US embassy cable - 04ROME2122

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ROME 002122 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/31/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, MOPS, AF, IZ, IT, NATO, AFGHANISTAN 
SUBJECT: AFGHANISTAN: ITALY EDGING BACK ON PRT/FSB 
 
REF: A. (A) ROME 2115 
B. (B) USNATO 534 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: DCM EMIL SKODON, 1.5 (B) AND (D) 
 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY.  ITALY IS EDGING BACK FROM A COMMITMENT TO A 
PRT AND FSB IN AFGHANISTAN, PENDING GREATER CLARITY OF ITS 
ROLE IN POST-JUNE 30 IRAQ.  WE ARE CAUTIOUSLY OPTIMISTIC THAT 
BERLUSCONI'S GOVERNMENT WILL EVENTUALLY JOIN A PRT - AND 
THINK AN FSB IS STILL NOT OUT OF THE QUESTION - BUT DO NOT 
EXPECT A FINAL DECISION BEFORE ADOPTION OF A NEW SECURITY 
COUNCIL RESOLUTION AND PARLIAMENT'S EXTENSION OF ITALY'S 
DEPLOYMENT IN IRAQ.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2. (C) DCM, ACCOMPANIED BY POL-MIL COUNSELOR, MET ON MAY 27 
WITH MFA SECRETARY GENERAL UMBERTO VATTANI AND ON MAY 28 WITH 
PM BERLUSCONI'S DIPLOMATIC ADVISOR, GIOVANNI CASTELLANETA. 
TOPICS INCLUDED PLANS FOR THE PRESIDENT'S JUNE 4-5 VISIT TO 
ROME, IRAQ (REF A), AND AFGHANISTAN, ON WHICH WE PUSHED AGAIN 
FOR ITALY TO JOIN A U.S.-LED PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAM 
(PRT) IN HERAT AND TO TAKE THE LEAD IN STANDING UP A FORWARD 
SUPPORT BASE (FSB) IN WESTERN AFGHANISTAN. 
 
3. (C) CASTELLANETA, IN PARTICULAR, WAS LESS FORWARD-LEANING 
THAN HE HAD BEEN IN PREVIOUS DISCUSSIONS.  (ASKED BY 
AMBASSADOR SEMBLER TO CLARIFY BERLUSCONI'S POSITION ON 
PRT/FSB IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE PM'S MAY 19 MEETING WITH THE 
PRESIDENT, CASTELLANETA HAD ASSURED THE AMBASSADOR THAT ITALY 
WOULD ULTIMATELY RESPOND FAVORABLY TO BOTH PARTS OF THE U.S. 
REQUEST.  HOWEVER, FOR DOMESTIC POLITICAL REASONS, THE 
GOVERNMENT NEEDED TO WAIT UNTIL PARLIAMENT AUTHORIZED FUNDING 
FOR CONTINUING ITALY'S DEPLOYMENT BEYOND JUNE 30 WHICH, HE 
ARGUED, MUST IN TURN AWAIT FINALIZATION OF THE PENDING 
SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION.) 
 
4. (C) IN HIS MAY 28 MEETING WITH THE DCM, CASTELLANETA 
HEDGED EVEN MORE, CITING A NEED TO WAIT UNTIL COMPETING 
OVERSEAS REQUIREMENTS FOR ITALIAN TROOPS (BALKANS, IRAQ, 
AFGHANISTAN) ARE SORTED OUT.  HE SAID ITALY MAY STILL BE 
ASKED TO MAKE ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL CONTRIBUTIONS IN IRAQ, 
SUCH AS FOR THE PROTECTION OF UN PERSONNEL AND MISSIONS.  HE 
ALSO CITED A RECENT SUGGESTION AT NATO (REF B) THAT ITALY 
PROVIDE TWO NRF BATTALIONS TO BACKFILL U.S. TROOPS TAPPED TO 
PROVIDE SUPPORT FOR AFGHAN ELECTIONS.  IN LIGHT OF THESE AND 
OTHER POTENTIAL DEMANDS, AND ITALY'S ALREADY STRETCHED 
CAPACITY TO FILL OVERSEAS DEPLOYMENTS, CASTELLANETA ARGUED 
THAT IT WAS PRUDENT FOR ITALY TO WAIT BEFORE COMMITTING TO 
THE PRT/FSB. 
 
5. (C) VATTANI PROVIDED MORE HOPE.  CITING MOD ARGUMENTS THAT 
IT WOULD NEED ADDITIONAL FUNDS FOR A PRT/FSB, VATTANI SAID 
THE MFA HAD IDENTIFIED A 50 MILLION EURO ACCOUNT WHICH MIGHT 
BE DRAWN FROM FOR THIS PURPOSE.  (NB: WE BELIEVE THESE FUNDS 
WERE ORIGINALLY EARMARKED FOR CIV-POL PRT ACTIVITIES 
ORIGINALLY PLANNED FOR GHAZNI; IT IS NOT CLEAR THAT THEY 
COULD BE USED FOR THE STRICTLY MILITARY EXPENSES OF AN FSB.) 
VATTANI CRITICIZED NATO'S LIST OF FSB REQUIREMENTS AS EXTREME 
AND INFLEXIBLE.  HE CALLED FOR A MORE MODEST DEFINITION OF 
FSB NEEDS, SINCE ADDITIONAL ASSETS WOULD BE AVAILABLE, IF 
NEEDED, FROM KABUL AND ITS ENVIRONS.  (VATTANI ALSO CONFIRMED 
THAT HIGH-LEVEL RESISTANCE TO FSB CONTINUES AT THE MOD.  HE 
VOLUNTEERED AT ONE POINT THAT CHOD DI PAOLA "MUST BE PUSHED" 
ON FSB.) 
 
6. (C) LIKE CASTELLANETA, VATTANI CITED CONTENDING DEMANDS 
FOR ITALY'S LIMITED NUMBER OF DEPLOYABLE FORCES, CALLING FOR 
MORE ASSISTANCE FROM THIRD COUNTRIES ON A BROAD ARRAY OF 
FRONTS.  HE RAISED THE POSSIBILITY OF A JOINT FSB, NOTING 
THAT REQUESTS TO THE DUTCH AND TURKS FOR HELP HAD BEEN 
REBUFFED.  CITING THE "NEED FOR QUIET" IN THE BALKANS, HE 
SAID ALLIES WERE PAYING TOO LITTLE ATTENTION TO THE NEEDS OF 
THAT REGION.  HE URGED CONTINUED ASSISTANCE FROM THE U.S. TO 
PUSH OTHER ALLIES TO CONTRIBUTE FORCES IN KOSOVO, WHICH WOULD 
FREE UP ITALIANS (AND OTHERS) FOR OTHER OVERSEAS DUTIES.  HE 
ALSO SPOKE OF THE NEED TO GARNER BROADER PARTICIPATION IN THE 
IRAQ MNF, ADDING THAT AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ ARE LINKED, AND 
THAT PROGRESS ON ONE FRONT CAN HELP SECURE PROGRESS ON THE 
OTHER. 
 
7. (C) FOR ALL THE CAVEATS, PRT AND FSB PREPARATIONS CONTINUE 
WITHIN THE ITALIAN BUREAUCRACY.  WORKING LEVEL CONTACTS IN 
THE MFA INDICATE THAT  BOTH PROPOSALS REMAIN VERY MUCH ON THE 
TABLE.  WE ALSO UNDERSTAND THAT ITALIAN MILITARY PLANNERS 
CONTINUE TO PREPARE FOR ACTUAL DEPLOYMENT OF A PRT AND FSB, 
ALTHOUGH NO PRECISE DATES ARE UNDER DISCUSSION. 
 
ROME 00002122  001.2 OF 002 
 
M A COMMITMENT TO A 
PRT AND FSB IN AFGHANISTAN, PENDING GREATER CLARITY OF ITS 
ROLE IN POST-JUNE 30 IRAQ.  WE ARE CAUTIOUSLY OPTIMISTIC THAT 
BERLUSCONI'S GOVERNMENT WILL EVENTUALLY JOIN A PRT - AND 
THINK AN FSB IS STILL NOT OUT OF THE QUESTION - BUT DO NOT 
EXPECT A FINAL DECISION BEFORE ADOPTION OF A NEW SECURITY 
COUNCIL RESOLUTION AND PARLIAMENT'S EXTENSION OF ITALY'S 
DEPLOYMENT IN IRAQ.  END SUMMARY. 
2. (C) DCM, ACCOMPANIED BY POL-MIL COUNSELOR, MET ON MAY 27 
WITH MFA SECRETARY GENERAL UMBERTO VATTANI AND ON MAY 28 WITH 
PM BERLUSCONI'S DIPLOMATIC ADVISOR, GIOVANNI CASTELLANETA. 
TOPICS INCLUDED PLANS FOR THE PRESIDENT'S JUNE 4-5 VISIT TO 
ROME, IRAQ (REF A), AND AFGHANISTAN, ON WHICH WE PUSHED AGAIN 
FOR ITALY TO JOIN A U.S.-LED PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAM 
(PRT) IN HERAT AND TO TAKE THE LEAD IN STANDING UP A FORWARD 
SUPPORT BASE (FSB) IN WESTERN AFGHANISTAN. 
 
3. (C) CASTELLANETA, IN PARTICULAR, WAS LESS FORWARD-LEANING 
THAN HE HAD BEEN IN PREVIOUS DISCUSSIONS.  (ASKED BY 
AMBASSADOR SEMBLER TO CLARIFY BERLUSCONI'S POSITION ON 
PRT/FSB IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE PM'S MAY 19 MEETING WITH THE 
PRESIDENT, CASTELLANETA HAD ASSURED THE AMBASSADOR THAT ITALY 
WOULD ULTIMATELY RESPOND FAVORABLY TO BOTH PARTS OF THE U.S. 
REQUEST.  HOWEVER, FOR DOMESTIC POLITICAL REASONS, THE 
GOVERNMENT NEEDED TO WAIT UNTIL PARLIAMENT AUTHORIZED FUNDING 
FOR CONTINUING ITALY'S DEPLOYMENT BEYOND JUNE 30 WHICH, HE 
ARGUED, MUST IN TURN AWAIT FINALIZATION OF THE PENDING 
SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION.) 
 
4. (C) IN HIS MAY 28 MEETING WITH THE DCM, CASTELLANETA 
HEDGED EVEN MORE, CITING A NEED TO WAIT UNTIL COMPETING 
OVERSEAS REQUIREMENTS FOR ITALIAN TROOPS (BALKANS, IRAQ, 
AFGHANISTAN) ARE SORTED OUT.  HE SAID ITALY MAY STILL BE 
ASKED TO MAKE ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL CONTRIBUTIONS IN IRAQ, 
SUCH AS FOR THE PROTECTION OF UN PERSONNEL AND MISSIONS.  HE 
ALSO CITED A RECENT SUGGESTION AT NATO (REF B) THAT ITALY 
PROVIDE TWO NRF BATTALIONS TO BACKFILL U.S. TROOPS TAPPED TO 
PROVIDE SUPPORT FOR AFGHAN ELECTIONS.  IN LIGHT OF THESE AND 
OTHER POTENTIAL DEMANDS, AND ITALY'S ALREADY STRETCHED 
CAPACITY TO FILL OVERSEAS DEPLOYMENTS, CASTELLANETA ARGUED 
THAT IT WAS PRUDENT FOR ITALY TO WAIT BEFORE COMMITTING TO 
THE PRT/FSB. 
 
5. (C) VATTANI PROVIDED MORE HOPE.  CITING MOD ARGUMENTS THAT 
IT WOULD NEED ADDITIONAL FUNDS FOR A PRT/FSB, VATTANI SAID 
THE MFA HAD IDENTIFIED A 50 MILLION EURO ACCOUNT WHICH MIGHT 
BE DRAWN FROM FOR THIS PURPOSE.  (NB: WE BELIEVE THESE FUNDS 
WERE ORIGINALLY EARMARKED FOR CIV-POL PRT ACTIVITIES 
ORIGINALLY PLANNED FOR GHAZNI; IT IS NOT CLEAR THAT THEY 
COULD BE USED FOR THE STRICTLY MILITARY EXPENSES OF AN FSB.) 
VATTANI CRITICIZED NATO'S LIST OF FSB REQUIREMENTS AS EXTREME 
AND INFLEXIBLE.  HE CALLED FOR A MORE MODEST DEFINITION OF 
FSB NEEDS, SINCE ADDITIONAL ASSETS WOULD BE AVAILABLE, IF 
NEEDED, FROM KABUL AND ITS ENVIRONS.  (VATTANI ALSO CONFIRMED 
THAT HIGH-LEVEL RESISTANCE TO FSB CONTINUES AT THE MOD.  HE 
VOLUNTEERED AT ONE POINT THAT CHOD DI PAOLA "MUST BE PUSHED" 
ON FSB.) 

6. (C) LIKE CASTELLANETA, VATTANI CITED CONTENDING DEMANDS 
FOR ITALY'S LIMITED NUMBER OF DEPLOYABLE FORCES, CALLING FOR 
MORE ASSISTANCE FROM THIRD COUNTRIES ON A BROAD ARRAY OF 
FRONTS.  HE RAISED THE POSSIBILITY OF A JOINT FSB, NOTING 
THAT REQUESTS TO THE DUTCH AND TURKS FOR HELP HAD BEEN 
REBUFFED.  CITING THE "NEED FOR QUIET" IN THE BALKANS, HE 
SAID ALLIES WERE PAYING TOO LITTLE ATTENTION TO THE NEEDS OF 
THAT REGION.  HE URGED CONTINUED ASSISTANCE FROM THE U.S. TO 
PUSH OTHER ALLIES TO CONTRIBUTE FORCES IN KOSOVO, WHICH WOULD 
FREE UP ITALIANS (AND OTHERS) FOR OTHER OVERSEAS DUTIES.  HE 
ALSO SPOKE OF THE NEED TO GARNER BROADER PARTICIPATION IN THE 
IRAQ MNF, ADDING THAT AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ ARE LINKED, AND 
THAT PROGRESS ON ONE FRONT CAN HELP SECURE PROGRESS ON THE 
OTHER. 
 
7. (C) FOR ALL THE CAVEATS, PRT AND FSB PREPARATIONS CONTINUE 
WITHIN THE ITALIAN BUREAUCRACY.  WORKING LEVEL CONTACTS IN 
THE MFA INDICATE THAT  BOTH PROPOSALS REMAIN VERY MUCH ON THE 
TABLE.  WE ALSO UNDERSTAND THAT ITALIAN MILITARY PLANNERS 
CONTINUE TO PREPARE FOR ACTUAL DEPLOYMENT OF A PRT AND FSB, 
ALTHOUGH NO PRECISE DATES ARE UNDER DISCUSSION. 
 
ROME 00002122  002.1 OF 002 
 
ERLUSCONI'S PRIORITY IS 
EXTENDING ITALY'S DEPLOYMENT IN IRAQ, AND HE WANTS NOTHING TO 
INTERFERE WITH PARLIAMENT'S FUNDING EXTENSION (CURRENT 
FUNDING AUTHORIZATION EXPIRES ON JUNE 30).  AS NOTED REF A, 
THE COMING MONTH PRESENTS CHALLENGES APLENTY FOR BERLUSCONI, 
BUT WE EXPECT HIM TO SUCCEED IN EXTENDING ITALY'S IRAQ 
DEPLOYMENT.  THEREAFTER, BARRING ANY ADDITIONAL AND 
EXTRAORDINARY REQUESTS FOR ITALIAN FORCES IN IRAQ (OR 
ELSEWHERE), THE POLITICAL WAY SHOULD BE CLEAR FOR ITALY TO 
JOIN THE HERAT PRT.  AND, GIVEN ENOUGH ASSURANCES ABOUT 
ASSISTANCE AND EQUIPMENT, ITALY MAY STILL BE PERSUADED TO 
TAKE THE LEAD ON AN FSB.  WE WILL CONTINUE TO PRESS FOR A 
COMMITMENT SOONER RATHER THAN LATER. 
 
9. (U) MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. 
 
VISIT ROME'S CLASSIFIED WEBSITE: 
HTTP://WWW.STATE.SGOV.GOV/P/EUR/ROME/INDEX.CF M 
 
SEMBLER 
 
ROME 00002122  002.2 OF 002 
 
/FSB.  BERLUSCONI'S PRIORITY IS 
EXTENDING ITALY'S DEPLOYMENT IN IRAQ, AND HE WANTS NOTHING TO 
INTERFERE WITH PARLIAMENT'S FUNDING EXTENSION (CURRENT 
FUNDING AUTHORIZATION EXPIRES ON JUNE 30).  AS NOTED REF A, 
THE COMING MONTH PRESENTS CHALLENGES APLENTY FOR BERLUSCONI, 
BUT WE EXPECT HIM TO SUCCEED IN EXTENDING ITALY'S IRAQ 
DEPLOYMENT.  THEREAFTER, BARRING ANY ADDITIONAL AND 
EXTRAORDINARY REQUESTS FOR ITALIAN FORCES IN IRAQ (OR 
ELSEWHERE), THE POLITICAL WAY SHOULD BE CLEAR FOR ITALY TO 
JOIN THE HERAT PRT.  AND, GIVEN ENOUGH ASSURANCES ABOUT 
ASSISTANCE AND EQUIPMENT, ITALY MAY STILL BE PERSUADED TO 
TAKE THE LEAD ON AN FSB.  WE WILL CONTINUE TO PRESS FOR A 
COMMITMENT SOONER RATHER THAN LATER. 
 
9. (U) MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. 
 
VISIT ROME'S CLASSIFIED WEBSITE: 
HTTP://WWW.STATE.SGOV.GOV/P/EUR/ROME/INDEX.CF M 
 
SEMBLER 
 
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 2004ROME02122 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL