US embassy cable - 04THEHAGUE1240

C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 001240 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/20/2014 
TAGS: MARR, MOPS, AF, NL, NATO 
SUBJECT: NATO-AFGHANISTAN:  DUTCH STAND FIRM ON GOING TO 
BAGHLAN 
 
REF: A. STATE 111287 
 
     B. THE HAGUE 1210 (NOTAL) 
 
Classified By: CLASSIFIED BY CHARGE DANIEL R. RUSSEL FOR REASONS 1.5 (B 
 AND D) 
 
1.  (C) In recent conversations with FM Bot, PM Foreign 
Policy Advisor Swartbol, and CHOD ADM Kroon, Amb. Sobel 
discussed request (outlined in ref A) for the Dutch to 
consider leading a PRT in western Afghanistan instead of 
Baghlan.  PolMilOff separately raised ref A points with MFA 
Security Policy Operations Chief Rob Gabrielse on May 19. 
The GONL remains firm, however, in its determination to lead 
a PRT in Baghlan.  Following discussions with his German 
counterpart on May 17, Minister of Defense Kamp publicly 
announced that the Dutch will go to Baghlan and that this 
would be the only PRT the Netherlands would lead.  MFA 
sources claim Struck "agreed with the Netherlands going to 
Baghlan."  MFA contacts advise that the Germans are viewed as 
trusted partners by the Dutch parliament, which will 
facilitate the GONL's efforts to gain parliamentary support. 
Contacts also noted that PM Balkenende and Chancellor 
Schroeder agreed in April to pursue Dutch-German cooperation 
in Afghanistan. 
 
2.  (C) Comment:  There are strong domestic political 
arguments behind the Dutch preference for Baghlan.  As noted 
ref B, the GONL is currently preoccupied with renewing the 
deployment of its approximately 1300 troops (whose regularly 
scheduled six month rotation is set to expire July 15) in 
Iraq.  This is not yet a done deal, and some members of the 
governing coalition have expressed public doubts about the 
wisdom of an extension.  Dutch governments always prefer to 
make military deployments backed by the broadest possible 
political consensus.  Given that the Iraq decision may well 
be divisive, the Balkenende government would prefer to make 
the PRT case as non-controversial as possible.  In addition 
to the political advantages of working in proximity to the 
German operation in Konduz, the Dutch are, as always, focused 
on having very clearly defined medevac and in extremis 
support arrangements (a legacy of their 1995 fiasco in 
Srebrenica).  MFA sources note that the fact that the Dutch 
Apache helicopters currently flying ISAF support out of Kabul 
could also reach Baghlan would be useful in parliamentary 
debate.  In view of these factors, a deployment to Baghlan, 
between Kabul and the German-led PRT in Konduz, would be a 
much easier sell for the GONL in parliament.  End comment. 
RUSSEL