US embassy cable - 04ANKARA2884

UNCLAS ANKARA 002884 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, MOPS, PHUM, PINR, ASEC, PTER, IZ, TU 
SUBJECT: Land mine attacks, hostile contact in Southeast 
Turkey continue 
 
REF: ANKARA 1717 
 
 
1.(U)  This cable is from AMCON ADANA. 
 
 
2.(SBU) Summary: Land mines have been featured in four 
security incidents presumed linked to KHK/Kongra Gel 
against Turkish Jandarma and Army forces since the 
beginning of May in southeast Turkey. This continues a 
trend seen since the first such attack this year on 
March 8 in Batman province. The recent casualty toll 
cannot be exactly determined, but is approximately 10- 
12 dead and wounded total.  End Summary. 
 
 
3.(SBU) There were two command-detonated land mine or 
land mine-like improvised explosive devices (IED) used 
in attacks against Turkish Jandarma and Army forces 
since the beginning of May. On the weekend of May 8-10, 
credible press reports generally corroborated by local 
contacts noted use of a probable remotely-detonated 
land mine or IED in the vicinity of Lice, Diyarbakir 
province, killing two Turkish security forces.  Later, 
on May 12, a Turkish armored vehicle was destroyed when 
it encountered a land mine or IED in the road. Local 
contacts say that it is not clear whether this attack 
was command-detonated or surface pressure-activated. 
 
 
4.(SBU) Meanwhile, in two recent security force 
investigations, landmines or IED were discovered, one 
in Sirnak province on or about May 1 and another 
involving alleged discovery of four C-4 explosive IED's 
in the road along the Pulumur-Tunceli highway. AMCON 
ADANA cannot independently determine whether C-4 was 
the actual explosive in the latter case. 
 
 
5.(SBU)  Who is initiating contact against whom 
sometimes is harder to determine in these cases.  Just 
prior to the para. 2 Lice attack, there had been an 
earlier skirmish between Jandarma and village guards 
against KHK/Kongra Gel on May 5.  Perhaps the Lice 
mine/IED attack was a reprisal for, or continuation of, 
that earlier contact.  In April and May, there have 
been larger scale, company- to battalion-sized Turkish 
security force (Jandarma/Army/Village guard) initiated 
efforts in Sirnak, Siirt and Bingol/Diyarbakir 
provinces (along this provincial border in high, rugged 
terrain).  Nevertheless, many of the mine or mine-like 
IED attacks seem to be at presumed KHK/Kongra Gel 
initiative, as are the recent Siirt police station 
raids. 
 
 
6.(SBU)  Local international community contacts in 
several eastern provinces who travel frequently in Van, 
Sirnak, Siirt and Hakkari provinces have told AMCON 
ADANA that they are shifting away from use of any 
vehicle which might be misconstrued as an official or 
non-local vehicle, preferring to use rather worn- 
appearing domestic vehicles for travel there. While 
they consider many of these attacks which they too 
consider to be remotely detonated mines or IED's, they 
are not sure 90's era exclusive KHK/Kongra Gel focus on 
Turkish security forces necessarily apply now.  Hakkari 
governorate official May 19-20 reference to an Iraqi- 
source fatwa giving authority to "international Iranian 
attackers from over the border" (Note: one of whom the 
press reports the Hakkari governate has in custody. End 
note.) to attack foreigners, Turkish government forces 
and infrastructure have also clouded the possible 
targeting picture, these contacts note. 
 
 
7.(U)  Baghdad minimize considered. 
 
 
EDELMAN