US embassy cable - 04BRUSSELS2389

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DEALING WITH EU IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: USEU FIRST IMPRESSIONS

Identifier: 04BRUSSELS2389
Wikileaks: View 04BRUSSELS2389 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Brussels
Created: 2004-06-04 10:40:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL UN EUN USEU BRUSSELS
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 002389 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/ERA JOHN RODGERS, IO/UNP MARK WEINBERG, L/EUR 
EVAN BLOOM 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/04/2014 
TAGS: PREL, UN, EUN, USEU BRUSSELS 
SUBJECT: DEALING WITH EU IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: 
USEU FIRST IMPRESSIONS 
 
REF: A. A) STATE 10097 
 
     B. B) STATE 100881 
     C. C) UNVIE VIENNA 471 
     D. D) BRUSSELS 2292 
 
Classified By: USEU POLOFF TODD HUIZINGA, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) 
 
 1. (C) SUMMARY:  We reviewed ref A draft guidelines on 
dealing with the EU in international organizations, and 
believe the guidelines, with a few adjustments, will provide 
what is needed: an equitable and fair framework which allows 
flexibility within broad parameters and clearly spells out 
U.S. redlines.  Below are USEU's overall recommendations 
(para 2), and specific comments on each of the draft 
guidelines (para 3).  END SUMMARY. 
 
2. (C) RECOMMENDATIONS: 
 
--The guidelines should provide flexibility within broad 
parameters, but with U.S. redlines clearly explained. 
 
--Flexibility within broad parameters should help USG 
officials to apply the guidelines in a wide variety of 
circumstances and venues. 
 
--Clear red lines are needed to overcome the current lack of 
clarity and the resulting tensions between the U.S. and the 
EU. 
 
--The guidelines should be conspicuously equitable.  It 
should be emphasized that their primary purpose is to promote 
fairness for all interested parties; the guidelines should 
ultimately be shared with the EU in order to promote 
constructive U.S.-EU engagement in international 
organizations. 
 
--Department, together with Japan, Canada and Australia, 
should consider approaching the EU once the guidelines are in 
final version.  The purpose of the approach should be to get 
explicit EU agreement to the guidelines, even if that may 
require a willingness to negotiate with the EU on some of the 
fine points. 
 
END RECOMMENDATIONS. 
 
3. (C) SPECIFIC COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT GUIDELINES: 
 
--The first guideline as written -- that rules for EU 
participation must be reviewed case-by-case and no particular 
case creates a precedent for others -- could result in a 
continuation of endless haggling with the EU in each 
individual case.  We suggest the following reformulation: 
"Equitable general guidelines should be established with 
which EU participation should comply in each particular case. 
 We do not view EU participation in any particular case as 
creating a precedent for others unless the relevant 
conditions of both cases are identically applicable." 
 
--On the second guideline, we would appreciate a clearer 
delineation of what type of speaking arrangements would 
confer special advantages to the EU, and what those special 
advantages would be. 
 
--On the third guideline, is the USG justified in trying to 
prevent EU member states alone from constituting a quorum at 
any meeting?  If the principle behind the guidelines is no 
additionality -- not to allow the EU and its member states to 
have an advantage over other countries simply because of the 
existence of the EU, then presumably the EU and its member 
states should suffer no disadvantage simply because of the 
existence of the EU. 
 
--On the fourth guideline, we agree that the onus should be 
on the EU to disclose fully its competence over the subject 
matter of meetings, and inform third parties who is 
negotiating for the EU.  If the EU claims mixed competency 
(competency shared by the European Commission (EC) and EU 
member states) but cannot explain how the mixed competency is 
shared or what the implications of mixed competency are in a 
particular case, the EC should not be granted any enhanced 
status. 
 
--On the fifth guideline, we propose that the sentence, "EU 
rights at major conferences should be subject to case-by-case 
review" be changed to "EU rights at major conferences and 
agencies within international organizations should be subject 
to case-by-case review within established and equitable broad 
guidelines."  This will allow for enough flexibility to 
accommodate cases in which enhanced EU rights not only in 
conferences, but also in agencies within IOs, may be 
equitable and in the interest of the U.S. 
 
--While we understand the need to maintain flexibility, the 
sixth guideline, "The EU should not be allowed to dominate by 
its numbers small negotiating groups," should be delineated 
more clearly.  What exactly is meant by "dominate by its 
numbers?"  What exactly are "small negotiating groups?"  If 
exact answers to these questions are not possible, perhaps 
Department can illustrate the overall intent of this 
guideline by including specific examples of cases in which 
the EU has dominated small negotiating groups. 
--USEU agrees with the final guideline, "We should consult on 
any additionality questions that go beyond these basic 
guidelines." 
 
END COMMENTS ON DRAFT GUIDELINES. 
 
3. (C) We will continue to work this issue, and consult our 
counterparts in the Japanese, Australian and Canadian 
Missions. 
 
FOSTER 

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