US embassy cable - 04ANKARA2974

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 002974 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
DEPT. FOR IO/UNP, EUR/SE AND NEA/NGA; 
BAGHDAD ALSO FOR CJTF-7 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/26/2024 
TAGS: PREL, TU, IZ 
SUBJECT: IRAQ: TURKISH REACTION TO DRAFT UNSCR TEXT 
 
REF: A. STATE 116099 
     B. STATE 115262 
     C. ANKARA 2916 
 
 
(U) Classified by DCM Robert Deutsch.  Reasons 1.4 B and D. 
 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
 
1. (C) DCM presented Ref B points on introducing the draft 
Iraq UNSCR to MFA Director General for Middle East Affairs 
Burcuoglu May 26, and discussed the text of the draft. 
Burcuoglu said it was important to Turkey that the UNSCR 
offer a high degree of visible sovereignty to the Iraqis and 
that there be a clear and appropriate relationship between 
MNF-I and Iraqi forces.  Burcuoglu said Turkey supported all 
of the preambular paragraphs.  He asked for clarifications of 
operative paras 8 and 9, suggested that op para 2 should 
state that the IGC would cease to exist June 30 along with 
the CPA, and recommended greater distinction be made between 
forces that would protect the UN and the rest of the MNF. 
Finally, he said Turkey would like to see language calling on 
Iraq to eliminate all terrorist groups in Iraq that 
constitute a danger to Iraq's neighbors.  He offered 
suggested language (see para 7).  End Summary. 
 
 
2. (C) On May 26, DCM called on MFA Middle East DG Tahsin 
Burcuoglu to present Ref B points and discuss the draft Iraq 
UNSCR.  Burcuoglu opened the meeting by pulling out a 
marked-up copy of the draft text and a page of notes, and 
telling DCM he appreciated that the task before us was not 
easy and that changing language in the draft would also be 
difficult.  Stressing the importance of the Iraqi people 
feeling that Iraqi political and military forces are in 
charge and that their sovereignty is real, not virtual, 
Burcuoglu said Turkey was focused on two main questions: 1) 
the degree of visible sovereignty that would be transferred 
to Iraqis; and 2) the relationship between the MNF-I and 
Iraqi forces.  He said Iraqis should not have to get 
permission from others to take actions, adding that if the 
first impression of the new IIG was negative or mediocre we 
would all have problems.  Iraqis, he added, must feel the 
leaders are the right people, and Turkey hoped that Ayatollah 
Sistani would be happy with Brahimi's list.  DCM noted that 
US views largely coincided with those of Turkey and referred 
to Ref B points. 
 
 
--------------------------------- 
Full Support for Preambular Paras 
--------------------------------- 
 
 
3. (C) Turning to the draft text, Burcuoglu said we had 
Turkey's support on all the preambular paragraphs.  Reading 
through them he said, "bravo!" after each.  He noted Turkey's 
satisfaction that there was no mention of the TAL in the 
draft.   Turkey fully supports the timetable outlined in the 
text as well as a national conference to "resolve any 
legitimacy deficit."  The composition of the conference, he 
said, would be important. 
 
 
------------------- 
Turkish Suggestions 
------------------- 
 
 
4. (C) Burcuoglu suggested that operative para (2) have the 
words "and the Iraqi Governing Council" added after the CPA, 
to make clear that the IGC would cease to exist with the CPA 
on June 30.  He noted Turkey's strong support for a census, 
as envisioned in op para (5)(b)(iv), the sooner the better 
from Turkey's perspective. 
 
 
5. (C) In op para (7), Burcuoglu said that for Turkey, the 
wording did not make a big enough distinction between the 
MNF-I forces that would deal with future Fallujahs and Najafs 
and the troops that would protect the UN.  He said to get 
other countries like Pakistan, India or Slovenia to 
contribute to the UN protection force, an enhanced 
distinction would be needed.  They should be two clearly 
separate things, otherwise countries will hesitate to 
contribute.  The difference should be clear to contributors 
as well as Iraqis. 
 
 
6. (C) Calling for more explanation of what was intended by 
op para (8), Burcuoglu also questioned what was meant by 
"international and regional security organizations" in op 
para (9).  He said he could only think of one such 
organization and asked what we had in mind besides NATO. 
7. (C)  Burcuoglu moved to op paras (11) and (13), noting 
their direct references to Iraq's neighbors, which he said 
was a negative reference (though he conceded that he 
understood why).  He said the current formula makes no 
reference to the dangers to Iraq's neighbors of threats 
emanating from Iraq, and cited the presence in Iraq of the 
PKK and the MEK as two cases in point.  Burcuoglu pointed out 
that the meetings of the countries neighboring Iraq had 
agreed language concerning this and urged that we consider 
inclusion in the text of something along the same lines. 
Without such language, he said, Iraq's neighbors are given 
obligations to fight terrorism threatening Iraq, but Iraq is 
given no obligation to fight groups in Iraq threatening the 
neighbors.  "We expect something from Iraq on this matter," 
he said.  DCM pointed out language in op para (10) on 
combating terrorism in Iraq, but Burcuoglu said Turkey hoped 
for more explicit language addressing the threat to 
neighbors.  He suggested consideration of language along the 
lines of the following: 
 
 
-- Reaffirming the necessity of eliminating all terrorist and 
other armed groups from the Iraqi territory that constitute a 
danger for the neighboring states;" (from a meeting in Kuwait 
of Iraq's neighbors); or 
 
 
-- reaffirming the necessity of removing from Iraqi territory 
those terrorists and armed groups that constitute a danger 
for neighboring countries, and calling upon the Iraqi 
authorities to extend their full cooperation to this effect. 
(from an Amman meeting of neighboring states' parliamentary 
speakers) 
 
 
8. (C) Finally, he said that Turkey would like a reference in 
the text to Iraqi ownership of all Iraqi natural resources. 
Burcuoglu concluded that getting the UNSCR finished and 
passed would not be easy, but Turkey wished us success. 
 
 
9.(U) Baghdad minimize considered. 
EDELMAN