US embassy cable - 04MADRID2136

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 002136 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/03/2014 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, SP, PSOE - Socialist Party, Spanish Election March 2004 
SUBJECT: SPAIN'S ZAPATERO: STILL IN CAMPAIGN MODE 
 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Kathleen M. Fitzpatrick for reasons 
1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
1.  (C) Summary:  Almost three months after his electoral 
victory and a month and a half after formally taking office, 
Spanish President Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero and his 
Spanish Socialist Worker's Party (PSOE) remain in campaign 
mode, intensely focused on winning a decisive victory for 
Spanish socialist candidates in the European Parliament 
elections June 13.  Zapatero and his party want to be able to 
point to such a victory as confirmation that their March 14 
election was not a fluke or a sop to the terrorists who 
attacked a Madrid rail station just three days before the 
national elections.  Every decision the new government has 
taken since the elections, including Zapatero's decision to 
withdraw troops from Iraq, his trips to France, Germany and 
Mexico, Spain's desire to abstain on the UNSC ICC rollover 
resolution, and his plan to delay any decision on increasing 
Spanish troops in Afghanistan are part of this June 13 win 
big strategy.  After June 13, we expect Zapatero and his 
party to ease some of their rhetoric, but we are skeptical 
that there will be any sea change on issues on which the 
Spanish public has strong opinions, particularly those that 
distinguish the new government from that of Aznar,s. 
Zapatero will follow, not lead the Spanish public.  Still, we 
continue to press the Zapatero government to make good on 
their professed desire to have good relations with the U.S. 
by giving us concrete examples of support.  END SUMMARY 
 
2.  (C)  Still insecure after the March 14 elections that 
took place three days after the Madrid terrorist attacks, the 
PSOE government wants to vindicate its electoral victory by 
scoring a decisive win against Popular Party (PP) candidates 
in the June 13 European Parliament elections (usually a 
yawner here in Spain, but this year a focus of political 
life).  Senior government officials have admitted to us over 
the past several weeks that the GOS will not make key 
decisions, such as whether to increase the Spanish troop 
presence in Afghanistan, until after the June 13 elections. 
The GOS's desire to abstain rather than vote in favor of the 
UNSC resolution rolling over the one-year exemption to the 
ICC for those not party to the Rome Treaty must also be seen 
in this light, particularly in the context of the Iraq 
prisoner abuse scandal.  At least one official in Zapatero's 
office readily admitted that until these elections are over, 
those who deal in foreign policy within and outside of the 
Spanish government will have to have considerable patience. 
When we raised our concern that the U.S. was being used as a 
foil in the June 13 electoral campaign, the official said 
that the visit by President Aznar to the U.S. -- still highly 
controversial here -- could be seen in a similar light. 
 
3.  (C)  Though PSOE won the March 14 election convincingly, 
if surprisingly, the party wants to dispel any notion that 
their victory was a direct result of the terrorist attacks 
and that the Spanish troop withdrawal from Iraq was a cave-in 
to Al-Qaeda.  The March 11 terrorist attacks have also become 
part of the campaign here, with PSOE seeking to show that the 
Aznar government did not read the warning signs on Islamic 
terrorism and manipulated public opinion into believing that 
the Basque terrorist group ETA had carried out the attack (in 
the belief that if the Spanish populace blamed ETA, Aznar's 
party would have won the elections).  The PP counters that 
the Socialists manipulated crowds and public opinion the day 
before the elections and that PSOE supporters in the police 
and elsewhere passed investigation information on to PSOE 
before it reached PP government officials.  All of this 
played into the debate on whether to convene a commission to 
investigate the terrorist attacks.  Both parties eventually 
agreed to establish such a commission, in the hope that 
information developed would discredit the other.  But the 
commission, formally established on May 26, will not hold its 
first session until after the June 13 elections. 
 
4.  (C)  PSOE has made foreign policy the key issue in the 
campaign.  Rhetoric remains particularly harsh on Iraq, the 
U.S. and Aznar.  Zapatero has remained generally above the 
fray, and has declined opportunities to criticize the U.S. on 
the Iraq abuse allegations, instead allowing the PSOE chief 
European Parliament candidate to take the lead.  Still, 
Defense Minister Bono has been very prominent in 
"orchestrating" the return of Spanish troops from Iraq, and 
he denied May 24 (though every interlocutor in Zapatero's 
office and the MFA insist to the contrary) that the 
government is considering augmenting troops in Afghanistan 
and possibly sending a presence to Haiti.  The government has 
made clear, however, that especially during the June 13 
campaign, it does not want to link the withdrawal of troops 
from Iraq with an increase in Afghanistan.  Zapatero's trips 
abroad, including to Morocco, France, Germany, and Mexico, 
fit into PSOE's desire for a large victory on June 13; each 
visit has allowed Zapatero to showcase how he and his 
government plan to differ from what they call Aznar's 
excessive kow-towing to the U.S. at the expense of core 
Spanish interests. 
 
5.  (C)  The PSOE and the government remain extremely anxious 
to avoid provoking public opinion even though polls show they 
are ahead some 6-10 percent.  While the PP had initially 
hoped to pull off a strong showing June 13, the party seems 
to have backed off of this idea in order to avoid 
embarrassment.  PP strategists tell us that the party regards 
defeat as likely and is focusing on keeping the margin of 
defeat as narrow as possible. 
 
6.  (C)  Though we expect the government to settle down a bit 
after the elections and ease the rhetoric, we do not expect a 
major turnaround by the Zapatero government on issues the 
Socialists feel are based on principles, Spanish consensus or 
to which they expect Spanish popular opinion to be opposed, 
in other words the vast majority of issues.  We do not expect 
a major troop increase in Afghanistan, nor a change of heart 
on the ICC resolution.  Even on the Iraq UNSC resolution, on 
which the GOS has professed to want to be helpful, we expect 
Spain to stand firm on their desire for a date certain for 
withdrawal of coalition forces (or at least a one-year 
renewal clause) and issues related to command and control of 
coalition forces. 
 
7.  (C)  One area, however, which the new Spanish government 
has not made an issue, is the U.S. presence on Spanish bases 
at Rota and Moron.  Thus far, neither the new government nor 
the PSOE has said this is a bone of contention with the U.S. 
In fact, when press reports indicated a possible reduction in 
local civilian presence at bases in Europe, including in 
Spain, the press and some government officials expressed 
concern -- probably because loss of Spanish jobs at Rota, for 
example, could harm the economy of Andalusia, a major 
Socialist regional stronghold. 
ARGYROS