US embassy cable - 04MADRID2096

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 002096 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/04/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, SP 
SUBJECT: SPAIN:  VIEWS ON IRAQ RESOLUTION 
 
REF: A. STATE 121748 
     B. STATE 121718 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Kathleen M. Fitzpatrick for reasons 
1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1.  (C)  SUMMARY  Spanish MFA Political Director Dezcallar, 
who now has overall Iraq responsibility in the MFA, told us 
June 3 that Spain appreciated the constructive and positive 
attitude evident in the US-UK revised text.  He said Spanish 
President Zapatero personally had instructed Spanish UN Perm 
Rep to be "helpful" in seeking to forge consensus.  On the 
revised text, Spain would like to see further clarification 
of the end date of the MNF mandate, but is willing to discuss 
pros and cons of leaving the date "indeterminate."   The GOS 
wants a specific reference to "international humanitarian 
law," but Dezcallar insisted that the kind of clause Spain 
would desire would be forward-looking, not refer to past 
events (e.g. prisoner abuse allegations).  Spain would also 
welcome further clarification on the relationship between the 
IIG and the MNF, and seeks language on this relationship to 
reinforce, not undermine, Iraqi sovereignty.  The GOS would 
prefer a 3-month schedule for MNF reports to the Security 
Council, rather than the 6-month schedule envisaged in the 
current text.  Dezcallar professed that none of these issues 
was a deal breaker for Spain, but identified the IIG-MNF 
relationship as the most serious issue for the GOS.  The 
Zapatero government clearly wants the US to see Spain as a 
positive factor in developing the UNSC resolution on Iraq; 
however, the GOS will not hesitate to raise difficult 
"details."  END SUMMARY 
 
2.  (C)  In a June 3 meeting with MFA Political Director 
Dezcallar, who has overall responsibility for Iraq in the 
MFA, and will take over Iraq responsibilities formerly housed 
in the MOD, PolCouns reviewed USG thinking on the revised 
Iraq UNSC resolution (ref a) and urged strong GOS support, 
including in public statements, for the new Iraqi interim 
government (ref B).  PolCouns noted USG,s desire to move 
quickly in adopting the resolution, as a firm expression of 
international support for the new government. 
 
3.  (C) As have previous GOS interlocutors over the past 
several weeks, Dezcallar said that President Zapatero had 
personally instructed the MFA to play a constructive role in 
crafting the new UNSC resolution.  "We have learned our 
lessons from past mistakes," Dezcallar noted, clearly 
referring to the Villepin parallel text process during the 
negotiations of 1483.  Dezcallar expressed appreciation for 
the positive U.S. and UK attitude, clearly reflected in the 
elements of the revised text that sought to meet concerns 
expressed previously by Council members.  He asked when the 
USG might want to put the text to a vote; PolCouns responded 
that the USG preferred to move sooner rather than wait for 
discussions to take place among non-Council members such as 
Iraq,s neighbors, as other members of the Council had 
suggested.  She added that while these views were important, 
the priority was to demonstrate support for the new 
government and the political transition process.  Dezcallar 
did not further comment on Spain,s view on timing. 
 
4.  (C) Dezcallar identified several key concerns for the GOS 
(roughly paralleling issues raised by the Spanish Perm Rep in 
New York), as detailed below. 
 
5.  (C) Reference to "International Humanitarian Law:"  The 
GOS wants a specific reference to "international humanitarian 
law" in the text; the Spanish Perm Rep has made this point in 
NY; subsequent to the conversation with Dezcallar, Foreign 
Minister Moratinos, in a press conference in Finland, said 
the text should include such a specific reference.  Dezcallar 
told us that, unlike the "Chinese proposal,"  which referred 
to past actions in Iraq (e.g. prisoner abuses), Spain's 
preference would be for language that looked forward to the 
future.  He said that the U.S. should welcome, not fear, such 
a reference, and thought that the U.S. should have as much 
interest in seeing it included as Spain or any other Council 
member.  Dezcallar opined that the UK supported some language 
referring to humanitarian law. 
 
6.  (C)  We asked why the reference to "international law" 
that is already in the text was not sufficient, since it 
obviously incorporates humanitarian law.  In addition, 
preambular language also refers to human rights.  Dezcallar 
responded that it would be important for the Iraqis to have 
the Council specifically to refer to humanitarian law.  He 
indicated that this might well be handled in preambular 
language rather than in the operative portion of the text. 
Dezcallar also took the opportunity to note that Spain 
understood the prisoner abuses were undertaken by a few, and 
that in our transparent democratic system they were being 
prosecuted in accordance with due process.  He noted 
President Zapatero,s comments to that effect on the margins 
of the EU-Latin America summit, in which Zapatero also said 
that the U.S. government was not to blame for the prisoner 
abuses. 
 
7.  (C)  MNF reporting schedule:   As the Spanish Perm Rep 
noted in UNSC informals, Spain would like the MNF to report 
every three months to the Council, which the SYG would also 
be called upon to do.  Dezcallar said that a three-month 
schedule would be a very good signal on the part of the MNF 
to the Iraqis.  He noted that on a six month schedule, the 
MNF might end up reporting only once to the Council (say, if 
MNF mandate ends with elections at the end of this year or 
early next year).  Again, this is not a deal breaker, 
Dezcallar indicated, but something Spain wants to be 
considered and would like to see incorporated in the text. 
 
8.  (C)  IIG-MNF relations:  By far this is one of the most 
important issues for the GOS, Dezcallar said.  Spain would 
like more clarification on how the U.S. would envisage this 
relationship, and noted that the resolution language on this 
issue must not be seen in any way to undermine Iraqi 
sovereignty.  Dezcaller referred to a meeting between Deputy 
Secretary Armitage and Secretary-General, EU High 
 
SIPDIS 
Representative Solana on this issue, in which Armitage had 
identified a number of scenarios in which the IIG and the MNG 
would have to develop arrangements.  According to 
Dezcallar,s readout, Armitage and Solana noted that 
operations on which all agreed would not be problematic, nor 
would defensive operations in which MNF troops clearly had to 
conduct an operation to defend themselves.  The most 
problematic, would be an offensive operation which the IIG 
did not approve. 
 
9.  (C)  PolCouns noted that the USG certainly shared Spain's 
desire to reinforce, not undermine, Iraqi sovereignty in the 
resolution text.  She also noted Secretary Powell's June 2 
interview at the Middle East broadcasting center in which he 
identified excellent examples of how this can be worked out 
with a sovereign nation, such as with Germany and Korea where 
our troops have been based for the past 50 years.  When asked 
whether Spain wanted more specific language on the 
relationship issue,  Dezcallar was unclear, but said the GOS 
would welcome further details on USG thinking on the 
arrangements between the IIG and the MNF.  We discussed the 
exchange of two letters process, in which the IIG would 
communicate with the UNSC to express its desire for the MNF 
to remain, and the lead MNF nation would send a letter also 
outlining in general terms the process by which relations 
would be developed. 
 
10.  (C)  End of MNF mandate:  Dezcallar noted Spain,s 
concern that the closure of the MNF mandate remains too 
"indeterminate" in the current text, which envisages the 
mandate to end at the end of the political process leading to 
democratization.  Dezcallar acknowledged that flexibility on 
the date might be beneficial, but said the Council should 
discuss pros and cons of further clarifying the sunset 
clause.  (FM Moratinos in Finland subsequently said publicly 
that "the sooner we give the Iraqi people a clear sign that 
the multinational troops will leave Iraq, the better."). 
Dezcallar declared the GOS "flexible" on this issue, however, 
but would welcome further discussion in New York. 
 
11.  (C)  Comment:   The Zapatero government clearly wants us 
to view Spain as helpful in the UNSC on the Iraq resolution - 
even as it raises "details" that could be difficult to work 
out. 
ARGYROS