US embassy cable - 04ABUDHABI1781

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UAE - Reactions to POTUS War College Speech, Iraq PM nomination

Identifier: 04ABUDHABI1781
Wikileaks: View 04ABUDHABI1781 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Abu Dhabi
Created: 2004-05-31 12:55:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL PGOV IZ TC
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
null
Diana T Fritz  03/15/2007 12:21:54 PM  From  DB/Inbox:  Search Results

Cable 
Text:                                                                      
                                                                           
      
CONFIDENTIAL

SIPDIS
TELEGRAM                                             May 31, 2004


To:       No Action Addressee                                    

Action:   Unknown                                                

From:     AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI (ABU DHABI 1781 - ROUTINE)         

TAGS:     PREL, PGOV                                             

Captions: None                                                   

Subject:  UAE - REACTIONS TO POTUS WAR COLLEGE SPEECH, IRAQ PM   
          NOMINATION                                             

Ref:      None                                                   
_________________________________________________________________
C O N F I D E N T I A L        ABU DHABI 01781

SIPDIS
CXABU:
    ACTION: POL 
    INFO:   P/M ECON RSO AMB DCM 

DISSEMINATION: POL
CHARGE: PROG

APPROVED: A/DCM:HOLSIN-WINDECK
DRAFTED: POL:JFMAYBURY
CLEARED: NONE

VZCZCADI656
RR RUEHC RUCNRAQ RHMFISS
DE RUEHAD #1781 1521255
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 311255Z MAY 04
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4576
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/HQ COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTH BAGHDAD
C O N F I D E N T I A L ABU DHABI 001781 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR NEA/NGA AND NEA/ARP 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/30/09 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, IZ, TC 
SUBJECT:  UAE - Reactions to POTUS War College Speech, 
Iraq PM nomination 
 
Classified by Acting Deputy Chief of Mission Hilary 
Olsin-Windecker, reasons 1.5 (b) and (d) 
 
1. (C) Summary: The President's War College speech has 
elicited no public reaction from the UAE leadership, 
and only a tepid response from lower-level government 
interlocutors.  For Iraqi expatriates, however, it is 
a different story.  They are still dissecting the War 
College speech a week after its delivery, and they 
plan to do the same with the speeches the President is 
expected to give in the run-up to the June 30 transfer 
of sovereignty.  Iraqi expats have generally been more 
comfortable than UAEG officials in offering their 
opinions about the new political appointees in Iraq. 
End Summary. 
 
2. (C) Iraqi expatriates told us they are searching 
for clues in the President's speeches about what the 
future Iraq will look like when neither Saddam Hussein 
nor the Coalition Provisional Authority is calling the 
shots.  As they see it, the U.S. has a chance to help 
the Iraqis "get it right," but they want the President 
to be more explicit in defining, for instance, the 
civilian and military authority structures, and the 
role of the proposed multinational force.  "The 
President did not touch specifically on who is going 
to be in command of these forces.  If they are 100 
percent under U.S. command, this will put the new 
government in a very very critical situation as it 
will be hard for the government to justify its actions 
to the people of Iraq," said Imad Al-Jebouri, an Iraqi 
employed as an engineer at the Abu Dhabi National Oil 
Company. 
 
3. (C) Rafil Hammoudi, a manager at the General 
Exhibitions Corp., and other Iraqi expatriates who 
spoke with us about the speech, were upset with the 
President's repeated references to terrorism and 
"expected trouble" in the months ahead.  They would 
like future speeches to place less emphasis on the 
potential for violence in Iraq because they fear some 
people might use that as a pretext to commit more acts 
of terror.  "Otherwise, the speech was on the mark and 
we look forward to more as we get closer to June 30," 
Hammoudi said. 
 
4. (C) MFA comments about the President's speech were 
very guarded, like those of Yacub Al-Hosani, who 
manages the UN portfolio as director of the 
International Organizations Department.  "What I will 
tell you is my personal reaction.  We are all very 
worried for the region and all of our interests. 
Lakhdar Brahimi is on the right track" with the 
political appointments, "but this is the first step." 
Al-Hosani said he worries that there is very little 
time to adopt a UNSCR that will address all the 
salient issues, including the question of how long a 
multinational force will stay in Iraq. 
 
5. (C) On the subject of nominations to the new Iraqi 
government, once again it is the Iraqi community that 
is more willing to talk openly.  All of our contacts 
seem to have become armchair analysts on this subject. 
Iyad Allawi's nomination as the next Prime Minister, 
for example, has generated a generally positive 
response from Iraqi expats.  Al-Jebouri and his Iraqi 
friends like Nabil Al-Tawil, Adnan Naji, and Laith 
Gabriel have been getting together at least once a 
month over dinner to discuss political developments in 
their homeland.  For them, Allawi is the right 
candidate for the job.  "I'd like to see more people 
like Allawi in the government.  He is very educated, 
comes from a well-known family, and has an acceptable 
personality," Al-Jebouri said.  "He is strong enough 
to take the country at this time.  He was with the 
Baath Party and knows their ways and means."  Hammoudi 
also likes Allawi's toughness.  "He doesn't get scared 
quickly.  We need a guy who is strong."  Polchief's 
contacts in the UAEG either said they did not know 
enough about the Iraqis being nominated, or stated 
that these were decisions for Iraqis to make. 
 
6. (U) Baghdad minimize considered. 
 
WAHBA 

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