US embassy cable - 04MANAMA831

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ARTICLE 98 RATIFICATION IN BAHRAIN: WE CAN GET IT BUT MAY BE MAKING A MISTAKE

Identifier: 04MANAMA831
Wikileaks: View 04MANAMA831 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Manama
Created: 2004-06-02 08:54:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL BA KIIC
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAMA 000831 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/30/2009 
TAGS: PREL, BA, KIIC 
SUBJECT: ARTICLE 98 RATIFICATION IN BAHRAIN:  WE CAN GET IT 
BUT MAY BE MAKING A MISTAKE 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Ronald E. Neumann.  Reasons 1.4(B)(D). 
 
1.  (C)  King Hamad has promised that he will bring into 
force the Article 98 exclusion agreement.  The foreign 
minister is struggling to find a way to carry this out 
without causing a political explosion in Bahrain.  I believe 
the GOB will honor its commitment to us, but I question 
whether we are actually furthering our own strategic 
interests. 
 
2.  (C)  I believe there are strong reasons to credit the 
many high level assurances we have received that Bahrain will 
never, under any circumstances, turn an American official or 
former official over to the International Criminal Court.  To 
do so would be contrary to the fundamental strategic 
relationship that underpins Bahrain's security and survival. 
The bilateral relationship is a key pillar of King Hamad's 
strategic view of the world and he would not undermine it by 
surrendering U.S. personnel.  Thus, what we get for 
ratification is a legal formula without any real substantive 
change, at least in the Bahraini context. 
 
3.  (C)  Yet, if our Article 98 agreement becomes public it 
could touch off a major political problem, pulling Bahrain's 
support for our military into the middle of a domestic 
firestorm. The Shi'a opposition is looking for issues on 
which to force confrontation with the government.  They want 
to provoke intense responses against which they could 
mobilize public support that is now inadequate to their 
needs.  The abuse of Iraqi prisoners is Abu Ghraib has made 
the whole issue of American "criminal" behavior a white hot 
issue in Bahrain as it is in the rest of the Arab world.  A 
leak of a concluded Article 98 agreement at this time and in 
these circumstances would be an issue tailor made for the 
opposition to take to the streets. Anti-government MPs would 
surely rise and demand that it be revoked.  Opposition 
deputies in parliament would also make a case that the 
constitution was being violated by secret passage of what 
ought to be publicly ratified treaties.  The Article 98 
ratification would certainly be undone. Moreover, all of this 
focus on the security relationship would tempt political 
opponents to try to expand the debate to other "surrenders" 
of Bahrain rights, in such matters as the Defense Cooperation 
Agreement. 
 
4.  (C)  My understanding is that the USG has no very certain 
way of protecting the confidentiality of an agreement since 
it must be reported under the Case Act. 
 
5.  (C)  As long as our instructions are to secure Article 98 
agreement, this embassy will do everything possible to carry 
out those instructions.  However, I believe I have a 
responsibility to tell you that in my judgment pressuring 
formal ratification has large potential political pain for 
infinitesimal gains.  Our desire for formal ratification of 
an Article 98 agreement now ought to be reconsidered. 
NEUMANN 

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