US embassy cable - 04CARACAS1889

C O N F I D E N T I A L  CARACAS 001889 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
NSC FOR C. BARTON 
USCINCSO ALSO FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/08/2013 
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, KDEM, VE 
SUBJECT: WHAT'S NEXT FOR CHAVEZ 
 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Abelardo A. Arias for reason 1.4 (d) 
. 
 
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SUMMARY 
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1.  (C) Pending announcement of the official results of the 
appeals for the presidential recall referendum signatures, 
there are rumors and indications that President Hugo Chavez 
may be willing to accept a National Electoral Council (CNE) 
decision that results in a recall referendum.  If so, the 
National Electoral Council would proceed to schedule a recall 
referendum.  Alternatively, some believe the President may 
push for early elections, a move complicated by legalities 
and feasible only if political agreements can be reached. 
End Summary. 
 
2.  (C)  President Hugo Chavez acknowledged publicly June 1 
that the opposition, though "having engaged in some fraud," 
might have come up with sufficient valid signatures in the 
appeals process for the presidential recall referendum.  They 
may be a winner "by  a hair," the President said, "nothing 
more."  Vice President Rangel followed the President's 
comments June 2, saying that if the National Electoral 
Council (CNE) determines that the opposition indeed has 
sufficient signatures, the GoV is prepared to go to the 
recall.  Vice President Rangel's chief of staff, Rene 
Arreaza, told the ambassador June 2 that Chavez will/will 
accept the results of the appeals.  Other GoV officials, such 
as Minister of Culture Jesse Chacon, and Fifth Republic 
Movement leader Elias Jaua, have echoed what appears to be 
Chavez line. 
 
3.  (C) National Assembly Secretary and Podemos deputy 
Eustoquio Contreras (protect) told DCM June 2 that Chavez and 
his top political advisers discussed all options, including 
the "hard line" of simply telling the CNE to rule against the 
Opposition which Chavez ruled out, at a late night meeting 
June 1.  The outcome, however, was that Chavez was inclined 
to accept a CNE decision that would permit a referendum to go 
forward.  The meeting participants, according to Contreras, 
acknowledged that the Comando Ayacucho had been excessively 
optimistic in assessing the Coordinadora's capabilities, and 
in its own ability to persuade people to withdraw their 
signatures.  The Comando Ayacucho reportedly believed that 
the Coordinadora had obtained only some 80,000 signatures 
beyond the minimum required.  Chavez and his advisors also 
discussed what next if Chavez lost the referendum.  Arreaza 
told the Ambassador that there will be a series of meetings 
at Miraflores beginning June 4 in which they will decide if 
they go to the recall or move to early elections. 
 
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Early Elections 
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4.  (C) Aragua State Governor Didalco Bolivar told the 
Ambassador June 1 that he was seeking a meeting with the 
President to advise him that he should call early elections 
to attenuate the loss before the CNE announces the results. 
Other pundits and politics watchers have speculated that 
Chavez would make such a move to catch the opposition 
unprepared for an electoral contest.  In a second 
conversation with Arreaza, the Chief of Staff reiterated that 
Chavez will accept the results; the question is whether to go 
to the recall or call general elections.  The Political 
Committee (the cabinet, key MVR party members, and the key 
Chavista mayors and governors) are to discuss the options in 
Miraflores June 4.  Arreaza also confirmed the assessment OAS 
SYG Cesar Gaviria had given the Ambassador earlier: that 
PDVSA President Ali Rodriguez and VP Rangel favor accepting 
the results while hard-liners such as Chacon, Libertador 
Mayor Freddy Bernal, and National Assembly Deputy Tarek Saab 
oppose. 
 
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Obstacles 
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5.  (C) The main obstacle to calling early elections, 
 
however, is that there are currently no legal provisions for 
Chavez to call early elections,  according to former Attorney 
General and law professor Ramon Escobar Salom.  Early 
elections would require a constitutional amendment, an option 
the opposition discarded during the OAS talks in 2003 
because, they say, former President Jimmy Carter backed the 
recall referendum solution and they did not believe they 
Chavez would agree to the idea.  Under the Constitution, the 
President with the Council of Ministers can introduce an 
amendment which the CNE must then put up for ratification via 
a referendum within 30 days.  The amendment requires approval 
by majority of voters to come into effect. Escobar told 
PolCouns June 1, however, that it is conceivable that Chavez 
could make a political deal to short cut the legalities of 
the Constitutional amendment path. 
 
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COMMENT 
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6.  (C) The important news is that Chavez, for whatever 
reasons, appears to have decided to accept a referendum.  He 
will continue to portray this, however, as the result of CD 
fraud, and GoV magnanimity.  Medium term, the important news 
is that the GoV knows it has lost a big one, and is concerned 
it may lose even more.  The combination of international 
observers, opposition organization and public opinion was 
critical, and will continue to be so in a referendum. 
SHAPIRO 
 
 
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      2004CARACA01889 - CONFIDENTIAL