US embassy cable - 04MADRID1870

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SPAIN: ZAPATERO'S CHIEF OF STAFF ON AFGHANISTAN

Identifier: 04MADRID1870
Wikileaks: View 04MADRID1870 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Madrid
Created: 2004-05-21 14:47:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL PGOV SP NATO American
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L MADRID 001870 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/21/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, SP, NATO, American - Spanish Relations 
SUBJECT: SPAIN: ZAPATERO'S CHIEF OF STAFF ON AFGHANISTAN 
 
 
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission J. Robert Manzanares, 
reasons 1.4(b) and (d). 
 
1.  (C) Summary:  DCM Manzanares met May 18 with Jose Enrique 
Serrano, President Zapatero's chief of staff.  Serrano said 
the Zapatero government planned to maintain the same 
excellent relations other Spanish governments have had with 
the U.S. since the administration of Socialist president 
Felipe Gonzalez.  Serrano said the GOS likely would make a 
decision on increased participation in Afghanistan and 
assistance to Haiti in the next week or so, but would not 
announce it until after the June 13 European parliamentary 
elections (several days later, Zapatero,s foreign policy 
advisor, who works for Serrano, said even a decision on 
Afghanistan would not be made until after June 13, see 
septel).  With respect to Afghanistan, he said that in light 
of the June 13 European parliamentary elections, the 
government had to be careful on timing to avoid making it 
appear to the public that Spain was simply trading troops in 
Iraq for an increased presence in Afghanistan.  The Zapatero 
government was looking at an increase of about 200 or so 
troops in Afghanistan.  Serrano was aware of our desire for 
more.  On Haiti, GOS is considering the options of providing 
police or troops, but again would have to prime public 
opinion because the Spanish people have little grasp of the 
situation in Haiti.  End summary. 
 
2.  (C)  Serrano, an important contact of the Embassy's 
before assuming his current position, said the Zapatero 
government has every intention of maintaining excellent 
relations with the U.S.  Like many of our new Zapatero 
government interlocutors, Serrano pointed to the very good 
relations the last Socialist president, Felipe Gonzalez, had 
with the U.S. and said Zapatero would aim for relations as 
good or better than those that Gonzalez maintained.  Serrano 
in fact had held the same post during the Gonzalez 
administration.  He recalled that despite difficult moments 
such as the Spanish referendum on NATO membership and 
negotiations to terminate the U.S. presence at Torrejon Air 
Base near Madrid, ties with the USG remained good during this 
period, and under Felipe Gonzalez, Spain had joined the 
coalition in the first Iraq war in 1991 to evict Iraq from 
Kuwait. 
 
3.  (C) Serrano said the GOS would not be able to announce an 
increase in its presence in Afghanistan before the June 13 
European Parliament elections, although the president might 
actually make the decision earlier, perhaps in the next week. 
 DCM emphasized the importance of announcing a decision 
before the NATO Summit in Istanbul.  Serrano understood but 
said that given the importance to the Zapatero government of 
winning the June 13 elections handily, it would be difficult 
to announce a decision much before the Summit.  He emphasized 
Spain's Iraq contingent will have completely returned to 
Spain by May 27, and the government simply could not risk 
making it look to the public like troops were returning from 
Iraq only to turn around and head for Afghanistan. 
 
4.    DCM said that the USG, after having expressed its 
disappointment with the Iraq troop withdrawal decision, wants 
to move forward with the GOS and wanted to find concrete, 
visible areas of cooperation.  A robust increase in 
Afghanistan would be an important signal, the DCM stressed. 
 
5.  (C) Comment:  Serrano echoed what we have heard from 
other GOS officials:  the Zapatero government wants to 
maintain tight relations with the U.S.  He understood the 
U.S. is expecting to see actions to back up the government's 
words and gave us positive signals on Afghanistan.  We expect 
Spain to increase modestly its contingent in Afghanistan, 
although the GOS will not likely announce its increase until 
after the June 13 elections. 
ARGYROS 

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