US embassy cable - 04BRASILIA1332

C O N F I D E N T I A L BRASILIA 001332 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR MIKE DEMPSEY 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/28/2009 
TAGS: PINR, PREL, VE, BR, External Relations 
SUBJECT: BRAZIL: VENEZUELA DEVELOPMENTS 
 
REF: A. BRASILIA 492 
 
     B. BRASILIA 1070 
     C. BRASILIA 1104 
 
Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR DENNIS HEARNE. REASONS 1.4 
(b)(d). 
 
1. (C)  The chief of the Brazilian Foreign Ministry's OAS 
Division (MRE/DEA), Nelson Tabajara, told Poloff on 28 May 
Brazil was "surprised" by recent negative developments in 
Venezuela and has not formulated an official response. 
Tabajara said the "inflamed" environment has raised the GOV's 
"level of insecurity" to such an extent that no one can 
predict Chavez's next moves. 
 
2. (C) Tabajara said Brazil's Ambassador to Caracas had 
recommended Brazil not/not provide MRE or other official 
observers to this weekend's "reparos" process. (Note. We were 
unable to confirm this with the MRE's Andean Division Chief. 
End note.)  Tabajara said the GOB expects the appeals process 
to move forward 28-30 May, and said Brazil will "react 
strongly and with the U.S." if there are irregularities. 
Tabajara noted also that the upcoming OAS General Assembly 
will provide a forum for Brazil and others to take positions 
in light of events. 
 
3.(C) Poloff asked Tabajara about 25 May press reports 
indicating President Lula da Silva's strong concern about the 
formation of pro-Chavez militias.  Tabajara was not aware of 
any recent intercessions by President Lula da Silva or FM 
Amorim with the Chavez government on the militias or the 
signatures appeals. 
 
4. (C) Comment. On the eve of this important weekend, we 
believe that the GOB will fulfill its Friends obligations in 
the event of a melt down in Venezuela.  But we also doubt 
that the GOB has a contingency plan for decisive bilateral 
engagement with Chavez.  Repeated queries over the past 
several weeks to candid and informed MRE interlocutors (refs) 
reveal anxiety but also a seemingly fatalistic approach -- at 
least at the professional working level -- to a matter that 
should be of high strategic concern to Brazil.  We cannot 
judge whether confidential caveats have been registered by 
the GOB with Chavez in recent days, but we doubt it.  If the 
situation does go critical, Lula could well pick up the phone 
to Chavez, but we are not confident that the GOB has a ready 
script for such a call, or that the message would be potent 
enough for meaningful impact. 
 
HRINAK