US embassy cable - 04KUWAIT1809

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(C) ASAD TELLS GOK HE WANTS DIALOGUE WITH USG, SUCCESS FOR IRAQ

Identifier: 04KUWAIT1809
Wikileaks: View 04KUWAIT1809 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Kuwait
Created: 2004-06-08 13:49:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL SY IZ KU
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.


 
C O N F I D E N T I A L KUWAIT 001809 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ARN, NEA/ARP 
TEL AVIV FOR DCM LEBARON 
RIYADH FOR TUELLER 
TUNIS FOR NATALIE BROWN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/07/2014 
TAGS: PREL, SY, IZ, KU 
SUBJECT: (C) ASAD TELLS GOK HE WANTS DIALOGUE WITH USG, 
SUCCESS FOR IRAQ 
 
 
Classified By: CDA FRANK URBANCIC; REASON 1.4 (B, D). 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY:  According to the Kuwaiti FM, Syrian 
President Asad used a brief visit  June 6 to ask the GOK to 
tell the USG he is serious about working together to promote 
stability in Iraq.  Asad was reportedly very concerned about 
the Syria Accountability Act, particularly the insertion of 
the Patriot Act into it, and eager to do some horsetrading 
with the US.  The visit reportedly was marred by Asad's 
unexplained early departure.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (C) Foreign Minister Shaykh Dr. Mohammed Sabah al-Salem 
al-Sabah gave Charge a readout June 7 on the visit the 
previous day of Syrian President Bashar al-Asad (other topics 
septels).  He said Asad had been very concerned about the 
Syria Accountability Act (SAA), particularly "the insertion 
of the Patriot Act within the SAA," and had complained the 
USG was being contradictory:  it did not want Syria to 
interfere in Iraq, but it did want Syria to  influence Iraqis 
to support the political process.  Asad had asked the 
Kuwaitis to convey to the USG the seriousness of his desire 
to restore the deteriorating relationship and to cooperate 
for the stability of Iraq.  Asad had expressed the sense that 
Syria and the US could accomplish a lot together.  He had 
reminded his hosts of Syria's helpful role in the liberation 
of Kuwait, and of its intelligence contributions against 
Al-Qaeda. 
 
3.  (C) Dr. Mohammed perceived that Asad's "sentiment was 
very different from those around him"; the President had 
remarked that he belongs to a new generation "not very 
attached to old slogans," but he needs to show the people 
that his course of action brings benefits.  The Minister 
summarized Asad's message as wanting to bargain "like in Souq 
al-Hammadiyya."   Charge promised to relay the message, but 
noted that we have a direct dialogue with Syria already, 
therefore he doubted that Washington would wish to use Kuwait 
as a channel to communicate with Syria. 
 
4.  (C) Dr. Mohammed mentioned with some amusement that Asad 
had criticized his own radio station's commentary as being 
contrary to his official policy.  He had insisted that the 
SARG wishes Iraq the very best, wants a good election in 
January, and will accept any Iraqi government that is 
acceptable to the Iraqi people.  That said, Syria would 
consider the Iraqi Interim Government to be the de-facto, not 
de-jure, government of Iraq, because it was not elected. 
Charge said the US looked forward to the next free and fair 
elections in Syria. 
 
5.  (C) The Minister mentioned in passing that Asad had come 
and gone June 6.  According to the French Ambassador 
(protect), the Kuwaitis had expected him to spend the night 
and were furious when he curtailed his visit without giving a 
reason, after they had organized the usual lavish banquet in 
his honor. 
URBANCIC 

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