US embassy cable - 04ROME2091

C O N F I D E N T I A L  ROME 002091 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/27/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, IZ, IT, AF, EUN, NATO 
SUBJECT: MFA OFFICIALS TELL EUR DAS BRADTKE AND STEPHENS 
ITALY WANTS TO WORK WITH USG ON IRAQ UNSC RESOLUTION, 
BALKANS 
 
 
Classified By: DCM EMIL SKODON.  REASON:1.4 (B)(D) 
 
1. (C) Summary.  On May 18, EUR Deputy Assistant Secretaries 
Bradtke and Stephens had productive exchanges with MFA 
officials on the present situation and way ahead in Iraq, 
Afghanistan and the Balkans, and discussed prospects for a 
robust Istanbul summit agenda.  Bradtke stressed the 
importance of strong transatlantic cooperation in the period 
ahead, particularly in working out a new UN Security Council 
resolution and supporting the transition of sovereignty in 
Iraq.  The next 18 months will be an important period for 
Balkans stabilization; the US, NATO, UN and EU would be 
working together on critical issues such as SFOR-EU handover 
in Bosnia and decisions relating to Kosovo status.  The next 
important step was reforming UNMIK, and identifying a strong 
successor to SRSG Holkeri.   At the 28-29 Istanbul NATO 
Summit leaders must pledge support for the Iraq UNSC 
resolution.  NATO must also be prepared to commit additional 
military resources in Afghanistan, both to support PRTs and 
the elections.     End Summary. 
 
2. (C) During a lunch hosted by the DCM, DAS Bradtke told an 
Italian delegation headed by European Affairs 
Director-General Giovanni Caracciolo that the next few months 
would be critical for Iraq's future and would also be a test 
of the strength of the transatlantic relationship.  A number 
of upcoming events, including the UNSC Iraq resolution 
debate, the June 30 sovereignty transfer, PM Berlusconi's 
meetings in Washington and the President's trip to Europe 
next month, and the US-EU, G-8 and NATO summits, represented 
challenges and opportunities for the USG to work together 
with its European allies on crafting a solid foundation for a 
stable Iraq. 
 
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Balkans Stabilization 
--------------------- 
 
3. (C) DAS Stephens added that the next 18 months would also 
be an important period for Balkans stabilization, noting that 
the US, NATO, UN and EU would be working together on critical 
issues such as SFOR-EU handover in Bosnia and decisions 
relating to Kosovo status.  She underlined that while the 
recent lethal violence in Kosovo was a setback to our 
efforts, it did serve to refocus attention on the need for a 
more secure environment in which the political process could 
advance, particularly in relation to the protection of Serb 
and other non-Albanian communities.  Bradtke added that while 
the US was generally pleased with the EU-NATO negotiations on 
the delineation of responsibilities in Bosnia, German/French 
attempts to define the NATO presence as having less than full 
Dayton authority would be problematic for the US.  NATO 
Office Director Giovanni Brauzzi assured Bradtke and Stephens 
that Italy fully concurred with the US on this point. 
 
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US-EU Cooperation 
----------------- 
 
4. (C) Caracciolo agreed that there was no alternative to 
transatlantic cooperation.  The government was doing all it 
could to overcome the "emotional" components distorting 
reality in the internal political debate over Italy's 
participation in Iraq.  That debate is also being driven by 
rhetoric related to the June 12 EP elections.  He also said 
that Europe has been absent of late from the MEPP, but he was 
encouraged by the most recent GAC conclusions calling for 
more robust EU participation in the process.  He was also 
optimistic that renewed US focus on Southeast Europe would 
help overcome "Balkan fatigue" and noted that Belgrade was 
starting to be more flexible on Kosovo's final status, on the 
condition that the IC remains engaged in returns of Serb 
refugees and IDPs. 
 
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Kosovo 
------ 
 
5. (C)  Caracciolo insisted that stability in the Kosovo 
depended on steady IC pressure.  "We can't rush" the process, 
he underlined.  The next important step was reforming UNMIK, 
including identifying a strong successor to SRSG Holkeri. 
The US and EU, perhaps through coordinated demarches, needed 
to speak with one voice to Belgrade authorities on the damage 
that a Radical party victory in upcoming elections would 
cause to Serbia's integration process.  DAS Stephens agreed 
in principle to the suggested strategy, but said it should be 
done quietly and make clear to Belgrade ramifications of a 
Radical victory to its aspirations to join transatlantic 
 
institutions.  We should urge Kostunica to make clear that 
for the good of SaM's future, a democratic candidate has to 
prevail. 
 
----------- 
GAC Readout 
----------- 
 
6. (C)  Director for EU Common Foreign and Security 
Policy Luigi Mattiolo had attended the June 17 GAC, and noted 
that there was growing awareness among the 25 EU Member State 
Foreign Ministers that transatlantic relations must move from 
their low point during the run-up to the Iraq war, to a 
higher level of cooperation on a wide range of issues - "a 
failure of one side is a failure for all sides" he said. 
 
 
7. (C) Mattiolo said ministers at the GAC had agreed that a 
UNSC Iraq resolution was essential for continued, expanded 
and enhanced international cooperation in Iraq, but not 
sufficient to secure lasting peace.  The August 19 bombing of 
the UN facility in Baghdad was "the UN's 9/11" averred 
Mattiolo, and the organization was still coming to grips with 
the fact that its operations can only be carried out 
successfully in a secure working environment.  The US can 
count on the EU's support in this regard.  Bradtke welcomed 
this spirit of cooperation, and predicted that it would be 
possible to work out a UNSCR that could gain unanimous 
support. 
 
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Istanbul Summit 
--------------- 
 
8. (C) Bradtke said that it was only natural that political 
and military developments in Iraq would dominate the June 
28-29 Istanbul NATO Summit.  Leaders at the Summit must 
pledge support for the UNSC Iraq resolution.  After approval 
of the UNSCR, we would need to look more closely at what NATO 
might do.  NATO must also be prepared to commit additional 
military resources in Afghanistan, both to support PRTs and 
the elections.  The Summit should highlight the end of SFOR 
as a success, and leaders will have to deal with the 
disappointment of the &Adriatic Three8, especially Croatia, 
that have high expectations for movement at the Summit on 
their membership aspirations.    Those aspirants must be kept 
focused on progress through the Membership Action Plan (MAP) 
process.  Bradtke also noted the strong feeling in Washington 
that until Sarajevo and Belgrade exhibit enhanced cooperation 
with the ICTY and in apprehending PIFWCs, PFP membership for 
Bosnia and SaM is out of the question. 
 
9. (C) Bradtke noted that the US was now prepared to see 
Ukrainian President Kuchma invited to Istanbul for a 
NATO-Ukraine Commission, and the US would like to see Putin 
come for a NATO-Russia meeting.  The U.S. did not see 
sufficient substance to warrant a NATO-EU Summit.  Turkey's 
position that Cyprus and Malta would have to be excluded also 
made a NATO-EU meeting problematic for the US.  Brauzzi 
agreed with Bradtke's view, and emphasized that the Summit 
should be seen as yet another mechanism for the US and Europe 
to "rediscover" their shared vision.  He also concurred with 
Bradtke's proposal that the Summit conclusions should be 
comprised of three separate documents: a "leaders 
declaration" which would try to articulate a broader vision 
of transatlantic relations; a statement on Iraq; and a 
communique dealing with all other business. 
 
-------------------------- 
Political Director's Views 
-------------------------- 
 
10. (C) In a follow up meeting at the MFA, Political Director 
Giampiero Massolo told Stephens and Bradtke, who were 
accompanied by the DCM and PolMil Counselor, that Italy was 
working hard, on the EU level, to get US-European relations 
back on the right track - this work is one of PM Berlusconi's 
highest priorities.  He hoped that concrete results and 
progress in Iraq after June 30, including a smooth transfer 
of sovereignty and a clearer definition of the UN's role, 
would help. 
 
11. (C) Massolo agreed that the events of the past two weeks 
made chances for a broad NATO role in Iraq less likely, but 
he hoped the UNSC resolution would leave the door open for 
more international participation, perhaps along the lines of 
ISAF-3. 
 
12. (C) Bradtke promised to consult with Italy on the 
 
drafting of summit documents.  Massolo opined that Putin 
could be induced to come to the Summit if he could expect 
Russia to be given a role in Iraq. 
 
13. (C) To the DCM's query on whether an acceptable UNSC 
resolution and productive Berlusconi/Bush meetings could sway 
Italians to be more supportive of Italy's role in Iraq, 
Massolo said that if these and other initiatives are 
successful, it would make it harder for the "left of the 
Left" to drive party policy, strengthening the hand of more 
moderate players.  The June 12 European Parliamentary 
elections will be a somewhat accurate indicator of trends for 
support of government policy. 
 
14. (C) Director for EU Common Foreign and Security Policy 
Mattiolo emphasized that "standards before status" in Kosovo 
has to be implemented in a transparent, efficient manner.  He 
said that the IC must think creatively about final status - 
something less than full independence may be the answer, 
"perhaps an EU protectorate" but now is not the time to 
address that issue. 
 
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Next SRSG Kosovo 
---------------- 
 
15. (C) Massolo raised the possibility of former UN Special 
Representative in southern Lebanon Steffan De Mistura as SRSG 
in Kosovo when Holkeri leaves in July.  Italy had not 
formally nominated De Mistura, who according to Massolo, was 
"a little bit Italian, a little bit Swedish, and a little bit 
UN" but was interested in how he was viewed by the USG. 
Massolo noted that Commission President Prodi's advisor (and 
former Belgrade OSCE HOM) Sannino has also been suggested, 
but that FM Frattini's current thinking was that he was "too 
young."  Stephens agreed to stay in touch on this issue. 
 
16. (U) DAS Bradtke and DAS Stephens cleared this cable. 
 
Visit Rome's Classified Website: 
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2004ROME02091 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL