US embassy cable - 04HANOI1618

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 HANOI 001618 
 
SIPDIS 
 
TERREP 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR DS/IP/EAP, DS/DSS/ITA, DS/ICI/PII, DS/DSS/CC, 
DS/ICI/CI and EAP/BCLTV 
DEPARTMENT PLEASE PAS TO DHS/BICE FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFIARS 
DEPARTMENT 
 
BANGKOK FOR RSO AND LEGATT, EMBASSIES FOR RSO 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC, PTER, VM, CTERR 
SUBJECT: POSSIBLE TERRORIST SIGHTING IN HO CHI MINH CITY - 
FOLLOW-UP O1 
 
REF: A) HO CHI MINH CITY 0750 (NOTAL); B) HANOI 1617 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  REFTEL (A) and (B) reported that on the 
evening of June 1, two visiting AMCITS observed an 
individual in a Ho Chi Minh City (HCMC) night club who they 
believed to be Fahid Mohammed Ally MSALAM (SUBJECT 1). 
SUBJECT 1 is listed on the FBI's Most Wanted Terrorist Web 
site.  Despite RSO Hanoi's efforts at the national level, 
the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) in HCMC only agreed to 
meet with RSO HCMC at 6 pm on June 4. However, HCMC DHS/OIC 
has been in touch with MPS and been advised that they have 
the necessary information and are investigating.  (Post 
Note:  MPS in HCMC is notoriously reluctant/unable to meet 
with RSO HCMC on an urgent basis because they must get 
permission from Hanoi.  End Note) RSO HCMC was able meet 
with elements of Military Region 7 (MR7) of the Ministry of 
Defense (MOD) and was provided additional information.  At 
this point, ConGen HCMC believes appropriate - if not 
integrated - assistance is being rendered by security 
agencies in HCMC. END SUMMARY. 
 
2. (SBU)  On June 2, RSO Hanoi met with Major Pham Dinh 
Trieu, Deputy Chief of the Section of Terrorism Analysis and 
Syntheses, Counterterrorism Department, MPS.  RSO provided 
Maj. Trieu with the details listed in REFTELS and provided 
copies of the wanted poster from the FBI website.  RSO 
requested that MPS Hanoi coordinate with MPS HCMC to ensure 
that an active and aggressive investigation was undertaken. 
RSO further requested the following from MPS: 
 
- Notify RSOs Hanoi and HCMC if anyone matching SUBJECT 1's 
description is located, identified or detained; 
 
- Ensure that fingerprints are taken of anyone detained that 
matches SUBJECT 1's description; 
 
- Allow Embassy or ConGen personnel to participate in any 
interviews of SUBJECT 1. 
 
Maj. Trieu indicated that he would contact his counterpart 
in HCMC immediately upon the conclusion of the meeting.  He 
was noncommittal regarding the rest of RSO Hanoi's requests. 
 
3. (SBU)  On June 3, RSO HCMC attempted to schedule a 
meeting with MPS HCMC in order to discuss this sighting.  He 
was advised that they (MPS) did not have time to meet.  RSO 
HCMC was finally given an appointment with MPS at 6 pm on 
June 4.  However, DHS/OIC Rick Sell was able to contact his 
MPS contacts and was informed as indicated in REFTELS, 
paragraph 7. 
 
4. (SBU)  On June 3, RSO HCMC met with Mr. Thanh (rank UNK) 
of the Security/Investigations section of Military Region 7 
(MR7) based in HCMC.  (Post Note: MR7 is charged with the 
mission of counterterrorism and border security in southern 
Vietnam.)  Mr. Thanh indicated that he was the assistant to 
a Lt. Col. Phuong.  Also joining the meeting was another Mr. 
Thanh and a Mr. Cuong (rank UNK). 
 
4A.  (SBU)  The first Mr. Thanh was provided with a copy of 
the FBI wanted poster for SUBJECT 1 and a summary of the 
statements by the AMCIT witnesses.  Mr. Thanh stated that he 
recognized the photograph of SUBJECT 1.  He indicated that 
he had seen SUBJECT 1 in March 2004, in a market outside 
Phnom Penh, Cambodia, that caters to foreigners and Middle 
Easterners (NFI).  He stated that he was in Cambodia on 
official business at the time.  Mr. Cuong and the second Mr. 
Thanh also stated that they recognized SUBJECT 1 as somebody 
they had seen in Cambodia. 
 
4B.  (SBU)  RSO HCMC also provided Mr. Thanh with a copy of 
the FBI webpage that contains thumbnail photos of the entire 
most wanted terrorist.  The second Mr. Thanh identified two 
additional individuals whom he said he has seen in HCMC. 
They are Saif AL-ADEL (SUBJECT 2) and Ahmed Khalfan GHAILANI 
(SUBJECT 3).  Mr. Thanh stated that he had seen SUBJECT 2 on 
two occasions in the Carmen Coffee Shop located on Ly Tu 
Truong Street in HCMC.  Mr. Cuong agreed.  (Post Note:  This 
coffee shop/nightclub is a popular entertainment spot for 
Vietnamese and foreigners alike - including ConGen 
personnel.  End note.)  Mr. Thanh could not definitively say 
when he saw SUBJECT 2 at the above location, only that it 
had been recently.  Regarding SUBJECT 3, Mr. Thanh could not 
recall where he had seen him, only that it had been recently 
and in Vietnam.  Finally, Mr. Thanh indicated to RSO HCMC 
that elements of MR7 would be actively searching for the 
aforementioned SUBJECTS. 
 
4C. (SBU) RSO Hanoi met again with MPS Counterterrorism 
Department to express concern that RSO HCMC had been unable 
to meet with the MPS in HCMC.  RSO Hanoi was provided with 
two contact names and numbers for RSO HCMC to call to set up 
an appointment. 
 
4D. (SBU)  RSO HCMC Comment:  During the meeting with MR7 
personnel, RSO HCMC was apprised of the professional rivalry 
between the MR7 and the MPS in HCMC. RSO HCMC was advised 
that the HCMC Police (who belong to MPS) consider the 
security situation under control in HCMC and very safe, 
whereas the MR7 believes there are vulnerabilities, and does 
not consider the situation completely safe. 
 
5.  (SBU)  RSO/Embassy comment:  We believe that MPS in 
Hanoi and HCMC are following up on the information both 
posts have provided them and are encouraged that MOD's MR7 
is evaluating the information.  As this cable is being 
drafted, RSO HCMC is heading out to a 6 pm meeting with MPS. 
At this point, neither the GVN nor we have been able to 
confirm the sighting(s) of these individuals.  We will 
continue to urge the GVN to investigate further and increase 
cooperation, and to permit MPS in HCMC to meet with the 
ConGen.  We will also continue to tap all resources 
available to us. 
 
6.  (SBU)  If it is necessary to contact ConGen HCMC 
urgently, please use NIACT IMMEDIATE precedence or send an 
email and alert officers by phone, since the cable lines are 
down and ConGen cannot retrieve cable traffic unless the IPO 
brings up the satellite connection.  Please note that ConGen 
HCMC is an Unclassified post. 
 
BURGHARDT