US embassy cable - 04MANAMA863

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PART I: PARTING THOUGHTS ON BAHRAIN'S POITCIAL AND ECONOMIC SITUATION: SUMMARY

Identifier: 04MANAMA863
Wikileaks: View 04MANAMA863 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Manama
Created: 2004-06-07 15:16:00
Classification: SECRET
Tags: PREL PGOV PINR KMPI BA KAPO
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T MANAMA 000863 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR NEA DAS DIBBLE, NEA/ARP, PI 
CAIRO FOR STEVE BONDY 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/07/2029 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINR, KMPI, BA, KAPO 
SUBJECT: PART I: PARTING THOUGHTS ON BAHRAIN'S POITCIAL AND 
ECONOMIC SITUATION:  SUMMARY 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Ronalt E. Neumann.  Reasons 1.4 (B)(D). 
 
This cable contains the summary of my parting reflections on 
Bahrain. 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
1.  (S) Not yet democratic, its stability potentially 
challenged by a rejectionist Shia opposition, unemployment 
and cultural backlash, Bahrain has yet managed significant 
advances in political freedom and economic liberalization in 
the nearly three years of my tour.  Its already complex 
political geography of different agendas between King, PM, 
parliament, and constitutional rejectionists has been further 
complicated by the growth of conservative Sunnis with a 
radical fringe. 
 
2.  (S)  King Hamad is the fulcrum.  He transformed the 
nature of the political debate.  I believe he will allow 
further change, but the pace will be slower than in 2000-2002 
and he will insist it come through the parliament.  Thus the 
rejectionist opposition will not achieve through 
extra-parliamentary dialogue the fundamental reordering of 
power they seek.  Lacking the resources to force change, the 
opposition continues seeking controversies with some looking 
for a violent reaction that would rally their Shia base. 
Hamad has dodged this sectarian confrontation, but has had to 
sacrifice some law and order to do so.  He may have decided 
to use Shia policemen to restore credibility, and take an 
issue from the rejectionists . A struggle will go on at least 
until the 2006 election when the opposition will face the 
stark choice of participating or splitting.  Some violence is 
possible. 
 
3. (S) We have the right mix of policies; supporting 
participants in political evolution with patience and MEPI 
programs and encouraging rejectionists to participate while 
not accepting their claims that they are the only democrats. 
Our programs in law reform and education are part of building 
a civic society, but it is important to remember that this is 
still a fragile situation with few democratic habits where 
unemployment, political shocks from outside -- including 
deeply resented American policies -- could empower the 
opposition and set back the evolutionary pace.  In this mix 
our support for job creation through the FTA and economic 
reform remains essential  The result will be felt in the rest 
of the Gulf. Our resources have been significantly increased 
to meet our new tasks.  It is essential that we maintain the 
support necessary for our mission.  End Summary. 
NEUMANN 

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