US embassy cable - 04CARACAS1817

C O N F I D E N T I A L  CARACAS 001817 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
NSC FOR CBARTON 
USCINCSO ALSO FOR POLAD 
USAID DCHA/OTI FOR RPORTER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/25/2014 
TAGS: PGOV, KDEM, VE 
SUBJECT: TSJ LAW TAKES EFFECT 
 
 
Classified By: A/DCM ABELARDO A. ARIAS FOR REASONS 1.4 (d) 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1.  (U) The Organic Law of the Supreme Court of Justice came 
into effect May 20 after the National Assembly (NA) passed it 
on May 18.  The Internal Policy committee of the NA made 
several substantial changes in the law between its second 
reading and the final vote, which the opposition claims 
violates parliamentary procedures. These changes increase the 
power of the Constitutional Chamber of the court, granting it 
supervisory power over other chambers and give legislators 
greater influence over the judiciary. Constitutional expert 
Tulio Alvarez_ has challenged the validity of the law before 
the TSJ. 
 
-------------------------- 
Substantial Changes in Law 
-------------------------- 
 
2.  (C) The Organic Law of the Supreme Court of Justice 
(LOTSJ) came into effect on May 20 after the National 
Assembly (NA) passed it on May 18. The final version of the 
law contained substantial changes made by the Internal Policy 
Commission (IPC) of the NA without discussion in the plenary. 
 Opposition deputies criticized the changes, noting that 
Assembly commissions do not have the authority to do so.  The 
IPC made the final changes under unusual circumstances. After 
the IPC's president, Nicolas Sosa (MAS) failed to gather a 
quorum to discuss the Commission's report required for the 
bill to go to its final reading, the commission's vice 
president, pro-Chavez deputy Iris Valera (MVR), called the 
pro-Chavez majority of deputies to order without opposition 
presence.  The pro-Chavez quorum then made the changes to the 
law. 
 
3.  (U) In addition to the irregularity of making changes 
between second and final readings, opposition deputies have 
protested that reducing the bill from 179 articles to 23 to 
overcome an opposition filibuster violates law-making 
principles. The pro-Chavez majority also changed National 
Assembly rules six times in the 16-month discussion of the 
bill when the opposition used existing rules to block the 
bill. 
 
------------- 
Super Chamber 
------------- 
 
4.  (U) NA Deputy Gerardo Blyde (Primero Justicia) found more 
than 34 changes to the law done by the committee. The version 
of the law passed on second reading attributed to the full 
court, the right to "resolve the conflicts of whatever nature 
which may arise among the chambers", and to "review the 
sentences dictated by any of the chambers". The version of 
the law presented by the IPC to the plenary for final 
approval gave these powers to the Constitutional Chamber. It 
also gave the chamber the right to take over jurisdiction of 
a case when fundamental constitutional principals are at 
stake. This was not in the law as passed on second reading at 
all. 
 
5.  (C) NA Deputy Leopoldo Martinez (Construyendo Pais) told 
PolCouns 19 May that the changes turn the Constitutional 
Chamber into a super chamber, a supreme court above the 
supreme court. In the version of the law passed on second 
reading, the full court, consisting of all the judges from 
all the chambers, had that role. Martinez called this 
increase in power especially dangerous given the 
Constitutional Chamber's demonstrated bias in favor of 
President Chavez. Another change eliminated the requirement 
that members of the NA and TSJ justices have no family 
connections. Numerous newspaper reports have pointed out that 
the Second Vice President of the NA, Noheli Pocaterra is 
married to TSJ justice Carlos Oberto Velez. 
 
----------------------- 
 
LOTSJ Challenged in TSJ 
----------------------- 
 
6. (U) Constitutional expert Tulio Alvarez_ challenged the 
constitutionality of the new law before the TSJ on 24 May. He 
specifically challenged articles 13 and 23 of the LOTSJ. 
Article 13 deals with the Nominations Committees for TSJ 
justices. Alvarez_ claims, as does Gerardo Blyde, that 
articles 264 and 270 of the 1999 constitution state that the 
nominations committee is dependent on the Judicial Power, not 
the Legislative Power. The new law gives the power to elect 
the nominations committees to the NA. 
 
7. (U) Article 23 of the law gives the Moral Power (Human 
Rights Ombudsman, Attorney General, Controller General) the 
authority to suspend justices indefinitely, pending the 
two-thirds vote in the NA that the 1999 constitution requires 
to remove a justice. Alvarez_ and Blyde call this article one 
of the most dangerous parts of the law. Alvarez_ argues that 
it clearly usurps the power of the NA, and subverts the power 
of the TSJ. (Note: Under these provisions, the suspension of 
a judge is tantamount to removal, according to Chavez 
opponents, because of the present control the executive 
enjoys over the legislative and moral branches of government.) 
 
----------- 
Last Stand? 
----------- 
 
8.  (U) Critics of the law, fear it will permanently 
compromise the judicial system. The liberal daily El Nacional 
editorialized on 20 May, "The new Supreme Court law ... is 
nothing less than the end of the rule of law and of checks 
and balances ... the door has been opened to establish an 
outdated and militaristic dictatorship with a deep repressive 
and police-heavy orientation. There is no longer justice in 
Venezuela." Referring to the changes made by the IPC of the 
NA, Tal Cual editor Teodoro Petkoff wrote May 20, "What the 
governing-party majority has done with the (law) during the 
session in which it was given final approval goes beyond the 
limits of the abuse of power, arrogance and the most absolute 
disrespect for public opinion. There is no longer any 
pretense of hiding behind a fig leaf." 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
9.  (C) The TSJ law puts the judiciary firmly under Chavez' 
control. The changes made in the Assembly's commission 
demonstrate the pro-Chavez majority's willingness to bend 
parliamentary rules and use its simple majority to push the 
Chavez agenda through the NA. This Chavista success gives the 
opposition  cause to be concerned about future legislation 
such as the media, anti-terrorism and national police bills 
which are designed to advance Chavez' revolution. The 
Constitutional Chamber coup, slipped in in a technical 
session, suggests the GOV may be willing to use blunter 
instruments to give Chavez what he wants. 
SHAPIRO 
 
 
NNNN 
 
      2004CARACA01817 - CONFIDENTIAL