified by Ambassador Jeffrey J. Lunstead. 
Reasons 1.5 (b,d). 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY:  Opposition Leader Wickremesinghe 
thought the Co-Chairs statement was good, but that the 
President and her government do not understand the 
psychology of the LTTE, and are determined to begin 
talks on the final ("hard") issues.  He also thinks the 
military is using LTTE rebel Karuna to attack the LTTE. 
When pressed to support the peace process, he said that 
the Government needs to make a statement laying out its 
policy. 
 
2.  (C) SUMMARY CONTINUED:  Norwegian Ambassador 
Brattskar says that the two sides are moving further 
apart, rather than closer.  The LTTE will meet with its 
diaspora experts in Switzerland in mid-July.  President 
Kumaratunga called the Norwegian Foreign Minister to 
complain that she had already made many concessions.  No 
one expects any movement until after the July 10 
Provincial Council elections.  END SUMMARY. 
 
Ranil: She just does not understand. 
------------------------------------ 
 
3.  (C) Ambassador met with Opposition Leader (and 
former Prime Minister) Ranil Wickremesinghe the evening 
of June 7 to discuss the recent Co-Chairs meeting in 
Brussels.  Ranil said that he had read the Co-chairs' 
statement and thought it was "good."  At the moment, he 
did not plan any action on the peace process:  "She has 
the mandate, not me."  President Kumaratunga and Foreign 
Minister Kadirgamar, he said, did not understand the 
psychology of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
(LTTE).  "They only want to discuss an interim 
administration.  They will never agree to discuss final 
issues now."  He had discussed this with Kadirgamar, but 
Kadirgamar had insisted that he wanted to take up hard 
issues now.  Ranil said that he had ignored some 
transgressions by the LTTE because it was the only way 
to keep negotiations going.  The President did not 
understand this. 
 
4.  (C) Ranil said that the Government was playing a 
dangerous game because the Sri Lanka Army (Department of 
Military Intelligence, "DMI") was using the breakaway 
LTTE rebel Karuna to get back at the LTTE.  Ranil said 
he "knew" this was the case -- he had sources in the 
military who told him so.  This was another example of 
the Government's dangerous game. 
 
5.  (C) Ambassador said that the Co-Chairs statement was 
directed at all parties in Sri Lanka.  If the 
international community were to keep its interest alive, 
we expected everyone to support peace.  Pressing the 
point, Ambassador said that he thought comments such as 
recent remarks by UNP spokesman G.L. Peiris that the 
President's efforts were a "sham" peace process were not 
helpful.  One could criticize what the President wanted 
to do, Ambassador said, but should not imply that she 
was not interested in peace.  Ranil said that the 
President and her ruling coalition needed to make a 
clear policy statement on the peace process.  (Comment: 
The President is avoiding this because she could never 
get her JVP coalition partners to go along with anything 
reasonable.) 
 
Norwegians: Getting worse, not better 
------------------------------------- 
 
6.  (C) Ambassador met with Indian High Commissioner Sen 
and Norwegian Ambassador Brattskar mid-day on June 8, 
along with EU and Canadian Chiefs of Mission. 
(Brattskar had arrived back from Oslo, where he had 
stopped after Brussels, only that same morning.) 
Brattskar said that the Norwegians were trying to put 
together a statement which would allow talks to resume. 
The Norwegians were in constant touch with both sides, 
receiving messages from both, but unfortunately the 
sides were moving farther apart.  Each side was sending 
"unhelpful clarifications."  The Government insistence 
on holding "parallel" talks on final settlement issues 
was, Brattskar said, just a non-starter. 
 
7.  (C) Each side was afraid that giving in would 
prejudice the final outcome.  The LTTE had rejected the 
plan to resurrect a NERF-like mechanism to disburse aid 
because they felt if they did so, the Government would 
never seriously discuss the LTTE's Interim Self- 
Governing Administration (ISGA).  The Government did not 
want to discuss the ISGA alone because it feared that if 
an ISGA were set up, the LTTE would have no incentive to 
discuss final issues.  Brattskar said that President 
Kumaratunga had called the Norwegian Foreign Minister 
the day before to complain that she had made many 
compromises, but the Tigers had not made any. 
 
LTTE issues 
----------- 
 
8.  (C) Sen said that he had heard that the GSL had been 
using Karuna and his faction to get back at the LTTE, 
but that the military had now been given orders to stop 
providing assistance to Karuna.  Brattskar said that the 
LTTE was now preparing for a week-long meeting they 
would hold in Switzerland beginning July 20.  The 
meeting would include the legal and constitutional 
experts from the Tamil diaspora who had helped the LTTE 
prepare their ISGA proposal. 
 
Messy Political Situation 
------------------------- 
 
9.  (C) All agreed that the current political situation 
makes it particularly difficult to make progress: 
 
-- The Government still does not have enough votes to 
show a majority in Parliament.  (See Septel for report 
on June 8 altercation in parliament.) 
 
-- The JVP faction within the government continues to 
snipe at the peace process (see Reftels). 
 
-- Pending Provincial Council elections on July 10, no 
one wants to make a dramatic move. 
 
10.  (C) COMMENT:  We believe that Ranil Wickremesinghe 
heard the Ambassador's message about not trying to take 
political advantage by attacking the peace process. 
Wickremesinghe made it clear, however, that he is not 
about to lend support to the President.  Ranil's 
analysis of the psychology of the Tigers, and the need 
to induce them to participate in the talks may be 
accurate.  The President's problem is that she directed 
the electoral campaign against Ranil on the basis that 
he gave in too easily to the Tigers -- now she has to 
show that she is harder to budge.  Combined with 
Kadirgamar's insistence on discussing final issues, the 
result is a poisonous atmosphere. 
 
11.  (U) Minimize considered. 
 
LUNSTEAD