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| Identifier: | 04AMMAN4426 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 04AMMAN4426 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Amman |
| Created: | 2004-06-02 12:19:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN |
| Tags: | ETRD ETTC JO IZ |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 AMMAN 004426 SIPDIS NOFORN E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/31/2014 TAGS: ETRD, ETTC, JO, IZ SUBJECT: STAFFDEL SCHARFEN MEETINGS ON OIL-FOR-FOOD Classified By: Ambassador Edward W. Gnehm for reason 1.5 (b) 1. (SBU) SUMMARY: In a May 21-24 visit to Jordan, Staffdel Scharfen engaged in meetings with officials from the Iraqi government, CPA, Jordanian government, and the United Nations. In these meetings the delegation dealt primarily with issues pertaining to Iraqi trade during the period of UN sanctions on Iraq, and particularly under the 1996-2003 Oil-for-Food (OFF) program. The delegation also met with USG contractors on the subject of the Iraq Police Training Center. CPA-organized meetings with Iraqis will be reported through CPA channels. END SUMMARY. ---------------------- JORDANIAN AUDIT BUREAU ---------------------- 2. (SBU) Salem Al-Khazaleh, President of Jordan,s Audit Bureau, reviewed for the delegation the history and structure of the Bureau, which has a role theoretically similar to that of the GAO in the United States. Khazaleh expressed the Bureau,s interest in improving its technical capabilities and thanked the delegation for the technical assistance and advice that the USG had provided to the Bureau in the past. The delegation asked Khazaleh about the Bureau,s role in monitoring funds coming in from Iraq. Khazaleh replied that while the Audit Bureau,s mandate did not extend to the monitoring of funds flowing to and from private Jordanian corporations and banks, it did monitor flows into and out of the Jordanian government accounts. He said, however, that he would look into the flow of Iraqi money through Jordanian government accounts and would pass anything of interest that the Bureau had on record to the delegation. (NOTE: Following this exchange, one of Khazaleh,s subordinates whispered in Arabic that this information might be confidential. Khazaleh replied that he would deal with that possibility if and when it arose.) STAFFDEL raised the possibility that port fees, illegally charged by Saddam,s regime during sanctions but before the beginning of OFF, might have been paid into the account of a Jordanian corporation or bank. Khazaleh reiterated that monitoring of private capital flows generally fell outside the mandate of the Audit Bureau. ------------------------------ JORDANIAN MINISTRY OF PLANNING ------------------------------ 3. (SBU) Minister of Planning Dr. Bassem Awadallah briefed the delegation on the Jordanian-Iraqi trade protocol, which predated both the OFF program and UN sanctions on Iraq by several years. He described the circumstances of the Iran-Iraq War, under which the program had been put into place, and the development in the 1980s of industries in Jordan whose raison d,etre was the service of the Iraqi market under the trade protocol. As the Iraqi and Jordanian economies became even more closely linked following the cutoff of Saudi oil supplies to Jordan in 1990, the volume of trade conducted under the protocol had grown. Awadallah noted, however, that the favored position of Jordanian industry in the Iraqi market prior to sanctions had not carried over into the OFF program, observing that very few Jordanian companies had been approved by the Iraqi government for participation in the program. He attributed this phenomenon principally to the state of Iraqi-Jordanian bilateral relations, which were worsening markedly by 1996. 4. (C) Jordanian companies participating in the trade protocol, on the other hand, had continued to export products into Iraq during this period of worsening relations. Awadallah attributed this to the relationships established during the previous ten years of the trade protocol by many Jordanian exporters with the Iraqi private companies, parastatals, and government bodies, who found it easier to simply renew contracts than to find new suppliers for the same goods. Awadallah observed that while some of the traditional exporters to Iraq are now having trouble adjusting to the advent of open competition in the Iraqi market, the overall volume of Jordanian exports to Iraq in the first quarter of 2004 have been greater than the combined total for the year 2002. He cautioned, however, that the postwar situation had brought new challenges for Jordan, and he asked that the delegation study the possibility of assisting Jordan,s efforts to control its borders. ---------------------------------------- JORDANIAN MINISTRY OF INDUSTRY AND TRADE ---------------------------------------- 5. (C/NF) Farouk Al-Hadidi, Secretary-General of the Ministry of Industry and Trade, expanded further on OFF and the Jordanian-Iraqi trade protocol and the role of the Jordan Export Development and Commercial Centers Corporation (JEDCO), of which Hadidi had previously been chair, in both processes. Very few Jordanian companies were not approved by the UN OIP committee to bid on OFF contracts (because of perceived links to the regime); those that were approved, however, were rarely awarded contracts by the Iraqis or had the funding of awarded contracts delayed by the Iraqis. JEDCO had acted as sponsoring agent in this process, making sure that the Jordanian companies applying for OFF contracts contained actual assets and were properly registered in Jordan. It did not perform further vetting of companies applying for contracts. As head of JEDCO, Hadidi had interacted closely with companies applying for contracts to export to Iraq, but he said that he had never seen a case in which a company holding a contract under OFF or the trade protocol had reported a request by the Iraqi government that it pay kickbacks. This did not necessarily mean that Jordanians had not been asked to pay kickbacks, but Hadidi supposed that companies holding contracts were afraid that they would be blacklisted by the regime if they blew the whistle. Hadidi said that it was well known, however, that Saddam used contracts to reward his friends and punish his enemies, whether on the level of individual corporations, sectors, or entire countries. ---------------------- CENTRAL BANK OF JORDAN ---------------------- 6. (C) Faris Sharaf, Executive Director of the Banking Supervision Department at the Central Bank of Jordan (CBJ), briefed the delegation on the basic regulatory structure for banks in Jordan and passed to them copies of Jordan,s banking law. Sharaf noted that the primary mission of the inspectors in the banking supervision department was to ensure that banks were meeting CBJ standards in areas such as reserve ratios and prudent allocation of loan portfolios, not to check accounts for links to Iraq. He added that the decision to freeze assets in Jordanian accounts usually came from outside the CBJ, and was transmitted through the CBJ Vice-Governor (not present at the meeting) to the banks in which the accounts were located. In answer to a question posed by the delegation about Jordan,s banking secrecy law, Sharaf explained that the law should pose no serious difficulties in the sharing of information between the GOJ and USG; it was in no way comparable in scope to the law governing bank secrecy in Lebanon, for instance. In any case, the law could be superseded by a bilateral treaty between Jordan and the U.S. ------------------------------------------ UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR IRAQ ------------------------------------------ 7. (C) Farid Zarif, Chief of Staff of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) and Alan Feles, Political Affairs Officer for UNAMI, met with the delegation on May 23. Zarif briefed the delegation on his personal history with the OFF program, which included constant involvement, in positions both in New York and in Iraq in directing the program throughout its duration. Asked his opinion of the potential for future conflict in Iraq, Zarif said that while it was difficult to say what exactly would happen, he was not optimistic that the transition would be peaceful. Zarif and Feles declined to respond to questions regarding abuses under the OFF program, saying that they would be unable to add anything of substance to the consultations already held between Congressional staff members and UN officials in New York and Washington. Zarif further noted that despite attempts to contact the office of Paul Volcker, the director of the UN investigation of allegations of past OFF abuses, he had received no response and felt unable to speak on the subject of an ongoing internal UN investigation without specific clearance from the person leading that investigation. Asked whether he had been specifically forbidden from speaking on the subject without clearance, Zarif replied that he had not. To a question by a delegation member about resentment within the UN towards congressional scrutiny of OFF abuses, Zarif replied that UN staff generally consider the pressure to be politically motivated and driven by a faction within the U.S. government rather than the government or society as a whole. --------------------- IRAQI POLICE TRAINING --------------------- 8. (C/NF) Following up committee interest in Jordanian support of Iraqi reconstruction, the delegation met with Richard Pemberton and William Vigneault, consultants employed by INL, and Aiman Zureikat, legal representative of DynCorp, to discuss the ongoing construction of the Iraqi police training center in Muwaqqar. The INL and DynCorp representatives briefed the delegation on the substantial strides made over the past six months in the construction of the center, whose essential facilities have already been completed with extraordinary speed during a time of unprecedented strain on the resources of Jordan contractors due to their participation in other Iraq reconstruction work. The representatives also noted their periodic frustration with the high prices in bills submitted by the Shaheen Group, a GOJ contractor on the same project tasked with supplying logistics services to the training center. They added, however, that they had been given broad leeway to negotiate the prices in these bills down to market levels, and they felt they had done so successfully for all bills to date. ------- COMMENT ------- 9. (C/NF) The Government of Jordan was generally receptive to meeting with STAFFDEL Scharfen at a reasonably high level and was quite open and cooperative in answering the delegation,s questions on the role of Jordanian companies in alleged abuses of UN sanctions on Iraq. The apparent fact that no official body within the GOJ appears to have much of a role in tracking Iraqi assets is plausible, given the Byzantine nature of Saddam,s various sanctions-avoidance scams, the reluctance of contract-holding Jordanian companies to participate in whistle-blowing against the regime, and the likely disinterest of the GOJ in investigating very deeply into the contracts awarded to Jordanian companies. The atmospherics of the delegation,s meeting with UNAMI staff were rather tense; however, this was not entirely surprising in view of the officials, failure to receive instructions from their headquarters giving guidelines on what is currently a very delicate subject for the UN. GNEHM
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