US embassy cable - 04MADRID1871

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NEA A/S BURNS IN MADRID

Identifier: 04MADRID1871
Wikileaks: View 04MADRID1871 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Madrid
Created: 2004-05-24 11:47:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL PTER KPAL SP MO AG IZ
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MADRID 001871 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/24/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PTER, KPAL, SP, MO, AG, IZ 
SUBJECT: NEA A/S BURNS IN MADRID 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Kathleen Fitzpatrick per 1.4 (b) and 
 (d). 
 
Summary 
 
1.  (C) NEA A/S William Burns paid a five-hour visit to 
Madrid May 18, meeting with President Zapatero's new National 
Security Advisor, Carlos Casajuana, and the new Deputy 
Foreign Minister, Bernardino Leon.  The Spanish expressed a 
desire to work with the US on such issues as encouraging 
better relations between Morocco and Algeria, and making 
progress on the Western Sahara.  A/S Burns reviewed US policy 
on Iraq and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.   On the public 
affairs side, A/S Burns was the featured guest at a 
roundtable for 30 opinion leaders on US Middle East policy at 
a prominent think tank.   He also gave an interview which 
appeared in Spain's leading daily, El Pais.  Press coverage 
of the visit was favorable.  Middle East issues were in the 
forefront in Madrid during the Burns visit, which coincided 
with the Israeli Foreign Minister,s visit and the 
Palestinian PM,s visit the following day.   End Summary. 
 
Casajuana: President Zapatero's Foreign Policy Advisor 
 
2.  (C) Carles Casajuana, newly appointed Director for 
International Affairs for President Zapatero (analogous to 
National Security Advisor), received A/S Burns at the Moncloa 
Presidential complex.  Casajuana said that despite the 
withdrawal of Spanish troops from Iraq, the Zapatero 
government looked forward to cooperation with the US. 
Casajuana said the USG reaction to the Spanish pullout had 
been measured and  "we had avoided a collapse in relations." 
 Regarding increasing Spain's military forces in Afghanistan, 
Casajuana said that the issue was under active consideration 
but that there had been no final decision. 
 
3.  (C) Casajuana noted that Israeli FM Shalom would meet 
with Zapatero that afternoon and that Palestinian PM Qurei 
would be in Madrid May 20 and would also meet with Zapatero. 
 Casajuana described the Israeli-Palestinian situation as 
"very bleak."   A/S Burns said the US was committed to 
engaging PM Qurei, as evidenced by Qurei's meetings with the 
Secretary and NSA Rice in recent days. 
 
SIPDIS 
 
4.   (C) Casajuana raised the March 11 Madrid terror attacks 
on commuter trains.  He said it was "astonishing" that 
Moroccans who, by all appearances, were westernized and doing 
reasonably well in Spain, would do this.   The willingness of 
seemingly middle class immigrants to engage in such acts was 
deeply troubling, he said.  Casajuana said this "sociological 
phenomenon" merited intense analysis, but speculated that the 
terrorist impulse of ostensibly integrated immigrants stems 
from a deep sense of humiliation.   Casajuana noted that many 
Moroccan immigrants have a positive view of bin Laden. 
Combating this will be a major challenge. 
 
5.  (C) Turning to Iraq, Casajuana said that the UN's Brahimi 
had a difficult task, indeed "we are asking him for a 
miracle" to form a caretaker government with legitimacy. 
Casajuana again turned to the theme of Arab humiliation. 
The Abu Ghraib prison abuses had intensified existing 
feelings of Arab humiliation.  Casajuana said that "we are 
extremely concerned" that public opinion in Spain and 
throughout Europe is so "terrible" regarding the US. 
Casajuana added, however, that Spain would play a positive, 
constructive role in the UNSC deliberations on the Iraq 
resolution. 
 
6.   (C) A/S Burns said that the US and Spain could work 
together on the Maghreb.  Casajuana said that Zapatero's 
April visit to Casablanca had been a success and that 
Zapatero had made it a top priority to put relations with 
Morocco "on a different track."    Morocco had followed up 
with a visit by the Interior Minister and the King's advisors 
to discuss security and counterterrorism issues.    Moratinos 
had already been to Algiers.  Casajuana confirmed that press 
reports on Zapatero,s visit had erroneously left the 
impression that Spain was backing away from the Baker plan. 
Casajuana said the GOS supported the Baker plan. 
 
7.  (C) A/S Burns noted that the US would have the 
opportunity to engage King Mohammed when he visits Washington 
in July.  Bouteflika will also visit Sea Island for the G-8 
Summit in June.  Burns noted that Special Envoy Baker remains 
actively engaged in mediation efforts between Morocco and 
Algeria.  Casajuana agreed and said that the US and Spain 
share the same goal of lessening tensions between Morocco and 
Algeria and that he looked forward to working together on 
this. 
 
Deputy Foreign Minister Bernardino Leon 
 
8.   (C) FM Moratinos was in Brussels during the visit of A/S 
Burns.   In place of Moratinos, Deputy FM Bernardino Leon 
hosted A/S Burns to a working lunch that included other 
members of the MFA team involved in Middle East and North 
African affairs.   Leon began the lunch with the Maghreb.  He 
noted that the Zapatero government seeks "equilibrium" in 
Spanish relations with Morocco and Algeria.  The Aznar 
government, having fallen out with Morocco, favored Algeria. 
The Zapatero government would seek to build on good relations 
with Algeria while working to significantly improve relations 
with Morocco. 
 
9.  (C) Leon said there had been no change in the Spanish 
position on Western Sahara despite media reports to the 
contrary.    The media had picked up on friendly comments 
Zapatero had made during his Casablanca visit in April and 
wrongly interpreted this as a change in GOS policy.   Leon 
said that Algeria had also felt that there had a been a 
change in policy and that he has had some "tough 
conversations" with Algerian counterparts. 
 
10.  (C) Leon said that with both Spain and Algeria in the 
UNSC there might be possibilities for progress on the Western 
Sahara impasse when the MINURSO mandate comes up once again 
for renewal in six months.  Leon said he looked forward to 
exchanging ideas with the US on this during the next six 
months.    He suggested that the US, France and Spain might 
work together on Western Sahara and on improving 
Algerian-Moroccan relations generally. 
 
11.  (C) A/S Burns said the USG welcomed the opportunity to 
work together with Spain in mending relations between Morocco 
and Algeria, and in making progress on Western Sahara.   A/S 
Burns reiterated that both King Mohammed and President 
Bouteflika would be in the US in the next few months, 
offering opportunities for engagement on this issue. 
 
12.  (C) On Libya, Leon said that he would likely visit there 
in the coming weeks.   Spain would continue to support 
Libya's renunciation of terrorism and WMD and its 
reintegration into the international community.   Leon said 
that Zapatero would not go to Libya any time soon, but that 
eventually he would be willing to travel there, as Aznar had 
done.  On Tunisia, Leon said that some repressive tactics by 
the government against the press were "of concern."  Leon 
noted that it was paradoxical that the Tunisian government 
would be heavy handed regarding freedom of speech given 
Tunisia's relative prosperity and good record on other rights 
issues. 
 
13.  (C) Turning to Israeli-Palestinian issues, Leon asked 
what topped the list of what the Palestinians need to 
deliver.   A/S Burns stressed the need, as outlined in the 
roadmap, for unity of Palestinian security forces and for 
cracking down on terrorists.   Leon said that Moratinos did 
not want to travel to the Middle East anytime soon. 
Moratinos is interested in moving away from the label of 
being Middle East focused.   He doesn't know Latin America, 
for example, and has to get smart on those issues.    Thus, 
Leon indicated he (Leon) would be the one focusing most 
closely on the Middle East for MFA and that he would "protect 
Miguel (Moratinos) for a while."  Leon said he had recently 
met with Arafat; he and Burns differed on the appropriate 
role for Arafat, as the U.S. continues to make clear that 
Arafat is not a viable partner. 
 
14.  (C) Leon stressed his interest in working with A/S Burns 
and the USG on these issues.   He said that EU budget support 
was critical for Arafat and the EU would use it as a lever. 
 If Israel withdraws completely from Gaza, the EU would 
pressure Arafat to make concessions, Leon said. 
 
15.  (C) Moving to Syria, Leon confirmed that Bashir Assad 
was likely to visit around June 1-2.  Leon said he would go 
to Damascus before Assad's visit to push for a serious agenda 
for the trip.   He said that if there was something the US 
wanted Spain to convey, "let us know." 
 
16.  (C) On a new UNSCR for Iraq, Leon said that we agree on 
the "main lines."   The Spanish side believes that "positions 
seem to be converging" and that there is widening consensus 
among EU partners.   Leon said Spain would play a 
constructive role in the UNSC on this issue and would not 
work on parallel tracks.  A/S Burns noted that the Russian 
idea for two resolutions had not caught fire with anyone. 
Leon said Spain was still examining the idea. 
 
17.   (C) Burns noted our continued desire for reform in the 
Middle East, and said that he hoped the Arab League summit 
(which Tunisian President Ben Ali had told him would be held) 
would endorse regional reform.  This remains an important 
project, which should focus on concrete steps and problems. 
Leon agreed, adding that Spain appreciated that the 
initiative would not supercede the Barcelona process; Burns 
noted the need for continued complementarity and said that 
the initiative was not meant to overtake other processes. 
Public Affairs 
18.  (C) A/S Burns had an on-the-record roundtable at the 
FRIDE think tank during his visit.   FRIDE has associations 
with FM Moratinos and the Socialist party.   In attendance 
were 30 prominent opinion leaders.  In addition, A/S Burns 
gave an interview to leading daily El Pais.   El Pais ran a 
favorable story about his visit on May 19, as did the 
conservative daily, ABC. 
 
Comment 
 
19.  (C) Casajuana and Leon were cordial and cooperative in 
their meetings with A/S Burns, as they have been in other 
early encounters we have had since they assumed office in 
April.  Despite the strong criticism of the US from the 
Socialist party, foreign policy interlocutors in the Zapatero 
government continue to express the desire to work closely 
with us.  Political optics are, however, paramount to 
Zapatero and his inner circle.   Regardless of the goodwill 
expressed by our foreign policy interlocutors, their room for 
maneuver is limited by the political considerations that are 
paramount right now in the Socialist government's strategy. 
 
20.  (U) NEA has cleared this message. 
ARGYROS 

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