US embassy cable - 04ABUDHABI1826

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 001826 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR NEA/NGA AND NEA/ARP 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/01/14 
TAGS: PREL, IZ, TC 
SUBJECT: Training of Iraqi police in the UAE 
temporarily on hold 
 
Ref: Abu Dhabi 219 
 
Classified by Ambassador Marcelle M. Wahba for reasons 
1.5 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (C) Summary: German federal police have trained two 
batches of Iraqi criminal police at the Al Ain police 
school since last March, but further training of Iraqi 
police under German auspices has been suspended to give 
Iraq's new authorities an opportunity to evaluate 
their needs to ensure effective training programs. Both 
the UAE and the German government are in favor of 
continuing the training, but the UAEG wants the new 
Iraqi Ministry of Interior to evaluate the program and 
identify their needs and priorities before the training 
resumes.  End Summary. 
 
2. (C) Last March, the German federal police began 
training 129 criminal police officers and members of 
Baghdad's Institute of Criminal Technology (see 
reftel).  Germany paid for the training expenses and 
for a dozen German police experts, while the UAE 
covered local expenses (e.g. training facilities and 
accommodations for trainees), as well as the cost of 
transporting the Iraqis aboard C-130s between Iraq and 
the UAE.  All the training took place at the Al Ain 
police school. There were two parts to the training: 
forensics and crime scene investigation.  The German 
police, comparable to the FBI, gave each of the Iraqi 
participants a crime scene investigation kit as part of 
the training, and to take back to Iraq with them. The 
Iraqis also visited the UAE's state-of-the-art police 
laboratory and saw demonstrations of cutting-edge 
equipment and machinery. 
 
Selection of appropriate candidates important 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
3. (C) Shaykh Saif bin Zayed, U/S of the Ministry of 
Interior, told the Ambassador on May 30 that the UAE 
was disappointed with the lack of coordination between 
the Germans, Iraqis, and CPA.  He said that the Iraqi 
trainees selected for these first programs were clearly 
too senior for the training courses offered.  The UAE 
was counting on the Germans to coordinate closely with 
both the Iraqis and the CPA but clearly that had not 
happened.  He told the Ambassador that the UAE has 
reached out directly to the Iraqis and asked them to 
provide them with their priorities so the programs can 
be designed according to their needs.  Shaykh Saif 
commented that while the Iraqis were senior in rank, 
the training assumed they had facilities and 
laboratories which they do not have, and hence there 
would need to be some linkage between the training and 
what they have to work with in terms of facilities in 
Iraq. 
 
4.  (C) Germany's Ambassador to the UAE, Jurgen 
Stelzer, told Polchief on May 31 that the first batch 
of Iraqis included about 30 lieutenant colonels and 
colonels, higher-ranking officers who were ill at ease 
in classrooms with junior officers.  "Back home (in 
Iraq), they were used to giving orders," Stelzer said. 
The higher-ranking officers also were upset that they 
could not leave the police school compound in Al Ain 
for a leisure outing to Dubai.  The Germans and 
Emiratis ironed out these wrinkles by the time the 
second batch of 92 Iraqi police (100 had been expected 
but the eight officers from Fallujah had to stay in 
Iraq during the siege in that city) came to the UAE. 
The second batch comprised junior officers from the 
different Iraqi provinces.  The result was a much 
smoother training experience, Stelzer said.  Everyone 
agreed that in the future, greater care should be taken 
to select appropriate candidates for the training. 
 
 
5. (C) Stelzer, who visited the Al Ain police school 
during the training, and accompanied a German 
parliamentary delegation to the facility, said the 
Iraqis displayed a considerable degree of self- 
confidence.  Germans and Emiratis alike "thought it was 
a very good project," Stelzer said.  The Iraqis' main 
complaint was that under the current system in Iraq, 
they enjoy little autonomy.  "They have to do what they 
are told to do" by the CPA, Stelzer said.  "That causes 
a problem for them (the Iraqi police) when they have to 
deal with people on the street" because Iraqi citizens 
question the police officers' authority. 
 
Project on hold awaiting a political decision 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
6. (C) The UAE has decided to suspend further German 
training of Iraqi police on UAE soil until Iraq's 
sovereign Interior Ministry can evaluate the training 
to determine whether it should be continued.  There 
will be no more training at this stage, but we will 
assess the results of the training in the next three 
months before deciding what the next steps will be, the 
Arabic daily "Al-Ittihad" newspaper quotes UAE Interior 
Ministry Under Secretary Shaykh Saif bin Zayed Al- 
Nahyan as saying.  Stelzer said the postponement may 
prevent further training this calendar year because it 
is unlikely the Emiratis would host the training during 
the hot summer months and not during Ramadan starting 
in mid-October.  He said the training could resume in 
early 2005. 
 
7. (C) Stelzer said the Iraqi liaison officer, Colonel 
Mustafa, who was in the UAE for the duration of the 
training, had expressed satisfaction with the training 
and stated that it should continue.  Colonel Mustafa 
said that there are another 2,000 Iraqi police in need 
of similar training.  "We are ready to do it," Stelzer 
said.  "The UAE is waiting for reaction from Baghdad." 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
8. (C) We believe that it is appropriate for the new, 
sovereign Iraqi government to take stock of the German 
training for Iraqi police in the UAE.  If the Iraqis 
decide to continue the training, we are confident the 
Emiratis will agree to host the courses again. 
However, the Iraqi authorities should ensure that they 
are sending the appropriate officers to the courses, 
and that the Iraqis set their priorities so the 
programs can be designed according to their needs. 
 
9. (U) Baghdad minimize considered. 
WAHBA