US embassy cable - 04KATHMANDU1054

C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 001054 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SA/INS, PRM/ANE; LONDON FOR POL/GURNEY; NSC FOR 
MILLARD; GENEVA FOR PLYNCH 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/08/2014 
TAGS: PREF, PTER, PHUM, NP, BH, Bhutanese Refugees 
SUBJECT: NEPAL:  SEVEN BHUTANESE REFUGEES ARRESTED AS 
SUSPECTED MAOISTS; OTHERS FLEE 
 
REF: KATHMANDU 594 
 
Classified By: DCM Robert K. Boggs for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY:  According to various media reports and UNHCR 
sources, seven Bhutanese refugees, including one minor, were 
arrested in the Beldangi Refugee Camp on suspicion of being 
connected to the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist). One of 
the refugees arrested reportedly was found in possession of 
Maoist literature, a home-made pistol and ammunition.  Two of 
the seven, including the minor, were subsequently released. 
UNHCR is attempting to assure due process for the arrested 
refugees.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2. (U) According to media reports, three Bhutanese refugees 
were arrested in Jhapa District on June 2 and another four 
the following day on suspicion of being Maoists.  All of the 
arrestees were from the Beldangi Bhutanese Refugee Camp. 
According to the reports, the principal suspect was Chandra 
Bahadur Prasain, who was found in possession of a home-made 
pistol, ammunition and Maoist literature.  Two of the 
suspects, Parbati Khadka and Januka Tiwari, have subsequently 
been released.  As a result of the arrests, the reports 
conclude, upwards of 100 other "suspected Maoists" have fled 
the camp. 
 
3. (C) UNHCR Protection Officer Giulia Ricciarelli (please 
protect) confirmed the arrests through her staff in Beldangi 
Camp.  According to Ricciarelli's sources, Nepali Armed 
Police (APF) personnel, in the presence of the camp secretary 
(a refugee representative) and the camp supervisor (a GON 
official), made the arrests in broad daylight.  Nepali 
security forces later confirmed the arrests, and the release 
of two of the suspects, to UNHCR.  UNHCR is attempting to 
assure due process for the arrested refugees. 
 
4. (C) Ricciareli stated that the Beldangi Camp rumor mill 
had long whispered that Nepali security forces suspected 
anywhere from 30 to 200 refugees of being connected with the 
Maoists.  (NOTE:  Nepali security forces withdrew from all of 
the refugee camps after a Maoist attack on a nearby police 
post in September 2003.  Since March 2004, APF has had a 
presence on the outskirts of the Beldangi Camp.  There is no 
security presence at the other camps.  END NOTE.) Thus, the 
arrests did not come as a surprise to UNHCR, nor did the 
stories of other refugees fleeing the camp.  Ricciarelli 
lamented that UNHCR had been warning that conditions in all 
of the refugee camps, particularly due to growing frustration 
with the stalled repatriation process, made the camps ripe 
for increasing militancy (Reftel).  Ricciarelli indicated 
that Beldangi Camp was considered the "most politicized" of 
the camps.  She added, however, that UNHCR was not aware of 
any Maoist forced recruitment in the camps. 
 
5. (C) COMMENT: This is a most unfortunate, but perhaps not 
unexpected, development.  While the arrests might argue for 
increasing the pace of verification and a beginning of 
immediate repatriation, these events could equally be used by 
the Bhutanese to justify further delay.  Moreover, any real 
or suspected connection between the Bhutanese refugee 
population and the Maoists only serves to increase the myriad 
risks to an already vulnerable population.  The sole 
positives were the style with which the arrests were carried 
out, in broad daylight and under the auspices of refugee and 
GON observers, and the speed with which those no longer under 
suspicion were released.  END COMMENT. 
BOGUE