US embassy cable - 04BRUSSELS2381

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BRUSSELS 002381 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/02/2014 
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, BK, EUN, NATO, USEU BRUSSELS 
SUBJECT: EUR/DAS BRADTKE'S SECURITY CONSULTATIONS WITH EU 
 
 
Classified By: USEU External Affairs Officer Andrew Erickson 
for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d) 
 
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SUMMARY 
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1.  (C) EUR/DAS Bradtke met May 26 in Brussels with EU 
leaders in the PSC Troika Format including representatives of 
the EU presidency, Council, and Commission.  Bradtke and his 
EU interlocutors reviewed ESDP/NATO developments, including 
the BiH SFOR transition, the EU's planning for a civ-mil 
cell, EU African peacekeeping ambitions, the development of 
NRF and the EU's rapid response capabilities, including 
battlegroups, and finally, ways of moving forward with 
NATO-EU strategic cooperation after enlargement in both 
organizations.  The EU believes that preparations for a 
post-SFOR EU presence in Bosnia are proceeding well.  The EU 
also reviewed its non-pro efforts and views on Afghanistan; 
Bradtke briefed on Kosovo and heard a read-out of the last 
EUROMED meeting.  Finally, Bradtke reviewed with EU 
interlocutors the state of play in Moldova.  In a separate 
meeting, Bradtke met with HiRep Solana at Solana's request to 
hear a strong pitch for a more creative approach by NATO to 
Partnership for peace for Bosnia.  Solana also stressed his 
desire for the EU to be more active in Kosovo.  End summary. 
 
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Solana/Cooper Meetings 
---------------------- 
 
2.  (C) At the Hirep's request, Bradtke met privately with 
Solana for half an hour prior to the larger consultative 
meeting with the EU Presidency, Council, and Commission. DG 
Robert Cooper told Bradtke Solana was "keen" on Peter Feith 
to succeed Holkeri in Kosovo.   Solana wanted the EU to get 
"their man" in UNMIK because they believe the EU will 
eventually take a lead role in Kosovo.  Solana, who joined 
the meeting later, did not make a pitch directly for Feith, 
but urged a quick decision on a replacement for Holkeri in 
Kosovo.  Cautioning that he did not want to give the 
impression the EU seeks to push the US out, Solana also 
argued for the long-term "Europeanization" of the 
international effort in Kosovo.  He suggested the appointment 
of an EU insider to replace Holkeri as the first step toward 
creating a dual-hatted figure similar to the role played by 
Paddy Ashdown in Bosnia. 
 
3.  (C) Bradtke told Cooper that the US was well aware of 
Feith's strong qualifications.  While this was a European 
decision, there was concern about Feith,s key role in 
managing the Berlin Plus transition in Bosnia.  Cooper 
recognized this as a problem, and suggested that if Holkeri 
stayed on through his tenure to August, much of the heavy 
lifting on Bosnia should be completed.  Solana said the 
international community should stick with its focus on 
standards through mid-2005, but that Kosovo was facing a 
difficult period with elections on the way.  He was pleased 
with the new US-EU-NATO formula, but noted that Kostunica 
preferred the Contact Group because he could use Russia's 
presence to gain leverage.  That said, Solana said in his 
recent discussions with the Russians (including Putin), he 
found Moscow open to new ideas, and prepared to be 
constructive.  After the meeting, Cooper approached Bradtke 
and suggested that one option was that Declan Kelleher, the 
Irish PSC ambassador, would replace Feith on Solana,s staff. 
 The other option was that he (Cooper) would try to take on 
more responsibility for the day-to-day management of the 
Bosnia transition. 
 
-------------- 
Bosnia and PfP 
-------------- 
 
4.  (C) Solana noted that the Bosnian PM had spoken to the 
NAC/PSC at the beginning of the week, and had made a strong 
case for his country's commitment to reform.  Solana 
suggested that, while mindful that it was not for him to give 
advice to NATO,it might be time for NATO to rethink the 
linkage between PfP and PIFWCs, noting that PfP is a powerful 
tool to provide "oxygen" to militaries that enable them to 
act more responsibly, which in turn is more likely to have a 
positive impact on efforts to apprehend PIFWCs than the 
current approach.  The linkage is leading to frustration, and 
it might be time to be more creative, rather than remain 
"trapped" in the current policy.  Bradtke responded that the 
US had reviewed this issue at senior levels, and was not  not 
prepared to change the current policy before the Istanbul 
Summit. 
 
------------------- 
BiH SFOR Transition 
------------------- 
 
5.  (C) Following his meetings with Solana and Cooper, 
Bradtke met with the PSC Troika formation of Presidency state 
Ireland, incoming presidency state the Netherlands, EU 
Council Secretariat and Commission staff.  The Presidency 
chaired, with Irish PSC Ambassador Declan Kelleher opening by 
noting that NATO-EU cooperation on Bosnia was moving ahead 
smartly.  The EUMS is staffing its liaison positions at 
SHAPE, and will soon send a liaison to Naples.  PSC 
ambassadors will visit Naples in early June to educate 
themselves about the role of CINCSOUTH.  The EU informal 
force generation conference will take place June 8th; 
modalities for third country participation remain under 
discussion.  The EU remains concerned about the need for 
clear delineation of tasks, a clear Dayton mandate for the 
EU, and ensuring "access to reserves at all levels."  Bradtke 
responded that the US was generally satisfied with the EU's 
general concept for Bosnia, and pleased with Pieter Feith's 
good cooperation with the NATO IS.  Nonetheless, the US was 
committed to the need for both NATO and the EU to have full 
access to all Dayton authorities, with Bradtke saying: 
"Dayton gave NATO very broad authority in Bosnia; we don't 
want an effort to pick apart Annex 1A." 
 
6.  (C) Dutch PSC Ambassador Hamer told Bradtke "what you 
have described is in line with our thoughts."  Council ESDP 
Deputy Director General Feith noted that the debate on 
delineation and mandate is on-going at NATO; the key is to 
"avoid the possibility of Bosnians using NATO as an appeals 
court if EU assesses non-compliance on an issue."  Feith 
added that the delineation remains a political point that 
can't be left to authorities on the ground; the EU "needs to 
be fully comfortable with delineation."  This delineation 
need not be formally endorsed by the NAC-PSC, Bradtke agreed 
with Feith.  Finally, Bradtke underscored that a NAC decision 
would be required to endorse EU access to strategic reserves. 
 
 
--------------- 
EU Civ-Mil Cell 
--------------- 
 
7.  (C) Kelleher noted that the EU cell "is not a standing 
HQ"; it is part of a package with the EU cell at SHAPE, and 
should be seen as such.  It will have three main functions, 
developing strategic options, assisting NHQs, and working EU 
autonomous operations without recourse to NATO assets.  The 
cell will have approximately 25 personnel, and will keep 
DSACEUR informed through consultations.  HRSG Solana's goal 
is to have a political way forward agreed by June; it will be 
up to the Dutch presidency (second half of 2004) to move the 
concept "from words to work" e.g. implementation and staffing 
of the cell.  Feith added that he believed the cell would be 
up and running by "late 2005 or the beginning of 2006." 
Bradtke noted that Washington continues to follow the 
development of the cell with close interest and appreciates 
the assurances the U.S. has received regarding its 
consistency with Berlin-plus and non-duplication of NATO 
capabilities. 
 
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EU Ambition 
for Africa? 
----------- 
 
8.  (C) Although the EU is currently not actively involved in 
peacekeeping in Africa, it anticipates a surge in demand for 
African peacekeeping, according to Kelleher.  The EU's 
approach will be multilateral, focusing on close cooperation 
with the African Union and other regional actors.  It will 
also be, in keeping with EU doctrine: "integrated" -- meaning 
that it will involve all EU actors, civilian & military, for 
a coordinated approach to security restoration.  For now, the 
EU's ambitions are greater than its actions: one EU military 
staff liaison officer is in Addis Ababa to liaise with the 
African Union.  He is there now.  The EU also has on line its 
250 million euro African peacekeeping facility, which it has 
yet to use. 
 
--------------- 
EU battlegroups 
--------------- 
 
9.   (C) Following Bradtke's review of developments with the 
NATO Rapid Reaction Force (NRF), the EU briefed on its 
battlegroups (BG) concept, based upon the UK-FR-GE proposal 
for national and multinational units of 1500 troops 
deployable within fifteen days.  The concept has been 
endorsed by EU foreign ministers, and is now being fleshed 
out.  The key point for the EU was the promotion of "mutually 
reinforcing" capabilities; Kelleher also warned of EU 
concerns that capabilities not be "frozen" by commitments to 
specific duties.  The EU would seek -- and offer -- 
transparency with NATO as it developed its approach to BGs. 
Bradtke probed for specifics on how the BG concept would 
work.  It was clear that EU interlocutors had few.  The 
Council military planner speculated that "sub-Saharan Africa 
would probably be about the limit" of potential 
deployability. 
10.  (C) Bradtke underscored the need to keep NATO and EU 
standards aligned.  In response to Bradtke's question about 
whether the EU would conduct field exercises for its BGs, 
Ambassador Kelleher underscored that the EU would not conduct 
field exercises, below the force headquarters level. 
Training remains a national responsibility.  Keller also 
assured Bradtke that participation in battlegroups would be 
open to all EU members, rather than only to members meeting 
certain criteria. 
 
----------------- 
Post Enlargement 
NATO-EU relations 
----------------- 
 
11.  (C) Bradtke observed that it was important to ensure 
that enlargement not hinder NATO - EU cooperation, despite 
the challenges posed on participation by the accession of 
Cyprus and Malta, both non-PfP members.  Ambassador Kelleher 
replied that the EU's position on participation was that the 
use of NATO classified information -- or information derived 
from NATO classified information -- was the dividing line for 
the EU in terms of whether Cyprus and Malta would participate 
in EU consultations with NATO.  While the classification 
exclusion was certain, it also could reduce their rights as 
full EU member states.  Kelleher probed Bradtke about the 
prospect of a NATO - EU summit, or ministerial, on the 
margins of the NATO Istanbul Summit.  Bradtke said that from 
his perspective, the issue of Malta and Cyprus did not 
preclude holding NATO-EU Summits or Ministerials with the 
participation of all twenty-five EU members.  However, at 
Istanbul, the US opposed a summit and probably would not be 
enthusiastic about a ministerial, because of the time 
constraints.  Changing the subject, Bradtke praised the 
Netherlands/UK/LUX non-paper on prospective enhanced NATO-EU 
cooperation; "let's operationalize it," he said. 
 
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Kosovo 
------ 
 
12.  (C) Bradtke agreed with the EU on the need to redouble 
efforts to address Kosovo; the US and the EU agreed that 
there could be no reward for the recent violence.  Instead, 
the work of the contact group and US-NATO-EU efforts on an 
intensive dialogue, including Belgrade Serbs needed to be 
advanced more rapidly.  Standards before status remained the 
operative vision of both the EU and the US; there was a need 
for a good replacement for UNMIK chief Holkeri, and there 
were a number of excellent European candidates under 
consideration. 
 
---------------------- 
Other Issues: Non-Pro, 
EuroMed, Afghanistan & 
and Moldova 
---------------------- 
 
13.  (C) Kelleher briefly reviewed recent EU actions aimed at 
strengthening non-proliferation cooperation; Bradtke 
responded that the US was pleased with EU efforts, and looked 
forward to further cooperation.  In this regard, the US was 
looking forward to seeing the EU draft for the US-EU Summit 
Declaration.  On other issues, Kelleher, Council, and 
Commission officials made the following points: 
 
-- On Afghanistan, the Commission has set a demobilization 
goal of 40,000.  The Commission is in the midst of an 
internal debate about how to manage observing the elections; 
clearly "a normal observation mission is impossible."  The EU 
will most likely seek a solution dependent upon heavy use of 
NGOs and human rights advocacy groups.  Bradtke briefed on 
the status of PRTs, and the critical need for countries to 
fulfill their assistance and security pledges with actual 
disbursements.  The EU asked for an assessment of the impact 
of the withdrawal of Russian border grounds from Tadjikistan; 
Bradtke replied that there was a need to address border 
security, but that the Russian record there had not been a 
good one. 
 
-- On the EUROMED dialogue, Kelleher noted that the most 
recent EUROMED meeting had been an informal one; the next 
formal meeting of the partners would be held during the 
Luxembourg presidency in the first half of 2005.  This 
informal was the first EUROMED meeting at 25 (the new 
accession states) plus the ten EUROMED partners; Libya 
attended as a guest.  There were two significant results. 
The first was the decision to make Alexandria the seat of the 
EUROMED foundation; this would enhance Israeli-Arab as well 
as European-Arab dialogue and intercourse.  The second 
outcome was a general agreement that at 35, a new working 
method needed to be conceived for EUROMED; this was being 
explored, but would result in a more efficient mechanism.  In 
an "unplanned" Troika with the Libyan FM, the EU expressed 
its strong dissatisfaction with the death sentences for the 
Bulgarian medics.  Bradtke thanked the EU for the update, and 
noted that US GME efforts were not intended to supplant EU 
efforts in the region, but rather to further dialogue among 
the parties. 
 
-- Finally, Bradtke and the EU briefly exchanged views on 
Moldova, with both sides agreeing that progress is stalled, 
and that the Russians must be held to their commitments. 
 
FOSTER