US embassy cable - 04ANKARA3130

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 003130 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/04/2014 
TAGS: PREL, CY, TU 
SUBJECT: CYPRUS FOLLOW-ON: U.S. AND UK AMBASSADORS' JUNE 4 
MEETING WITH MFA U/S ZIYAL 
 
 
REF: ANKARA 2898 
 
 
(U) Classified by Ambassador Eric Edelman; reasons: 1.4 (b,d). 
 
 
1. (C) Summary:  Turks express reservations on two points in 
UNSYG's Cyprus good offices report but grudgingly agree the 
report is helpful.  Turkey sees the Russians as unhelpful in 
the UNSC and seeks a UNSC outcome that does the most to end 
northern Cyprus' isolation -- probably a simple UNSC 
endorsement of the report followed by strong statements by 
the U.S., UK and a few others.  Turkey also considers the 
Annan Plan phrase "Turkish Cypriot State" to be the minimum 
acceptable point of reference, but will not seek recognition 
of the TRNC as an independent state.  End summary. 
 
 
2. (C) Calling in U.S. and UK Ambassadors June 4 to discuss 
how to proceed on Cyprus, MFA U/S Ziyal and Deputy U/S Ilkin 
characterized UNSYG Annan's Cyprus good offices report as 
"the least that could be done" (Ziyal) and "relatively 
objective" (Ilkin).  The Turks proceeded to lay out two 
points of concern for Ankara: 
 
 
--the UNSYG's apparent interpretation that the 1960 Treaty of 
Guarantee gives no right of unilateral intervention (UNSYG 
report, para 61); 
 
 
--the report states that the UNSC would be "well advised to 
stand ready to address" lingering Greek Cypriot security 
concerns, perhaps through a resolution. 
 
 
3. (C) Ziyal reiterated what he said he had emphasized to SCC 
Weston in Burgenstock: any change in the definition or scope 
of guarantor status would be rejected by Ankara as a 
deal-breaker.  What the Greek Cypriots asked for they got at 
Burgenstock, he added.  What the Turks asked for, they got, 
thanks to the U.S. and UK.  What made the Annan Plan work was 
the trade-off of guarantees for the Turks/Turkish Cypriots 
and functionality for the Greek Cypriots.  The Greek Cypriots 
did not raise these security concerns at Burgenstock.  No one 
should open the door to them now.  Opening the door will only 
encourage Papadopulos to become even more intransigent in 
asserting that he is the government of Cyprus and that the 
Turkish Cypriots should join him. 
 
 
4. (C) Regarding UNSC action, the key would be the Council's 
willingness to declare that UNSCs 541 and 550 should not be 
interpreted as requiring an embargo of northern Cyprus.  In 
terms of what Turkey would like to see coming out of the 
UNSC, Ziyal and Ilkin reiterated (reftel) that the Russians 
are being unhelpful: "the Gul-Lavrov discussions in Moscow 
went badly."  Turkey needs to be realistic, Ilkin continued; 
if it's clear a satisfactory UNSCR or presidential statement 
is not in the cards, then Turkey would prefer a simple UNSC 
endorsement followed by strongly worded national statements 
by the U.S., UK and some others under the coordinated 
statement procedure. 
 
 
5. (C) In response, both Ambassadors Edelman and Westmacott 
pointed out why the UNSYG report is balanced.  Edelman 
emphasized that the USG continues to believe the Annan Plan 
offers the best basis for a settlement and there is no 
disposition to re-open the text.  Westmacott added that the 
Russians' unrelenting pro-Greek Cypriot stance stems in part 
from Putin's wish to remind everyone that Russia is still a 
major player and isn't to be taken for granted. 
 
 
6. (C) Turning to other next steps, Ilkin noted that Ankara 
is searching for a way to clarify definitively Turkey's view 
of "Cyprus"-in-the-EU as the "Greek Cypriot State".  Ziyal 
underscored that Ankara cannot retreat from the Annan Plan 
phrase "Turkish Cypriot State".  At the upcoming OIC summit 
in Istanbul Turkey wants to renew the Turkish Cypriots' 
status as observers under the name "Turkish Cypriot State" 
but clearly labeling it as having that name under the ambit 
of the Annan Plan.  Turkey would not, however, try to push 
beyond this change of nameplate to seek recognition.  There 
is pressure from the Russians not to seek the change, but 
Ankara is confident it can handle the Russians since they 
seek observer status.  Crucial will be U.S. and UK agreement 
not to lobby against the change. 
 
 
7. (C) The Ambassadors reviewed U.S. and UK step-by-step 
moves to end northern Cyprus' isolation.  Westmacott noted 
that making a breakthrough in ICAO would be helped if the EU 
could achieve consensus.  In this regard, Verheugen appears 
strongly positive. 
EDELMAN