US embassy cable - 04BOGOTA5234

C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 005234 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE ALSO FOR P AND L 
AID/LAC ALSO FOR DEPUTY ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR KAREN 
HARBERT 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/22/2014 
TAGS: EAID, PHUM, PREL, PTER, CO, Demobilization 
SUBJECT: LEGAL AUTHORITY FOR USG SUPPORT TO DEMOBILIZATION 
PROCESS 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood, Reasons 1.5 (b) 
and (d). 
 
1.  (C) This is an Action Request:  Embassy Bogota requests 
that the Department urgently work with both DOJ and USAID to 
resolve legal ambiguities that inhibit our ability to support 
aspects of desertion and demobilization programs in Colombia. 
 In particular, we need a ruling on whether, and when, 
program assistance can be provided to a former member of a 
designated FTO who has voluntarily left the organization, is 
cooperating against it, and is participating in a program of 
peaceful re-insertion.  We also need clarification of our 
ability to provide assistance to peace verification programs 
(although these do not provide assistance to ex-combatants). 
 
2.  (C) This issue has been pending for some time.  President 
Uribe raised it with Secretary Powell in March, although the 
question pre-dates last February's inter-agency 
demobilization team visit by more than six months.  Recently, 
the issue took a step backward when the office of the AID 
General Counsel informed the embassy that it could "express 
no opinion on the legality... of assisting child 
ex-combatants" because "the legality of the USG assisting 
former members of the AUC, a designated foreign terrorist 
organization, under the AUC reintegration program is being 
considered by the Department of Justice and to date no 
opinion has been forthcoming."  In short, not only do we have 
no permission to provide assistance to motivate and support 
deserters or other voluntary demobilizations, but we no 
longer even have a clear picture on our long-standing 
assistance to ex-child soldiers. 
 
3.  (C) The issue became more urgent with the signing two 
weeks ago of a concentration agreement between the 
paramilitary leaders and the government.  Although we don't 
know where this will end up, the government hopes to 
concentrate and begin demobilizing an additional 5,000 
paramilitaries before the end of the year, in addition to the 
4,000 or so deserters who presently are languishing at great 
expense in government-provided housing. 
 
4.  (C) Government preparations for concentration and 
demobilization have improved, but are still not where they 
should be.  During the February inter-agency visit, the 
government provided its demobilization and reincorporation 
plan, which has since been refined.  We would like to do 
more, not only in the planning, but also in the 
implementation phase. 
 
5.  (C) We understand that this is a tough question.  But, as 
we understand it, because there has been no formal FTO 
designation in the case of the Baath party or the Republican 
National Guard, the Taliban, the RUF, and certain Mideast 
organizations, Colombia must be the test case.  We completely 
support the FTO designations of the FARC, ELN, and AUC in 
Colombia.  The current legal uncertainty acts, however, not 
as a constraint on terrorists, but on the ability of the U.S. 
to pursue anti-terror polices in Colombia:  to motivate 
desertions and demobilizations (with concurrent provision of 
first-rate intelligence on terror groups), to meet genuine 
humanitarian needs of child soldiers and the families of 
deserters and the demobilized, and to build a structure that 
can lead to reinsertion and a return to legitimate life for 
those involved in the conflict who want to find an 
alternative.  By impeding demobilization, we are also 
impeding application of the draft law on justice and 
compensation, which the U.S. largely supports, and which 
provides for incarceration of and restitution by those guilty 
of serious violent crimes. 
 
6.  (C) A related question is our ability to assist in the 
monitoring of compliance with concentration and 
demobilization.  On this, the USAID General Counsel said 
that: &monitoring of these types of programs to ensure that 
ex-combatants do not return to terrorist activity raises 
serious questions as well."  The OAS verification mission 
needs, and deserves our support. 
WOOD