US embassy cable - 04VATICAN2058

C O N F I D E N T I A L  VATICAN 002058 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
DEPT. FOR NEA DAS SATTERFIELD, EUR/WE-LEVIN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/25/2014 
TAGS: PREL, IS, VT, IZ 
SUBJECT: DAS SATTERFIELD REVIEWS MIDDLE EAST AND IRAQ WITH 
HOLY SEE DFM 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Jim Nicholson.  Reasons:  1.5 (b) and (d). 
 
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Summary 
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1. (C)  NEA Deputy Assistant Secretary David Satterfield 
reviewed U.S. policy in regard to the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict, Iraq, Middle East reform and Syria in a May 17 
meeting with Holy See Deputy FM equivalent Monsignor Pietro 
Parolin.  Satterfield described the Israeli-Palestinian 
dispute as "an extremely painful and difficult situation" 
that has to change.  He outlined how PM Sharon's Gaza 
withdrawal plan fit in with the Road Map and offered a 
possibility to break the cycle of violence and hopelessness. 
On Iraq, Satterfield emphasized that the June 30 transfer of 
sovereignty to Iraq would mark a clean break with the 
occupation, and that no later than January 2005 there would 
be a fully empowered Iraqi government in place.  Satterfield 
emphasized the importance of reform in the Middle East, 
noting that the U.S. was encouraged by the tenor of 
discussions at the Arab League Summit in Tunisia in favor of 
a robust, indigenously developed reform program.  On Syria, 
Satterfield made clear that the U.S. believes the time has 
come for Syria to withdraw from Lebanon and allow the 
Lebanese people to choose their own government.   End Summary. 
 
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MEPP: Repairing the Breakdown of Partnership 
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2. (C) NEA DAS David Satterfield told Holy See DFM Parolin 
May 17 that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict had become an 
extremely painful, difficult situation in which both sides, 
the region as a whole, and the international community had 
been repeatedly frustrated.  The greatest casualty, he said, 
has been a "breakdown in a sense of partnership" between the 
sides and a sense of their ability to live together.  The 
consequence of Israeli actions to address their security 
situation has been that economic activity had ground to a 
halt, communities have become isolated, and it has become 
difficult for Palestinians to live normal lives.  This "has 
to change," Satterfield stated.  Parolin said the Holy See 
shared these concerns, observing that the Vatican believed 
the situation in the territories had been made even more 
difficult by the exchange of letters between President Bush 
and PM Sharon on Gaza. 
 
3. (C) Satterfield said the President's vision of two states 
sought to offer an end goal for the parties to aspire to, but 
for the past three and a half years there has been a visible 
breakdown between them.  Clearly something was needed to 
break this cycle of political passivity combined with 
violence.  The U.S. believed that PM Sharon's unilateral Gaza 
withdrawal plan -- though developed for his own reasons -- 
offered a means to overcome the breakdown.  Noting that the 
plan was popular within Israel, but not in Sharon's Likud 
Party, he explained that Sharon had appealed to the President 
to support the withdrawal in order to sway his own party 
members.  The President agreed to do so, but had been careful 
to make clear that all end-state issues, including refugees 
and borders, had to be worked out between the parties.  The 
U.S. was determined to continue playing an honest broker 
role, and would not cross lines that would jeopardize this 
role.  In a situation in which nothing has moved for three 
and a half years, Satterfield observed, the U.S. believes 
that the Gaza withdrawal -- if executed in a multilateral 
framework and in line with the Road Map -- could change the 
negative dynamic in the region. 
 
4. (C) On this latter point, Parolin pressed for more detail 
on how the Gaza withdrawal fit with the Road Map. 
Satterfield pointed out that the Road Map calls for 
progressive Israeli withdrawal from all occupied territory 
linked to Palestinian performance on security.  In this case, 
the Palestinians have yet to meet security goals, but the 
expectation is that Israel's withdrawal will compel the 
Palestinians to perform.  In other words, the Road Map would 
be triggered by the withdrawal.  Whatever its origins, 
Satterfield added, the Gaza withdrawal was consistent with 
the Road Map and a two state outcome, and could in fact 
become a model for other areas. 
 
5. (C) Parolin expressed the Holy See's concern that Gaza 
would become "an open air prison" in light of Israel's 
refusal to allow the construction of a port or airport and 
the constant surveillance of the Israeli army.  Parolin added 
that the Holy See also had concerns about ongoing 
construction of a security trench.  Satterfield agreed that 
Gaza could not be shut off from a flow of workers, supplies, 
and economic activity.  He noted Israel has offered us 
 
 
assurances on this point.  Nevertheless, there would probably 
be an Israeli army presence between Gaza and Egypt at the 
outset.  Satterfield praised Egypt's active role along the 
border, and also indicated that there could in time be a role 
for the MFO (Multinational Force Observers) along the border. 
 Pressed again about consistency with the Road Map, 
Satterfield indicated that the Gaza withdrawal could not be 
"Gaza first and last," but had to be the first step that 
could bring the two sides together in a constructive 
framework.  The decision, though unilateral, had to be 
implemented multilaterally and would therefore offer an 
opportunity to restart dialogue. 
 
6. (C) Parolin expressed hope that the Gaza withdrawal could 
provide the needed impetus, but said he doubted whether the 
steps taken thus far are the right ones to build trust.  On 
the contrary, he suggested, the Holy See had the impression 
the gap was widening.  The Holy See believes greater pressure 
needs to be applied to both sides.  In the past, he noted, 
impetus for peace had come from outside, and it would have to 
be the same now.  The parties cannot work out peace on their 
own.  Satterfield acknowledged this point, but noted that the 
process had to start somewhere and Gaza could be that point 
of departure.  Parolin said it was critical to recognize that 
not only the Palestinians, but also the Israelis had to meet 
agreed goals if the Road Map was to move forward. 
Satterfield agreed, noting that the U.S. has been blunt and 
direct to both sides. 
 
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Holy Sites and Visa Problems 
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7. (C) Satterfield said the U.S. fully appreciates the Holy 
See's concerns for the implications of the wall's 
construction for Holy sites and convents in Jerusalem and 
elsewhere in the West Bank, and has spoken with the wall's 
principal designer regarding potential adjustments. 
Satterfield noted that this was a serious issue not only for 
the Church, but for the Palestinians as well.  While the U.S. 
was not opposed to the wall in principle, we were opposed 
where it would negatively affect Palestinian lives and the 
peace process.  Israel has been responsive to some U.S. 
concerns, he noted, but not all.  On the Holy See's concerns 
about visas for Catholic religious workers in Palestinian 
territories, Satterfield stressed that the U.S. was working 
with Israel, and that we understood that a resolution was 
being prepared by the Israeli government.  The Holy See's 
concerns, he noted, were shared by other NGO's working in the 
territories.  The U.S. wants to see full access, and will 
continue to be an interlocutor with the Israelis to this end. 
 
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Iraq's Challenge 
---------------- 
 
8. (C) Turing to Iraq, Satterfield acknowledged that reaching 
our goal of a unified, prosperous, peaceful and democratic 
Iraq was proving a difficult challenge, but the U.S. was 
moving forward on target for the June 30 transfer of 
sovereignty.  The departure of Ambassador Bremer June 30 and 
arrival of Ambassador Negroponte would signal a fundamental 
break with the occupation.  By January, Iraqi authorities 
would have full power and ability to govern the country.  UN 
Special Representative Brahimi's role was critical, 
Satterfield noted, and he has succeeded in reaching out to 
all groups.  Our goal was to ensure the new interim 
government was seen by Iraqis as genuinely Iraqi.  The U.S. 
would retain forces on the ground, and was working to achieve 
agreement on a UN resolution that would provide the basis for 
their continued presence. 
 
9. (C) On Abu Ghraib, Monsignor Parolin asked Satterfield how 
this could have happened.  Satterfield expressed U.S. 
revulsion at these actions and our determination to ensure 
justice is done.  He called Parolin's attention to Secretary 
Powell's speech in Jordan where he spoke as a soldier of his 
horror and disappointment at the actions of those soldiers 
involved.  Satterfield acknowledged that this abuse was "a 
blow to America's image" in the Arab world, and assured 
Parolin that we would find out how this happened and take 
steps to ensure it never happens again.  Parolin described 
the scandal as "very unfortunate", noting that it had damaged 
broader relations between the West and the Muslim world and 
provided ammunition for extremists. 
 
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Middle East Reform 
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10.  (C) Satterfield said the U.S. had been encouraged by the 
 
 
tenor of deliberations at the Arab League Summit in Tunisia, 
where it appeared the region would develop robust proposals 
that will address issues such as women's rights and 
education.  The U.S. was determined to encourage and support 
an indigenous reform agenda.  The U.S. was sensitive to the 
need to support but not dictate the path of reform, and we 
have been pleased with the positive signs we have seen coming 
form the region.   Satterfield noted that this would be a 
central issue at the upcoming G-8 Summit, and was also on the 
agenda of NATO and the OSCE. 
 
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Syria and Lebanon 
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11.  (C) Turning to recent U.S. policy statements regarding 
Syria, Satterfield said the U.S. believes the time has come 
for Syria to withdraw from Lebanon and to allow  the Lebanese 
people to be able to follow their own national will. 
Upcoming presidential elections, he added, should not be 
dictated from outside.  Syria remained resistant, however, 
and the situation in Lebanon would continue to require 
careful tending. 
 
Nicholson 
 
 
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 2004VATICA02058 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL