US embassy cable - 04BOGOTA5276

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BOGOTA 005276 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/24/2014 
TAGS: PINR, PREL, PTER, SNAR, KJUS, PINS, CO, OAS, AUC 
SUBJECT: THE AUC PEACE PROCESS: AVOIDING ANOTHER CAGUAN 
 
REF: BOGOTA 4951 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood for reasons 1.4 (b) 
and (d). 
 
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Summary 
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1. (C) In its negotiations with the paramilitaries the Uribe 
administration has avoided several mistakes the Pastrana 
administration committed during its fruitless peace process 
with the FARC.  In contrast to talks with the FARC, the Uribe 
government has used public commentary sparingly and 
effectively, will maintain state control over concentration 
zones and limit their size, and will set concentration and 
demobilization deadlines.  As paramilitary commanders and 
their bodyguards concentrate, the Peace Commissioner's 
Office, OAS Verification Commission, and security forces say 
they will focus on holding paramilitaries to the terms of 
their agreements, ensuring permanent state control over 
concentration zones, and moving forward with demobilization. 
Focusing on these priorities should prevent the paramilitary 
peace process from degenerating into a fiasco reminiscent of 
the Pastrana administration's "Caguan" process with the FARC. 
 End Summary. 
 
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Discretional Public Statements 
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2. (C) The GOC prohibits public comments about internal 
negotiations.  The May 13 agreement specifically states that 
neither the paramilitaries, GOC, or OAS verification mission 
will publicly disclose anything discussed during 
negotiations.  This policy of confidentiality has prevented 
the paramilitary peace process from degenerating into the 
media circus that characterized the Pastrana administration's 
"Caguan" talks with the FARC. 
 
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State Control and Security 
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3. (C) According to the May 13 agreement, the zone in Cordoba 
Department where the ten key paramilitary commanders and 
their bodyguards will concentrate is less than 150 square 
miles.  It will have a permanent presence of representatives 
from the OAS and Peace Commissioner's Office and should be 
small enough to permit effective state control.  Restrepo has 
recently floated the idea of a slight reduction in the zone's 
size.  It will be surrounded by a cordon of security forces 
who will control access to the area.  Paramilitary commanders 
concentrated there will be held accountable for their troops' 
actions outside the zone.  Restrepo has told the Ambassador 
that any future concentration/demobilization zones for 
paramilitary troops must be small enough to ensure full state 
control.  According to OAS representative Sergio Caramagna, 
the GOC hopes to create five to seven concentration zones 
totaling no more than 460 square miles.  In contrast, the 
FARC's safehaven ("despeje") in Caqueta and Meta departments 
was 16,200 square miles (roughly the size of Switzerland) and 
had no state presence. 
 
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An Agenda 
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4. (C) The GOC is pushing paramilitary commanders to 
concentrate in one month, and expects the concentration 
period to last six months.  These deadlines, although 
flexible, should help to prevent talks from continuing 
indefinitely without concrete progress.  The GOC will need to 
work quickly to define and agree on a demobilization 
schedule, which the paramilitaries have been avoiding. 
 
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Expected Next Steps and Clarifications 
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5. (C) In the next month: 
-- Logistics: The Peace Commissioner's Office will prepare 
the zone for a permanent GOC presence.  Paramilitary leaders 
will be responsible for their own food and shelter. 
 
-- Verification: The OAS is developing a detailed budget 
plan.  Caramagna tentatively expects to spend approximately 
USD 500,000 for offices in Bogota, Medellin, and Monteria, 
capital of Cordoba.  He hopes to expand his two-person team 
to seven international employees and several local hires (see 
septel for the possibility of U.S. support for the OAS 
mission). 
 
-- Security: The Peace Commissioner's Office will coordinate 
with the Colombian Armed Forces to create a security cordon 
around the zone. 
 
During the six month concentration period: 
 
-- Regulation: Delegates from the Peace Commissioner's 
Office, paramilitaries, and OAS will form a Security and 
Co-existence Committee, which will regulate the zone and 
manage communications and visits.  Local government officials 
and Catholic Church representatives will have an open 
invitation to serve as guest members of the Committee.  The 
Peace Commissioner's Office must authorize any paramilitary 
leader's departure from the zone.  The agreement has left 
ambiguous how often and for how long commanders will be 
permitted to leave the zone to "conduct activities related to 
the peace process" and how many commanders may be outside the 
zone at any given time.  This needs to be clarified. 
 
-- Verification: Assuming funding is available, the OAS 
mission will verify that all parties are fulfilling the 
agreement and maintain an inventory of all weapons possessed 
by the concentrated paramilitaries.  Paramilitary leaders and 
their security details will be allowed to carry arms but 
cannot transport any weapons in or out of the zone. 
Delegates from the Peace Commissioner's Office, 
paramilitaries, and OAS will form a Verification Committee 
that will receive complaints about violations of the 
cease-fire nationwide and help the OAS verify the agreement. 
Restrepo has repeatedly asserted that individuals who violate 
the agreement and/or the cease-fire must be punished. 
 
-- Security: The concentration zone is in 
paramilitary-dominated territory.  The security forces will 
be responsible for preventing any other illegal armed group 
from making incursions into the area.  More importantly, the 
security forces will seal off unauthorized access routes to 
the zone and conduct robust intelligence operations to record 
violations. 
 
Post Concentration: 
 
-- Demobilization: Restrepo hopes to concentrate/demobilize 
5,000 paramilitaries this year.  So far, paramilitary 
commanders have refused to do so until they receive 
guarantees against prison and extradition.  Restrepo intends 
to press the paramilitaries to commit to and follow a 
detailed demobilization schedule. 
 
-- Verification: As more concentration/demobilization zones 
are created, the OAS will have to rapidly expand its 
operation in order to monitor these areas. 
 
-- Security: The paramilitaries have warned that the FARC 
will move into areas where paramilitaries currently have a 
presence if the paramilitaries demobilize.  Restrepo states, 
however, that the paramilitaries are not necessary or wanted 
by the local population (reftel). 
 
-- Legal processes: The "Law of Justice and Reparation" will 
not be considered until the next session of Congress, which 
begins on July 20.  The GOC has repeatedly assured us that 
the peace process will not raise legal impediments to 
extradition. 
WOOD